




No. 3. August 1914

The CANDID Quarterly Review of Public Affairs: Political, Scientific, Social and Literary.

Conducted by Thomas Gibson Bowles.

CONTENTS.



The Cabinet
Our Place in the World
Naval Training. *The Selborne-Fisher System*
The Caucus and the Sale of Honours. *Revolt and Remedies*
The English Way. *Old and New*
The Alleged British Empire
The City as Peace Compeller. *Mr Norman Angell*
A Gentleman's Agreement. *The Panama Canal Tolls*
A Privileged Caste. *The Trade Disputes Act, 1906*
A Lesson from Leeds. "*All or Nowt*"—"Nowt"
Changes of Climate. *The Glacial Epoch Explained*
Our Daily Bread. *The All-English Loaf*
National Finance, 1914.
The Budget. False Accounts. The New Taxation
The Political Situation. *Home Rule—so far*
Bob

Published by Frederick Henry Garratt at 26 Maiden Lane, London, W.C.

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THE CABINET

“For which Inconveniencies, the Doctrine
“of Italy, and Practice of France, in some
“Kings times, hath introduced Cabinet
“Counsels; a Remedy worse than the
“Disease.”

(Bacon's *Essayes or Counsels Civill and
Morall*, XX, of “Counsell.”)

AMONG the strange contradictions and paradoxes of the actual system of English government, none is stranger than the Cabinet, none harder to fit in with any coherent or logical conception of the Constitution. It is unknown to the Law. No instrument appoints it. It has no place of meeting, no quorum, no method of procedure, no record of its own proceedings, no acknowledged powers or duties, no recognized position or authority of any kind; not one of the marks or signs whereby any power in the State is known or asserted. It is not, like the King, an ancient elementary institution preserved to modern times. It is not, like the Parliament, a body developed out of a previously existing body, with changes adapted to changing circumstances. It is not in any sense the People, which were before Kings or Parliaments, and which long governed themselves in their own neighbourhoods without either. It is outside all these foundations of authority, and rests upon no one of them. Yet this unknown, untraditional, unrecognized body to-day exercises the chief power in the State, dictates all policy, takes all action, silences Parliaments, and claims the right to coerce even the King himself.

To take counsel first, and to act afterwards, has always been the English rule. To interpose between the individual

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in authority and his acts, a council of some sort has always been the method. "The wisdom of the Crown," says Nathaniel Bacon in 1650, "is not intended to rest in one person, but in the counsels of many, who are equally wise, whether the person of the King be old or young." Hence the King's Council, which is as old as the Monarchy and as essential a part of it as the King himself. From the earliest times, in all his Kingly acts, the King has been advised by the Great Common Council of the Kingdom which became the Parliament, and, later on, from at least the thirteenth century, by his own personal Privy Council, sworn to advise him to the best of their discretion, to keep his counsel secret, and to assist in the execution of what the Council had determined. The King, on the other hand, was to "allow the Council to exercise their discretion in the Government of the Kingdom, and to give them audience whenever they wished to communicate with him."* Of this latter Council the records exist from the end of the fourteenth century, though it is said not to have assumed the name of Privy Council till the beginning of the fifteenth century. The style and title, however, matter little, for the Council had then, in fact, existed for two hundred years.

The "sad and grave" Council promised by Henry VI to his Parliament after Cade's rising in 1450, was the Privy Council, composed of the "sworn and notorious counsellors" of the King, bound by an oath of secrecy and fidelity, having their Clerk of the Council and Book of Record. This is the Council by and with whose advice, and not otherwise, the things of State were and are to be done by the King.

Yet the King has never been less than a King. In all his Councils the last word has always lain with him. In the Parliament, indeed, where he met his people, both the first and last words have always been his. He alone could convoke

* Parliamentary regulations of 1406. Proceedings of Privy Council, i, 295-298, quoted in Dicey's *Privy Council*, p. 32.

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it. He alone could dissolve it. He alone could ask it for those supplies of money the need for which rendered its convocation necessary. He alone could finally decide to give or withhold his assent to the petitions of the subject for redress of grievances presented to him in the form of bills, and could thereby make or refuse to make them into Acts of Parliament, binding on all, including himself. In his Privy Council he had even greater importance. He presided over it. He was the principal figure in it—for it was strictly only “the King in Council.” His pleasure was ascertained before anything affecting himself was brought into question. He took part in its deliberations, as he did not in those of Parliament. For its members were not, as were those of the Parliament, the representatives and attorneys of all his people, seeking that which was good for them, and getting as much as they could of it in return for supplies of money; they were the personal advisers of the King, sworn to advise him as to what was personally good for him and his successors. The good of the Kingdom was assuredly not disregarded either by the People in Parliament or by the King in Council, yet the immediate purpose of each was not that of the other, was often, indeed, quite opposed to it.

There was not only the King in Council; there was, and there still is, the King in person, with vast personal powers, many of which he could, and some of which he must, exercise, after taking advice, at his own discretion, and in the last resort upon his own personal judgment. The power of calling or dissolving Parliament has already been mentioned; it is perhaps the greatest of all; it is wholly in the hands of the King; and upon its prudent exercise the fate of King and Kingdom together has depended, and will depend again. The power of choosing his own Privy Councillors is the King's, actually as well as nominally, exercisable at his discretion, on his own judgment, after or without advice. And it is to be remembered that whenever

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there is more than one counsellor advice may—nay, invariably does—differ. One counsellor advises one way, another the opposite way; and between them the King at last must decide. There is nobody else to do it. Nay, since in differing advices he must reject one, he may, as undeniably, reject both and take a third course. He must exercise his judgment. That is his duty as well as his right. There is none to command the King, except only the Law, to which he is as much bound as the meanest of his subjects. Outside the Law, indeed, he may not—nay, he cannot—go; but within that there is no command to be given to him which he must obey, but only advice which he may or may not accept, according to that discretion and judgment which he is intended and expected to exercise.

There are, moreover, occasions when the King is left quite alone, without any advice whatever. And some such are of infinite importance. Such is the occasion of the resignation of a Minister, or his dismissal, which is strictly and undeniably an act within the King's power. When that has occurred—which is often in any single reign—to whom is the King to go for advice? There is no Minister to give it, not so much as an Under Secretary, since all the Ministry is gone together. Yet the King's Government must be carried on, and the King must find somebody to carry it on. That necessity he cannot avoid. He must send for somebody to form a new administration.

Formerly, when Party spirit was less cruel and unscrupulous, the Monarch might, at a pinch, and did, upon occasion, ask the opinion of the dismissed or resigned Minister as to the proper person to be sent for. That was always a step of doubtful propriety and regularity, but it was sometimes possible to take it as an expedient. It would not be possible now. The exaggeration and exacerbation of Party spirit would forbid it. The outgoing Minister regards all those of the opposite Party as his personal enemies, as traitors to the State, given up to their own interests, corrupt villains, certain to dishonour and ruin

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the country. In his opinion the best choice among them would be the one least able to maintain himself, and least likely therefore to achieve that dishonour and ruin. On every ground he must—if asked his opinion—advise that that one and no other shall be sent for. Otherwise he would manifestly fail in his duty to his King and to his country; above all he would fail in his duty to his Party. Since, through no fault of their own, but because of lying, misrepresentation or the precession of the equinoxes, the innocent lambs have been cast out, and ravening wolves are to be admitted to the fold, the most elementary duty is to advise the choice of the most toothless—of the wolf least likely to raven for any considerable period, and most likely to fall before a renewed assault of the lambs upon their own proper fold. The outgone Minister, in short, could not be trusted to give, in such a matter, honest advice, taking sole account of the interest of the King and the country, understood otherwise than as being identical with the interest of his own Party. In which circumstances, and with the consciousness that they are known to all, he would probably, if asked for his own opinion or advice, at least have the decency and prudence to refrain from expressing any opinion or offering any advice at all.

Who, then, is to decide and to act? There is nobody but the King alone. He alone it is who must choose for whom to send, and if, as has often happened, the person sent for fails to form an administration, then whom next to send for. This suffices to shew that the King has a duty of his own and a part of his own to play quite apart from any Ministerial advice; that he is a King, and not merely, as some have pretended, an instrument of the Minister. And if, in this momentous decision, he must use his own discretion and judgment in the performance of his own duty, it is also the case with the decision—no less momentous—on a dissolution of Parliament. Since Parliament is by law appointed to exist for a given term of years, its dissolution before the end of that term is a very grave act, almost an

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act of violence, in which the Monarch is only justified by the most serious considerations. For a dissolution of Parliament otherwise than by the effusion of time is in effect an expression of the King's decision that the Parliament is so inadequate, incompetent, perverse, or out of correspondence with the national will, that he cannot allow it to live out its statutory life, but must put it to an immediate and violent death. And inasmuch as the sovereign power resides in the Parliament—in the King and the two Houses—a dissolution is in effect the dismissal by one element of the sovereignty of the next most powerful of the other two elements. The Power of dismissal is unquestionable and most necessary. It is one of the ultimate resources of the Constitution only to be resorted to in the most extreme cases. And it is the function of the King in Person.

“ ‘The sovereign,’ says a great authority,* ‘ought by no means to be a passive instrument in the hands of his ministers; it is not merely his right, but his duty, to exercise his judgment on the advice they may tender to him.’ ”

To turn to the King in Council. It is when sitting in and acting “by and with the Advice of his Privy Council” that the Monarch appears in his greatest splendour, his highest dignity, his widest authority. Here it is that his great Acts of State are intended to be performed, his course in affairs of State treated and settled, foreign policy debated, negotiations directed with foreign powers, the judicial powers of the prerogative exercised, or proclamations authorized. In Anglo-Saxon days, thrice in the year, at Winchester each Christmas and Easter, and at Westminster

* Wellington in *Peel's Memoirs*, b. 2, p. 400, and Grey, *Parl. Govt.*, new ed., p. 80, quoted in *Parliamentary Government in England*, by Alpheus Todd—second edition. Longmans, Green & Co., 1888-9. Vol. II, pp. 509-510.

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each Whitsuntide, the King wore his crown before his people, and by that emblem announced and affirmed his regal power and authority. So in later days he wore the Privy Council which associated with him "the counsels of many" in the exercise of that authority.

In the Lancastrian times the Privy Council consisted of from nine (in 1410) to forty members, the usual number being from fifteen to twenty. The quorum was then fixed at "six or at the least four," but in 1422 it was ordered that "in all great matters that shall pass by council, all be present or else the more part"* which is as well the reasonable rule as the old English rule, whether for Council or for Parliament. The members of the Council were appointed by the King, yet in 1404, 1406, and 1416 Henry IV agreed that they should be nominated in Parliament, and in the minority of Henry VI, up to 1437, they were not only nominated in but were appointed by Parliament,† which indicates that for thirty-three years in the fifteenth century there existed even more formally and avowedly than now a strict Parliamentary Government. From 1437, however, the King nominated the Council himself,‡ and has done so ever since.

Clarendon says:

"The truth is, the sinking and near desperate condition of Monarchy in this Kingdom can never be buoy'd up, but by a prudent and steady Council attending upon the virtue and vivacity of the King; nor be preserved and improved when it is up, but by cherishing and preserving the wisdom, integrity, dignity and reputation of that Council: the lustre whereof always reflects upon the King himself: who is not thought a Great Monarch when he follows only his own Reason and Appetite; but when, for the informing his Reason, and guiding his Actions, he uses the service, industry and faculties of the Wisest men."§

* *The Governance of England*, by Sir John Fortescue. Revised text, edited by C. Plummer, M.A. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1885, pp. 296-297.

† *Ibid.*

‡ *The Constitutional History of England*, Stubbs, Vol. III, pp. 254-257.

§ Clarendon's *History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England*, Vol. I, Book III, p. 197. Oxford, 1707.

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This is the account and justification of the Privy Council, written during the retirement and impartiality of exile, by one of the ablest statesmen England has produced, whose temper and worth had been tried as much as any man's that ever lived.

It is as true now when the Privy Council has been practically abolished and relegated to mere formalities, as it was in the year 1641 whereof Clarendon wrote.

But into all human institutions creep error and abuse. The Privy Council had gradually developed what was originally a remedial Court of Equity jurisdiction into an abusive secret tribunal which became intolerable and was very rightly ended. So early as the fifteenth century, in the reign of Henry VI, the proceedings of the Privy Council record* that its sittings were held in that "Starred Chamber" which was two centuries later to give its name to what had then become a detested Court, exercising odious authority rather resembling that of the Spanish Inquisition than anything known to English tradition, and including the exercise of torture and a censure of the press. In 1640 it was declared by Act of Parliament† of "the Court commonly called the Star Chamber" that "the proceedings, censures, and decrees of that court have by experience been found to be an intolerable burthen to the subjects and the means to introduce an arbitrary power of government, and contrary to the law of the land and the rights and privileges of the subject," wherefore the Court "and all jurisdiction power and authority belonging unto or exercised in the same Court" was clearly and absolutely "dissolved taken away and determined." This Court of Star-Chamber was indeed only an excrescence which had grown up upon the Privy Council, in usurpation of the functions and authority of the King's Courts. It was

* Proceedings of Privy Council, III, 231 to 243 (quoted by Dicey).

† 16 Charles I, cap. 10.

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no essential part of the Council itself; and when the excrescence had been, very properly, removed and the usurpation of two centuries ended, the Privy Council remained what it properly was, a grave and reverend body of men sworn to advise the King in affairs of State.

Next came the far greater abuse of the Cabinet Council which subsists to this day.

From all time it has been found that whenever any body of men are brought together for consultation and counsel, there are invariably discovered amongst them a few who, either because they are conscious of more ability or because they are more astute and less loyal than their fellows of the council, come secretly together apart from it, become a council within the council, and seek to dominate it, and in effect to destroy it.

An insidious complaint was made of the Privy Council, which gave to such men their opportunity. It is thus described by Clarendon:

“By this means the Number hath been increased, which
“in itself breeds great Inconveniences; since a Less number
“are fitter both for Council and Dispatch, in matters of
“the greatest moment, that depend upon a quick execu-
“tion, than a greater number of men equally honest and
“wise: and for That, and other reasons of Unaptness and
“Incompetency, Committees of dextrous men have been
“appointed out of the Table to do the business of it: and
“so men have been no sooner exalted with the Honourable
“title, and pleased with the obligation of being made
“Privy-Counsellors, than they have check’d that delight
“with discerning that they were not fully trusted.”*

A greater than Clarendon had already anticipated this complaint, and had answered it. Lord Chancellor Bacon, writing in 1620, had said:

“Let us now speak of the Inconveniences of Counsell,
“and of the Remedies. The Inconveniences, that have

* Clarendon's *History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England*, Vol. 1, Book III, pp. 196-197. Oxford, 1707.

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“been noted in calling, and using Counsell, are three. “First, the Revealing of Affaires, whereby they become “lesse Secret. Secondly, the Weakning of the Authority “of Princes, as if they were lesse of Themselves. Thirdly, “the Danger of being unfaithfully counselled, and more “for the good of them that counsell, than of him that is “counselled. For which inconveniences, the Doctrine of “Italy, and Practise of France, in some Kings times, “hath introduced Cabinet Counsels; a Remedy worse “than the Disease.”*

“The Doctrine of Italy, and Practise of France,” were no part of the traditions of England. Yet within fifty years they were to be transplanted to our soil. They were cultivated at first rather as exotic hothouse plants, not to be trusted in the free, open air of these islands. Nor was it until our own times, late in the nineteenth century, that to the Doctrine of Italy and Practice of France was added the Vice of America in the shape of the Caucus. That was the mordant that fixed the dye of Faction upon all. To that we owe the final development and exaggeration of the mischiefs of unfaithful counsel always latent in the Cabinet system. From that, if release can be found, we may once again emerge to safety.

What has always distinguished the Cabinet from all other bodies of State of any kind is, above all, the deceptions practised upon the major part of its members by some two or three of them. The members of the Cabinet are supposed one and all to be in the innermost secrets of State, to be at one in the motives at the bottom of every important act of State, and to be so wholly agreed that the act of one is the act of all, and that as each one of them is responsible for all, so are all responsible for each one. There is in fact no truth in those suppositions. They are all convenient constitutional fictions invented afterward to give a semblance of propriety

* Bacon's *Essayes or Counsels Civill and Morall*, XX, “of Counsell,” pp. 74-75. J. M. Dent, London, 1897.

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to the Cabinet, and to persuade men that, however irregular, and even astonishing it may be in its constitution and character, the Cabinet is not only a part of the Constitution, but a most necessary and wholesome element thereof. None of which is in fact true.

Perfection indeed is not to be expected either in any Constitution as a whole, or in any one of the institutions whereon it reposes. The test of each is whether, on the whole, it works well in the country and for the men for whom it is provided. Every constitutional institution and practice begins as a rule in a device adopted for the sake of its practical convenience and most often as a compromise between two opposing principles; and the device is not to be condemned only because it is faulty in theory, unsymmetrical or incapable of being logically justified. Least of all is it to be condemned when, as in our case, the Constitution and the institutions alike have been built up stone by stone according to the ideas of the time, and always with a reserved power of removing any stone that subsequent experience might prove to be unsuitable, and of putting another in its place. Most of our most valued and useful political institutions have been thus arrived at. They have not been adopted as the logical and symmetrical sequence of an existing principle, but rather in order so to escape from principle as to enable us to live comfortably in practice. They have rather happened than been contrived.

Subjected then to the sound principle of Trial and Error, they have been developed and altered as occasion and necessity dictated. That is the history of Parliament and of the representative system in general. That is the history, too, of the Royal Prerogative, and of the doctrine, held in England alone of all countries in the world that, whoever may be King *de jure*, full obedience is due to the King *de facto*. Each institution has been valued, not for its appropriateness as a part of a symmetrical system, justifiable because a part of the system, but for its practical uses. The tree has been judged by its fruits, nor has any fear of spoil-

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ing the plan of the orchard ever prevented us from tearing up or cutting down a tree found on trial to give evil fruit, or from planting another tree in its place.

If, judged by this test, the Cabinet is found on the whole to have worked well; if it has been found, on the whole, to be a body animated by public spirit, shewing an honest desire to order all things under its control for the public good, selecting the policy, and holding the conduct which a sole regard for the welfare of the State as a whole pointed out as the best; if its policy, plan and conduct have in fact, wherever we can trace them, conduced on the whole to that welfare—then indeed we may overlook its irregularity and informality, however great these may be, and may regard this strange excrescence upon the Constitution as one to be not only accepted but continued as it exists. If, on the other hand, we find that it has not worked well; that public spirit is very rarely found even present, and still more rarely predominant in its counsels; if the real desire in all its deliberations is to order all things for the benefit not of the State but of a Party; if it is found that even the benefit of that Party is sacrificed to the personal benefit of the fifteen or twenty men who compose the Cabinet, and even to the personal advantage of two or three out of the fifteen or twenty; and if finally we find that, in the plurality of cases in which we can trace its action, that action has brought discredit and dishonour to the country—then it will only remain to acknowledge the evils of this strange accident in the State, and to consider how the Cabinet can either be destroyed or replaced by something better, or at least how it may be so modified as to remove its dangers.

Which of these two conclusions must commend itself to a reasonable mind will be apparent from an array of the facts about Cabinets which the efflux of time, and the priceless “Indiscretions” of Cabinet Ministers have brought within our knowledge. Those facts will suffice. They are, indeed, not complete. For the Cabinet system is so contrived, of set purpose, as to render all but impossible in the present, and

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nearly impossible even in a remote future, the revelation of all that has actually passed in the secret and unrecorded deliberations of a conclave whose interests and whose power depend on the maintenance of secrecy. But at certain intervals certain revelations have been made which, if due attention be given to them, disclose at once the essential character of the Cabinet, its most dangerous defects as a Council of State, and the mischiefs which have thence resulted.

The history of the Cabinet can only be told summarily. It is the modern mistletoe that has grown on the ancient Privy Council.

The introduction of the Cabinet Council took place in 1667, Charles II had then been seven years on the throne. He was at odds with his Parliament. He had quarrelled with his faithful minister, Clarendon, and in August, 1667, had dismissed him as a preliminary to the exile which followed three months later, and to which we owe the monumental *History of the Great Rebellion*. Clarendon was succeeded by five as bad men as ever exercised power in England. These were Clifford, Arlington, Buckingham, Ashley and Lauderdale. The initials of their names formed the word "Cabal," by which they were at once designated. The Cabal was the first English Cabinet.

The Cabinet of five was professedly founded on the pretence that the Privy Council, then numbering fifty, was too large a body for the dispatch and the secrecy needed for Affairs of State. With fifty councillors it was said, each councillor having probably a wife and certainly a friend, secrets must leak out, and in many cases many minds were so many causes of delay. Those inconveniences would be removed by setting up a Cabinet of five who should be trusted with all, know all, do all promptly, and keep all secret.

Never was expectation more promptly deceived. No

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sooner was the first Cabinet appointed than it was found that it also was too large. Charles II desired to rule as nearly as possible like Louis XIV. He was a Roman Catholic, and wished to put himself in such a position as would enable him safely to avow his religion, by the shameful expedient of accepting a pension from the French King, together with a promise of a French army to coerce and to defend himself against his own sturdily Protestant subjects. He at once found that even five were too many for the secrecy and dispatch so nefarious a plan required. He gave his complete confidence, therefore, to two alone of them, to Clifford and to Arlington, themselves eager Roman Catholics, and he employed their willing services to deceive and betray their three colleagues. They two alone were admitted to "the great secret," which was concealed from the rest, of the plan for the infamous Treaty of Dover, signed in May, 1670, whereby Charles undertook to declare himself a Roman Catholic, and Louis to assist him against his subjects with £200,000 and 6,000 French soldiers, while the two monarchs undertook to join together for the destruction of the Netherlands United Provinces and the furtherance of Bourbon interests in Spain. Clifford and Arlington alone knew of the treaty and put their names to it. For their three colleagues they caused to be prepared a false treaty in which the essential article concerning religion was omitted. Thus, the deception of their own Cabinet Colleagues was the very first thing by which the treacherous pair marked the first Cabinet.

The deception of colleagues and the withholding by one or two in the Cabinet of all important plans and information has been the mark of Cabinet Government from that day to this.

Well did that first of all Cabinet Councils deserve the judgment passed upon it by Macaulay:

"The Cabal, holding power at a time when our government was in a state of transition, united in itself two different kinds of vices belonging to two different ages

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“and to two different systems. As those five evil counsellors were among the last English statesmen who seriously thought of destroying the parliament, so they were the first English statesmen who attempted extensively to corrupt it. We find in their policy at once the latest trace of the Thorough of Stafford, and the earliest trace of that methodical bribery which was afterwards practised by Walpole.”*

These were the men—Clifford chief among them—who in January, 1672, and because sufficient money had not been obtained from Parliament, effected what was known as the “Stop of the Exchequer,” or in other words repudiated the payment of the interest on loans advanced by the London bankers, and robbed these bankers of nearly a million and a half of money. These, too, were the men who deliberately set about to corrupt the Pensioner Parliament, which was only too ready to be corrupted.

“The Constitution of this Parliament, that had lasted seventeen years (and was to last yet another), was grown into two known Factions, that of Court and Country. The Court-Party were grown numerous, by a Practice introduced by my Lord Clifford, of downright buying off one Man after another, as they could make the Bargain.”†

For these and all their other infamies they were duly rewarded. Clifford was made a baron; Ashley was made Earl of Shaftesbury; Arlington received an earldom and the Garter, and Lauderdale the Garter and another earldom.

The little clique of five, mastered and deceived by two, thenceforth not only usurped the functions of the Privy Council, but pretended to be that Council, with all its powers and without any of its safeguards. The book of the Council, with its record, was thrown aside, so that none should ever know what the Cabinet had done or who had done it. All that ensured its honesty or accountability was repudiated. But the Privy Council oath, which was intended

* Macaulay's *History of England*. Third edition, Vol. I, p. 214.

† *The Life of Sir W. Temple*, Bt. London, 1714, p. 291.

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to bind the Privy Councillors to the King, was retained in order to bind the Cabinet Councillors to each other. The old form of summons was likewise retained. The only difference was—and it was immense—that the Messenger enjoined to “acquaint the Lords and others of His Majesty’s “Most Honourable Privy Council, that a Council is appointed to meet at the Court at ” such and such a place, was now instructed to acquaint of this only such of the Lords and others of the Council as were of the Cabinet Council. No others received any summons. It was as though writs should be issued for a general election to Parliament only to those constituencies which return members pledged to support the Government. It was a mean and monstrous trick; but it sufficed. It restricted the fifty to five; it put aside the Privy Council and replaced it by the Cabinet Council. And the Cabinet which had superseded and usurped the powers of the Council went on from that day pretending to be the Council itself.

Yet, at perhaps the most momentous crisis of our modern history, the trick failed; and only because of that failure the nation escaped, at the very last moment, a restoration of the Stuarts and the civil war which would thence undoubtedly have resulted. Queen Anne was well disposed to the banished Stuarts. The Cabinet Council, dominated by Bolingbroke, whose rival Lord Oxford had just been deprived (on the 27th July) of his office, was in favour of the Pretender, prepared, and so far as is known, absolutely decided to call him over at the death of the Queen, then stricken down by what was expected to be, as it proved, a fatal illness. On the 30th July, 1714, the Cabinet Council was assembled at eight in the morning, at the Cockpit in Whitehall, and on learning that the Queen’s situation was desperate, adjourned to Kensington. Bolingbroke’s friends and supporters, Buckingham and Wyndham, were, by accident or by design, absent. Suddenly the door

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of the Council chamber was opened, and the Dukes of Shrewsbury and Argyle, members of the Privy Council, though not of the Cabinet, “went into the Council Chamber, as their Graces had a right to do, being Lords of the “Council,”* and announced that, although not summoned, they deemed it their duty to offer, in this great crisis, their counsel and advice. The Duke of Shrewsbury, who in Buckingham’s absence presided over the Cabinet Council, and who probably knew of his two fellow dukes’ intention to attend, welcomed them with thanks. The whole scene changed. Bolingbroke and his friends the supporters of the Pretender were taken by surprise, and being unprepared were cowed and stunned. They at once affected zeal for the Protestant succession. Bolingbroke himself proposed that the Queen should be advised to appoint the Duke of Shrewsbury to the post of Lord Treasurer in place of Oxford, recently deprived of the White Staff, and Argyle and Somerset then proposed that the whole Privy Council should be summoned. That Council instantly blew to the winds the conspiracies of the Cabinet, called up troops and secured beyond question the exclusion of the Pretender and the peaceful accession of the House of Hanover in the person of George I. Bolingbroke’s commentary on the amazing adventure is recorded in his letter to Swift of four days later:—“The Earl of Oxford was removed on Tuesday—the Queen died on Saturday! What a world is this, and “how does Fortune banter us!”

The incident shows more clearly than any yet known to us the terrible danger to the country of allowing its affairs to be governed by a secret conclave of conspirators of one party, masquerading in the splendid robes of the Privy Council, and excluding from their conspiracy all those members of the Council not previously gained to the conspiracy.

For once, then, the trick of summoning only those of the Privy Council who had been chosen into the Cabinet

* Oldmixon’s *History of England*, 1735 (p. 560).

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Council had failed. It had been defeated by the unsummoned advent of the two Dukes; and this advent it was that alone saved the country from civil war. Perhaps in a crisis of similar urgency the same trick may again be defeated by the same means.

Despite this notable check given to the Cabinet Council, it was too convenient to the Ministry to be abandoned. George I knew no more of the English Constitution than of the English language. Lord Townshend assumed the position of Prime Minister, with Walpole as his colleague in a Whig ministry, and the Cabinet Council, continued as before, was not weakened but strengthened for its own purposes by the new practice now introduced and ever since continued, of excluding the Monarch from its deliberations—over which Queen Anne had always presided. Thus, for two hundred years the effectual rule has been in the hands of a Party Cabal unknown to the Constitution, unsanctioned by the law, and so constituted as to be pledged to act, first of all and above all, in the sole interests of the Party for which it acts.

It might reasonably be expected that the members of a Cabinet Council banded together to secure the retention by their Party of power and by themselves of Place, Pay and Honours, would at least, however untrue to such interests of the country as might hamper their action, be true to themselves. But that has never been the case. Every glimpse we get of Cabinets shows that, on the contrary, treachery between its members has marked every Cabinet of which we authentically know anything. The business of Politics is perhaps of all the most highly competitive. It is also the most personal. The conception of political struggle presented to the world as that of a conflict of principles between two Parties is well known to those engaged in the struggle to be a wholly false conception. The true conflict is between members of the same

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Cabinet. Among those who concert and consult together are always found some whose real purpose is to oust and to take the place of some of those with whom they rub shoulders at the council board and with whom they live in familiar intercourse. No stately periods or passionate perorations affect the fact that inside the Party there is always this personal struggle arising from the desire to get the better of a colleague in the conflict for power and importance. That it is that makes Politics so dirty a trade. And nowhere is it dirtier than inside a Cabinet.

All Cabinets are founded on distrust. Two or three—as a rule, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary are of them—know everything, and these two or three allow their trusted colleagues to know nothing.

Thus in Lord Shelburne's Cabinet of 1782, consisting of eleven members, "there were," says Jeremy Bentham on Lord Shelburne's own authority,* "three grades of "power: the Cabinet simply; the Cabinet with the circulation; and the Cabinet with the circulation and the "Post Office," by which, as he explains, was meant that some few members of the Cabinet had a key to the box in which the foreign dispatches and the most confidential information was sent round, and that some still fewer had not only that key but also "the power of ordering the "letters of individuals to be opened at the Post Office," while all the rest of the Cabinet had neither the key nor the power. That system, as already said, was begun in the Cabal of 1679. It has ever since been continued. Generally only two, as in the Cabal, do everything and know everything of high State importance; one or two more know something and are allowed to do something; the rest of the Cabinet know nothing and do nothing except the business of their own departments, which would always be as well and usually better done by the Chief Clerks.

Under the elder Pitt all pretence of allowing members of

* Bentham's Works, IX, 218, quoted in FitzMaurice's *Life of Shelburne*, Vol. II, p. 156.

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the Cabinet to have knowledge of what was being done was thrown aside.

“ During the administration of the great Lord Chatham, “ he took the correspondence with naval commanders into “ his own hands, and required the First Lord of the Admiralty “ to sign instructions which he did not allow him to peruse.* “ And in 1807 (under a later Government) the principal “ members of the Board of Admiralty, in a document signed “ with their own hands, formally denuded themselves of “ all future knowledge and control of the secret expedition “ for the seizure of the ships at Copenhagen, and directed “ that the admiral in charge of the expedition should “ receive his instructions from the secretary of state, without “ the cognisance of the Admiralty. The effect of this was “ that the first lord, being a member of the cabinet, was “ cognisant of the expedition, but that the other members “ of the board were in total ignorance about it.† After “ all, the Admiralty is but an executive board, and is “ necessarily subject, on occasions of emergency, to the “ supreme control of the crown, to be exercised through “ the secretary of state, whose order, in such case, would “ even supersede the authority of the first lord and of the “ whole board.”

Sir Robert Peel's Cabinet formed in 1842, consisted of sixteen members. Of these sixteen Sir Robert Peel, prime Minister, Lord Aberdeen, Foreign Secretary, and the Duke of Wellington were alone of the sixteen in the see-all, know-all and do-all category. When the Ministry was two years old the Emperor of Russia came to England. These three, not only without the knowledge of the country, but without the knowledge of any of their colleagues in the Cabinet, and without leaving any trace of their act even in the Foreign Office itself, signed a memorandum undertaking

* Knight's *History of England*, Vol. vi, p. 287. *Brougham*, sketches, etc., first series, Vol. i, p. 24. *Rep. on Mil. Organis.*, p. 396. Com. pap., 1860, Vol. vii, and

† *Rep. on Bd. of Admiralty*, p. 124. Com. Pap., 1861, Vol. v. A similar instance occurred in 1815, the particulars of which are mentioned by Sir James Graham, *Ib.* See also pp. 156, 157. Quoted in *Parliamentary Government in England*, by Alpheus Todd—second edition. Longmans, Green & Co., 1888-9. Vol. ii, pp. 771-773.

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to support Russia in her claim to a protectorate in Turkey of the Greek religion and the Holy Places, and to do this without consulting France, whose claims to influence in that respect were well known.

When in February, 1852, Lord Derby took office, the Foreign Office was committed to Lord Malmesbury, who has given a frank account of his astonishment at being repeatedly challenged by the mysterious allusions of the Russian Ambassador to the undertaking of which neither he nor anybody in the Foreign Office knew anything, nor could find any trace. Lord Derby only retained office till December, 1852, and Lord Malmesbury's account was written in June, 1853, and was only published, long after the event, in 1884. Here it is:

“ June 3rd (1853).—Walewski and Brunnow are naturally
“ in a state of great anxiety as to whether the Government
“ will go to war. The former, who constantly sees Palmers-
“ ton, hopes and believes they will, but Brunnow is
“ sanguine that Aberdeen will not do so, and they re-
“ spectively are constantly applying to me for an opinion.
“ I always give them the same answer—namely, that the
“ ‘strongest character of the two, which, undoubtedly is
“ ‘Palmerston’s will prevail.’ ”

“ There is a circumstance which I think must strongly
“ influence Lord Aberdeen at this moment; which is, that
“ when the Emperor Nicholas came to England in 1844, he,
“ Sir Robert Peel (then Prime Minister) the Duke of Wel-
“ lington and Lord Aberdeen (then Foreign Secretary)
“ drew up and signed a memorandum, the spirit and scope
“ of which was to support Russia in her legitimate pro-
“ tectorship of the Greek religion and the Holy Shrines, and
“ to do so without consulting France.”

“ When Lord Derby’s Government came in [in February,
“ 1852, with Malmesbury as Foreign Secretary] at first I was
“ unable to understand the mysterious allusions which
“ Brunnow made now and then, and which he retracted
“ when he saw that I knew nothing of this paper or that I
“ desired to ignore it. Since it was composed and written,
“ the position of affairs in Europe has totally changed, and
“ is even reversed. In 1840, the events in the East had
“ then totally estranged England and France from one

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“another, and Louis Napoleon did not exist as a factor in European policy. Now he is Emperor of the French, and the Duke and Peel are dead, yet it is not unnatural to believe that Nicholas, finding Lord Aberdeen Prime Minister, and the sole survivor of the three English statesmen, should feel that the moment had arrived, so long wished for by Russia, to fall upon Turkey. His menacing conversations with Sir Hamilton Seymour began the moment Lord Derby resigned [i.e., in December, 1852], and not before, and at the same time Menschikoff’s arrogant demands were made.”*

The following extracts from *The Greville Memoirs* complete the story:

“ . . . To obtain this agreement was doubtless the object of the Emperor’s journey. It bore his own personal signature. The existence of this Memorandum was a profound secret known only to the Queen and to those Ministers who held in succession the seals of the Foreign Department, each of whom transmitted it privately to his successor. Lord Malmesbury received the document from Lord Granville, and on leaving office in 1853 handed it to Lord John Russell. This fact, hitherto unknown, throws an entirely new light on the causes of the Crimean War. The Emperor of Russia naturally relied on the support of the very ministers who had signed the agreement and were again in power, whilst Lord Aberdeen was conscious of having entered into an engagement wholly at variance with the course of policy into which he was reluctantly driven.”—H.R.†

“ March 20th (1854) . . . About a week ago, or perhaps more, appeared the Petersburg ‘ Gazette ’ with a sort of manifesto, complaining bitterly of the conduct of the British Government, which was said to be the more inexcusable as a confidential correspondence had taken place between the two Governments, and we had been all along informed of their views and intentions. The

* “ All the actors are now (1884) dead, and as all the events connected with them have passed away for ever, I see no reason against publishing the above facts from my journal.”

From *Memoirs of an ex-Minister*, by the Earl of Malmesbury. Vol. 1, pp. 402-403. London, Longmans, 1884.

† Editorial note, *The Greville Memoirs*, part III, Vol. 1, pp. 54-55 (24th March, 1853), Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1887.

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“ ‘Times’ published this (as did all the other papers) and
“ with it a peremptory denial of its truth, stating that John
“ Russell, then Foreign Secretary, had sent an indignant
“ refusal to the proposals made to us.”*

The story seems almost incredible. That three members of a Cabinet should have put their hands to such a document of undertaking with a foreign sovereign without the knowledge of their colleagues or even of the Foreign Office, and should so completely have concealed their act that no trace of it was left in the Foreign Office, and that the next Foreign Minister was unable to understand the allusions to it of the foreign sovereign's ambassador—this seems beyond belief. Yet it is certainly true. And if it was true then it might be conceivable now. Sir Edward Grey and the Government have more than once said that Great Britain is not bound by any written engagement embodying the Entente with France begun in 1904. That is said no doubt because Sir Edward Grey has found no trace of any such written engagement at the Foreign Office. But Lord Malmesbury would have said the same in February, 1852, and for the same reason, as regards any written engagement of 1844, with the Emperor Nicholas. Yet as we now know, the engagement did then actually exist, although its existence was not made public till over thirty years later. How then are we to feel confidence that thirty or forty years hence the country may not yet learn that a 1904 engagement exists? How are we to be sure that one or two of the 1904 Cabinet did not, as did those of the 1844 Cabinet, make it without the knowledge of their colleagues, and, as in 1844, without leaving any trace of it at the Foreign Office? Sir Edward Grey may conceivably be as much in the dark in 1914 as Lord Malmesbury was in 1852 and may conceivably yet, as Lord Malmesbury did, publish thirty years hence the true explanation of his ignorance. So soon as it is discovered that this kind of

* (*The Greville Memoirs*, part III, Vol. I, p. 147. Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1887).

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deception and withholding of information has been, even in our own days, practised by a few members of the Cabinet upon their colleagues, none of us can feel sure that it may not have been again practised even more recently.

Early in 1861 the Cabinet of that day was described by Lord Clarendon as dominated by "three confederates."

"To the last he [Clarendon] considered that Palmerston "was acting like a Conservative at home and a Revolution-
"ary abroad; in writing to Charles Greville he referred to
"the victorious minority in the Cabinet as 'the three
" 'confederates,' Palmerston, Russell, and Gladstone . . . "*"

Later in the same year, Sir George Cornewall Lewis shows how the Cabinet was merely called together to register things "already decided" by the dominating members thereof:

"Our Cabinet, though it might as well not have been
"called, was not quite harmless. Nominally, we were
"summoned in order to decide upon the Mexican ques-
"tion; but practically the question was already decided,
"for proposals had been made to the French and Spanish
"Governments, by which we were bound, and which
"engaged us to a joint occupation of the country for the
"purpose of collecting the custom duties." (Sir G. C.
Lewis to Lord Clarendon. Dated from Harpton, 27th Oc-
tober, 1861.)†

In 1864, we find the same want of fidelity and confidence between the members. In May of that year, Lord Palmerston being Prime Minister, Lord Russell Foreign Secretary, and Lord Granville President of the Council, Lord Palmerston had threatened the Austrian ambassador with English intervention in the war then proceeding between that State conjoined with Prussia on the one side,

* *Life and Letters of the Fourth Earl of Clarendon*. By Sir Herbert Maxwell. Vol. ii, p. 235. (Edward Arnold, London, 1913.)

† *Ibid.* Vol. ii, p. 243.

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and Denmark on the other; to which intervention Queen Victoria was offering a prudent and what proved a successful resistance.* Lord Granville wrote to Lord Russell “denying that anybody in the Cabinet besides Lord Russell had approved the language of Lord Palmerston”† to the Austrian ambassador. Then came the following correspondence:

Lord Granville to Lord Russell

“House of Lords, May 6, 1864.

“My dear Lord Russell,—I am afraid that a discussion tomorrow upon the Queen’s question may lead to a general row; bad for the health of the Cabinet in general and for Palmerston’s Government; for George Grey’s stomach and for my jaw in particular. There can be no objection to ‘a most confidential’ despatch to Bloomfield informing him of Palmerston’s private conversation with Apponyi. I am certain that the approbation of the Cabinet will be contested by more important members of the Cabinet than myself.

“There is a public question as to the expediency of calling again upon Austria to give an assurance which she has already refused. But that is a different matter from the first.

“Yours, G.”

Lord Russell to Lord Granville

“Chesham Place, May 6, 1864.

“My dear Granville,—If I am wrong in thinking that the Cabinet approved the language of Lord Palmerston to Count Apponyi, I greatly regret it.

“But in that case it is necessary for the Cabinet to adopt some other policy, and it will be for Lord Palmerston to consider whether he can be responsible for that policy.

“It is necessary for me, who am the organ of the Government in regard to foreign affairs, to ascertain what that policy is.

“I was no party to the draft agreed upon by the Cabinet on Saturday, nor could I have signed a despatch in the terms of that draft. I was at liberty, therefore, to propose another draft, which I did. It is true that I wanted to

* *The Candid Quarterly Review*, No. 1, p. 28.

† *The Life of Lord Granville*, by Lord Edmond FitzMaurice, Vol. 1, p. 463.

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“omit all mention of the fleet, as it was thought such a mention would be offensive to Austria.

“But that omission was not to prevent my informing our own Ambassador at Vienna, in a despatch marked ‘most confidential,’ of the conversation of Lord Palmerston with Count Apponyi, which I conceived was sanctioned by the great majority of the Cabinet.

“I think that Lord Palmerston’s communication must either be confirmed or disavowed by the Cabinet; and that if members of the Cabinet wish to keep for themselves perfect liberty of action to be free to act how and when they like, but to avoid committing themselves to any threat (?) of definite action, or rather to any definite action, particularly action of an isolated character, Lord Palmerston’s language must be distinctly repudiated.

“Of course, I shall not be a party to such repudiation. But in the event of the Austrian fleet going into the Baltic, the event must not find the Cabinet unprepared. They must make up their minds one way or the other.

“Yours truly,

“RUSSELL.”

General Grey to Lord Granville

Osborne, May 9, 1864.

“My dear Granville,—The Queen desires me to return Lord Russell’s letter. It strikes Her Majesty as strange that Lord Russell should declare himself to have been no party to the draft agreed to at the Cabinet on Saturday, and still more so that claiming a right in consequence to suggest a new draft, he should not only send one, adopting the very language to which the Cabinet had positively objected both on Saturday and Monday, but that he should ask to have her Majesty’s assent communicated by telegraph, so that no time should be lost in sending it. For I need not tell you that the draft sent for her Majesty’s approval, embodying Lord Palmerston’s conversation with Count Apponyi, and expressing the concurrence of the Cabinet in the language he had used, was *not* marked ‘most confidential’ or even ‘confidential,’ and that part of the compromise her Majesty desired me to suggest to you was, that this character should be given to it.

“All this naturally increases the feeling of distrust with which Lord Russell has contrived to inspire her. But she is most anxious that you should keep matters as smooth

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“ as you can, and do your best to prevent a ministerial crisis,
“ which on such a question, and in the present excited state
“ of the public mind, would be very serious.

“ Her Majesty will insist, before she goes to Scotland,
“ upon no important step being taken without having been
“ fully and maturely considered by the Cabinet, before it is
“ submitted for her Majesty’s approval. And she relies upon
“ the Cabinet, and particularly upon yourself, to ease her
“ from being dragged unnecessarily into this miserable war.
“ I go to town this evening. Should I find you at home
“ tomorrow morning if I called between ten and eleven?

“ Believe me, yours very truly,

“ G. GREY.”

The first words of this last letter of 9th May show that Lord Granville, having written to his confidential Cabinet colleague Lord Russell on Cabinet differences the letter of 6th May, and received Lord Russell’s reply of the same date, had at once sent that reply to the Queen, and thus disclosed outside (for none is kept so much outside the Cabinet as the Monarch) the dreadful secret of Cabinet dissension. It was fortunate indeed that Lord Granville should have done this, for it enabled the Queen three weeks later to give the warning that rather than submit to so dangerous a course she would dissolve the Parliament and appeal to her people against her Ministers. This warning saved the country from what would have been a disastrous war, and was a right Queenly act. But it was the disclosure of Cabinet Secrets by a Cabinet Minister which alone rendered possible the Sovereign’s intervention at a moment early enough to prevent the mischief. The country was saved because the secrecy of the Cabinet was violated. Which alone suffices to show the danger of the Cabinet.

The name of Cabinet Council implies a council meeting in the King’s private Cabinet or Closet, and therefore in especially close relationship with, and especially devoted to, the interests of the monarch. That was what it was first intended to be, and, indeed, what it was when originally

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established. But that, as we have seen, is very different from what it soon became; wholly different from what it now is. Originally the King always presided over it; now never. Originally it met in the King's Cabinet; now never. Originally the King knew all that passed in it; now nothing. The Cabinet Council has been withdrawn gradually, partly by taking advantage of accident, and partly by astute contrivance, from the association and knowledge of the Monarch. It is also a body separate and apart from Parliament and People. This aloofness is not reluctantly admitted but insolently claimed. It deliberates and decides, not perhaps without any consideration for the public interest, but principally with reference to its own interests, which are those of the Party that supports it, and more especially of the Caucus that coerces it. That is the mischief. It is known to all; denied by none of those who have taken part in Public Affairs; and its effects are daily visible to those who not only see but also understand. The Professors indeed are still true to their mission, which is to explain everything they see and to affirm that everything that is is so rightly and inevitably, and the true, destined and beneficial end, through previous gropings and mistakes and crimes, to the perfection of all in these our times. Honest schoolmen and theorists as they are, they torture themselves to construct coherent and logical systems out of the rude, incoherent, illogical events and facts of actual life, and in all sincerity present their system pontifically to those who have had a share in events which can nohow be wrested into accordance with that system. The Professor of Constitutional Law and practice arrays his precedents and assiduously pens his tomes; and when he has conclusively proved that we have arrived at the end of all perfection, the Craftsman and Practitioner puts him aside with a sigh, quotes him when he serves for the confusion of an opponent, and dismisses him and his teaching altogether whenever he comes to the danger or the difficulty of the moment—which difficulty or danger he knows to be altogether new, quite unprecedented and

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wholly unprovided for by any text book or closet wisdom. The professors are like those who undertake to teach seamanship or horsemanship by correspondence—at whom the horseman or the seaman smiles indulgently. For he knows that neither the sea nor the horse can be thus used or tamed, but only by the actual knowledge that use of them alone can give, and by the actual seamanship or horsemanship that use of them alone can teach.

And so it is that, despite all constitutional treatises and defences and explanations, those who know not merely what institutions are supposed to be but how they work, know that Cabinets are in fact constructed and kept together, not at all in the interests of the Monarch, of the Parliament, and of the country, nor because they are, in these times and conditions, the most appropriate or the only possible means of conducting Public Affairs; but solely in the interests of the dominant Party, and for the purpose of keeping that Party in predominance and in power under those who compose the Cabinet. Every political craftsman knows it; no candid Cabinet Minister, present or future, would in moments of private confidence deny it. It is the brutal, undeniable fact; and none the less a fact because of the conviction, real or affected, that the particular Party to which the Minister belongs is alone able and desirous to conduct the affairs and to pilot the revolutions of the country for its greater benefit. The justification may or may not suffice. The fact remains.

The Cabinet Council as it now exists is in no sense a National Council. It is hardly a Party Council. It is, in strictness, a secret conclave of the personal adherents of the Prime Minister. He appoints its members, in any number he pleases, and usually, of late years, in increasing numbers so that they have recently been as many as twenty. This, while it deprives the Cabinet of its original character of a meeting of five or six initiating experts, more fully secures to the Prime Minister its support. For while the five or six experts, being experts, might stand out against him, and

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may still, the remaining greater number, not being experts, nor confident of their knowledge or capacity, will almost always support him. Thus, in a Cabinet of twenty like that of to-day he is much more likely to have his way than in the Cabinet of seven over which William Pitt presided. For in Cabinets also there are differences, divisions, conflicts and votings, though since all takes place in secret nothing is known of them, until, forty or fifty years later, those revelations begin, in the shape of memoirs and diaries and Cabinet Minutes, which enable later generations to estimate the real stature of the great of to-day. The policy or the act, once agreed upon, perhaps after much wrangling and by a bare majority in the Cabinet, is presented to King, Parliament and Country as that on which the Cabinet is all agreed. Every member of the Cabinet is equally responsible for it, even he who has most strenuously resisted it and has come near to resigning because of it. Throughout, the Prime Minister remains master. In case of an irreconcilable difference between him and any member of his Cabinet, it is that member who must go, while the Prime Minister remains. In case the Prime Minister goes, the whole Cabinet go with him; for it is he who has been charged by the King with the formation of an administration, he and no other. When Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman's administration was ended by his death, Mr Asquith's was a new administration, and if many members of that which had preceded became members thereof, it was only because Mr Asquith chose to take them in. He might, had he chosen, have left all of them out. They all owed their places to him.

Thus the present system has become in effect a system of personal government embodied in the Prime Minister. It is true that there is no such office in existence, nor ever was, as that of Prime Minister, nor any duties or salary attached to it. So little is he recognized that up to a few years ago he had, as Prime Minister, not even a ceremonial existence, and although for the trivial purpose of personal

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precedency this is now altered, the alteration by no means affects or improves his constitutional and legal position.

The Privy Council, having lost all the power and all the importance that now belong in fact to the Cabinet, has been greatly enlarged in numbers. It has now some 300 members. It only meets for purely formal purposes, which are held to be sufficiently provided for by the summons of three councillors, though the late King Edward insisted on four. Upon the demise of the Crown, indeed, the Council meets in full and might, on emergency, play a great part at that supreme moment of the Succession. Otherwise the position of Privy Councillor is no more than one of honour without power; and while the Council does in fact contain almost all the men who have attained, if not political eminence, at least political office, it also contains many who have found entrance into it for other reasons than that of political ability or State service.

Perhaps the most important relic yet upstanding of the Privy Council is the Councillors' oath. "You shall in all things to be moved, treated and debated in Council, faithfully and truly declare your mind and opinion according to your heart and conscience, and shall keep secret all matters committed and revealed unto you or that shall be treated of secretly in Council." Now it has often been claimed for the Cabinet that it is a "Committee of the Privy Council," which it certainly is not, for it is not appointed by the Council, it has nothing committed to it by the Council, and it does not, as all Committees must, report to its superior authority the committing body—in this case the Council. But the members of the Cabinet are presumed, as such, to be bound by the Council oath touching all that passes in the Cabinet. Whether that is so seems very doubtful. The oath touches only things debated "in Council"—i.e. in the Privy Council, and the obligation of secrecy only refers to matters "committed and revealed or treated of secretly in Council." That the Cabinet should not only usurp the powers of the Council, but should also

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pretend to support the usurpation by annexing its oath, is one of the many curious contradictions of our system. That which was meant to secure the secrecy of the Council against all, is now appealed to as securing the secrecy of the Cabinet against the Council itself. It does not always do so.

The constitutional picture presented to the student is that of a venerable and majestic body of Councillors gravely debating and deciding on the great affairs of State, and deciding them in view of the King's honour and the interests of the Commonwealth. The fact is that of a secret personal conclave, pushing aside the Councillors and turning them out of doors, then taking upon itself the Council's business, and debating and deciding on these great affairs, with some regard to the interests of the Commonwealth, but with more regard to those of their own Party, and of the Prime Minister to whom they owe their posts.

Queen Anne presided over the Cabinet Council every Sunday, and if efficiency, whether in the Crown or in the Cabinet, be mainly regarded, there seem strong reasons why the Presidency of the Sovereign should be reverted to. By the present system the King is deprived of all knowledge of the reasons for and against the Cabinet decision, which is presented to him as that of one and all, whereas it is often only that of a bare majority. The decision may have been come to rather in the interests of the Party represented by the Cabinet than those of the country; it may, indeed, have been come to exclusively in the Party interests. Were the King to preside, his mere presence would tend to prevent purely Party decisions. His influence so far as it might be exerted would certainly do so; for the King can have no Party predilections strong enough to dissociate him from the interests of the country with which his own are bound up. This would necessarily change the character of Cabinet discussions for the better. With the King present, representing the State at large, the Cabinet could no longer be the mere conclave of a faction. In his presence and under his presidency it must become a Council of State. And the

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King himself would gain that knowledge of his Ministers of both parties which it is so necessary he should have at the moment when, a Prime Minister having resigned, the Monarch has to decide who shall be sent for to form another Cabinet. That the King, who presides over the Privy Council which does nothing, has still the right to preside over the Cabinet Council which does everything, cannot be denied. The desire of the Minister to keep the Monarch out of the Government for the sake of his own greater and more exclusive power, has been of gradual growth. It has now become a source of mischief. The dangerous person in the State is no longer the Monarch: it is the Minister. His is the weight that now needs a counterbalance, his the power that needs control; and one wholesome way of controlling it would be the resumption of the old practice of the Sovereign's presence at Cabinet meetings. A further advantage of that presence would be the fact that it would put some check upon the system of internal secrecy and dishonesty which, as we have seen, prevailed in the past.

The short historical review which we have given shows that the Cabinet Council has been in fact used, not as a true Council at all or for the use of the wisdom of many, but as an expedient to secure the domination of a few, in destruction of the very principle whereon the Cabinet itself is built. That principle has been thus authoritatively stated:

“ From henceforth (i.e., from 1812) this was an admitted
“ political maxim, and all cabinets are now constructed
“ upon some basis of political union, agreed upon by the
“ members composing the same when they accept office
“ together. It is also distinctly understood that, so long
“ as the different members of a cabinet continue in the
“ ministry, they are jointly and severally responsible for
“ each other's acts, and that any attempt to separate

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“ between a particular minister and the rest of his colleagues
“ in such matters would be unconstitutional and unfair.”*

It has been seen that the members of the Cabinet themselves have, in the past, constantly performed acts for which, not only were their colleagues not jointly and severally responsible, but of which those colleagues in fact knew nothing. How is it in the present day?

During the existence of the present Ministry the following incidents have occurred. Some of them have been so revealed to the public that they are undeniable. Others of the same character have not yet been thus revealed, but we believe that some of them are equally undeniable, and will not be denied, as for instance, the following:

In July, 1911, when the German warship was sent to Agadir, Mr Asquith, Sir Edward Grey and Mr Lloyd George secretly, and without the knowledge of any other Members of their Cabinet,† arranged for Mr Lloyd George to make to the bankers in the City of London a speech defiant of and menacing to Germany, certain to complicate and embroil the political situation, and not at all unlikely to lead to a war. The Cabinet had met that very morning (see *The Times* of 22nd July, 1911) yet not a word of what was intended was communicated to its Members. Mr Lloyd George that very afternoon went down to the bankers and read to them a menacing typewritten statement prepared for him by Sir Edward Grey; and the Members of the Cabinet who were equally responsible with the three who had arranged the explosion of this bomb were left to learn what had happened from the next morning's newspapers!

French statesmen make no concealment of the fact

*Lord Palmerston, *Hans. D.* Vol. CLXXIII, p. 1,920; *Ib.* Vol. CLXXVI, p. 1,272. And see Grey, *Parl. Govt.*, new ed., pp. 51-58. *Quar. Rev.*, Vol. CXXIII, p. 544. Ashley, *Life of Lord Palmerston*, Vol. II, p. 329. Quoted in *Parliamentary Government in England*, by Alpheus Todd. Second edition. Longmans, Green & Co., 1888-9. Vol. II, pp. 142-143.

† “ Without waiting to consult the Cabinet,” see *Our Foreign Policy*, by G. H. Perris. Melrose, 1912, p. 178.

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that at the time of the so-called Agadir crisis Sir John French was suddenly sent over to France to arrange with the French Government for the transport to the northern frontier of France of 150,000 British troops; that ports of debarkation were arranged; and that arrangements for officers and men were provided for down to the smallest detail, including the supply of hot coffee to them, and the designation of hotels in which the staff were to reside. All this, too, was done without the knowledge of the Country, and it may be reasonably therefore presumed without the knowledge of the Cabinet in general. For it was a sequel and consequence of Mr Lloyd George's threatening speech.

Incidents such as these suffice to show that, as from the beginning, so now, members of Cabinet Councils have never been true to each other; that the common knowledge of all, and consequently common responsibility for all, is a fiction; and that, while in intention the Cabinet Council is still no national council and no Parliamentary council but only a Party Cabal, it is now, in fact, often no more than a scene of personal competition, used as a field in which some members of the council are always found pushing their own plans, power and importance at the expense of their colleagues.

The Cabinet then appears as an invention, not of Statesmanship, or of Patriotism, but of Party; and as representing the doctrine that the right government is government of the country by the Party, for the Party, through the Party. It is to assure this that the Cabinet has been contrived.

It is as well-fitted for that purpose, as it is ill-fitted for a Council of State.

THE PINNACLE OF POWER

“ we shall neither be united at home nor respected
“ abroad till the reins of government are lodged with men
“ who have some little pretensions to common sense and
“ common honesty. Had our Ministers, my Lords, even the
“ wish to act with wisdom, they have not the ability. The
“ mere possession of their places does not give them a
“ capacity to understand or a resolution to execute. They
“ have received no instruction in the real schools of busi-
“ ness, and ignorant of everything but their own interests,
“ they look down from their accidental elevation, confused,
“ astonished, terrified. Ashamed to descend and yet afraid
“ to act on the lofty pinnacle of power, the welfare, the
“ reputation of the kingdom is hourly given up; nothing
“ is attended to but the preservation of their official emolu-
“ ments, and so these emoluments can be preserved, they
“ are deaf to the execrations of their indignant country-
“ men.”

(Lord Shelburne, in the House of
Lords, 22nd November, 1770. *The
Life of William, Earl of Shelburne*, by
Lord FitzMaurice. Vol. 1, p. 415.
Macmillan, 1912.

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“O thou that art situate at the entry of the sea which art a merchant of the people for many isles!”—Ezekiel xxvii, 3.

WE islanders have not to ask ourselves where our business lies or what our policy should be. The Sea that girds our shores plainly shows us our destinies. It speaks to all who will listen. The lesson is written plain and permanent on every Cape and Headland, Gulf and Inlet. It is roared in every winter storm and whispered in every lap of the summer wave; recalled and recorded in every movement of every ship; affirmed and established in every act of our lives and every event of our history. What these teach it behoves us to learn. We must be blind if we do not see, foolish indeed if we do not understand what all cries aloud in our ears.

Before Land Roads were the Sea was; Nature's own Road and the best of all. It needs no making, upkeep or repair at men's hands; it makes and keeps itself without pains, labour or cost. It is always open to all, free to all without toll or charge. It goes from everywhere to everywhere. The Land divides nations; the Sea joins them. It is the safest and surest of all roads. It is the easiest and cheapest of all. Of all Servants to Man, the Sea is the most helpful.

To us islanders it is everything. It is our sole access to our fellow inhabitants of the Earth. By it alone can we reach them or they us. If to other nations the Sea is precious, to us it is priceless. The use of the Sea to us is vital. Without it we must have remained for ever savages and prisoners, denied all other movement than what we

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could take in the narrow prison of our own little sand-bank, deprived of all knowledge and all resources but our own, cut off from all the stores of ancient learning, without a share in the riches of the world, unhelped and unhelping, disinherited exiles from our kind. Without it we must remain straitened prisoners, with it we become free with a freedom limited only by the limits of the Ocean.

Oversea traffic is our proper business. Moreover the Sea is not only our road for traffic; it is also our barrier for defence. To use the Sea is the only way of prosperity, it is also the way of safety. To understand the uses of the Sea is our first need whether for Peace or for War. That is our business and our policy.

The Map of Europe shows very plainly how masterful is the position of the British Isles, whether in peace for trade, or in war for offence or defence. Nothing more happy could be conceived than their situation either for traffic or for fighting; no such heritage for either was ever given to any nation as that with which these islands are endowed, nor any which carries with it so complete a pledge of permanence and security. The Map alone, if they would consider it and learn its lessons, suffices to shame and to refute those who, from time to time, create or encourage panic either for our Trade or our Security. The Map alone should show them that, so long as we refrain from putting artificial fetters upon it, our Trade must continue to flourish out of all proportion to our territory and our population, and our riches and importance therewith to increase despite all the competition of the less fortunately placed nations: and that our Security from outside attack is less challengeable and easier maintained than that of any country whatsoever. Once the true nature of our position in the world is understood and our command of the great Sea roads recognized, there need be no more Trade Panics, nor any more empirical attempts to encourage Trade by laying charges upon it. Nor would there be any more War Panics. What there would be would be

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only a thankful recognition of the blessings we have inherited, and that quiet and confident determination to maintain them which comes from the knowledge that, so long as we appreciate and accept our place in the Sea, there is nothing on the land that need ever disquiet us.

For Trade these islands are admirably situated. Set down, as it were, within one short Sea step of the Continent, with Sea approaches from the Ocean wide, open and offering good land-falls, they are also endowed all round with innumerable harbours of vast extent, good depth, and complete shelter. Especially are they so endowed on the great Ocean approaches of their western and southern shores, and most especially on the southern coast of England from the Land's End to the Thames, where a succession of unmatched ports invite the seaman. The opposite coast of Europe from Ushant to the Elbe is a stretch of some six hundred miles. It is what may be called the effectual coast of the Continent on the Ocean, for trading purposes; for it lies nearest to the great consuming, producing and manufacturing centres of European countries. Yet on the whole stretch, after leaving the fine harbour of Brest at its western extremity, there is not a single really good natural harbour, none in any way comparable in natural advantages to those with which the British coast is so thickly studded. There are, indeed, some havens there—such as Havre, Cherbourg, Antwerp, Rotterdam, Bremen, Hamburg—that have been with great pains artificially made, and are with greater pains maintained; but there are none which like ours were made by Nature herself, free from outlying shifting dangers and easy of approach, none which stand, as do the best of ours, always open at all times of tide and in all weathers, easy of access without the dangers of outlying shoals or inlying serious inconveniences. There is nowhere on that European stretch of coast a Falmouth, a Plymouth, an Isle of Wight, or a Thames. It is as though Nature had herself announced that the Sea Portals of Europe are

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given to the British Isles and denied to the shores that are over against them.

But that is the least of it. Their position in the world is even more striking and more masterful. A map of the World on the rational horizon of London* contains almost all the habitable earth of our globe except Australia. It contains all Europe, practically all Asia, all Africa, all North America and nearly all South America. In the centre lies this England of ours with all the four quarters of the world grouped round her, and she in the Sea which is the road to all, and at the crossing of all the roads. The only one direction in which her road is barred is that of the North Pole closed by ice, but for which thereby would lie the nearest way to the North Pacific and the Far East. And since the wise men tell us that (because of the varying inclination of the earth's axis) the ice cap of the Pole is receding—which experience seems to show to be true—it may possibly be that within the next ten generations of man, we may expect to see this gate also unlocked, this new road opened, and sea traffic established through the Behring Straits from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

England then lies in the centre of the habitable parts of the earth, and at the crossing of all the roads. From the beginning it was so. But it was not always known to be so. In the early days of the World's history, America was unknown. The world was believed then to end towards the west at the Pillars of Hercules in the Straits of Gibraltar and to have its eastern limit in China. Then, as now, the best road was the Sea, and the sefarer, then holding on to the coasts and only rarely adventuring a great way beyond them, believed that when he reached the great Atlantic Ocean on the one side and the great Pacific on the other he had reached the two ends of the earth. On this assump-

* See the map hereto appended.

[illegible]

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tion the central seafaring position was somewhere in the Persian Gulf, and possibly in those Bahrein islands which appear to have been the first seat of the Phœnicians who then played, so far as was then possible, the part in traffic now played by England. As the world then was they were admirably situated for that, with all the then richest parts of the earth adjacent and accessible to their ships. We are told, probably with truth, that even England was reached by the Phœnician Vessels, trading with Cornwall for the precious tin there found. But to them alone perhaps were these islands then known. They lay beyond the Pillars of Hercules almost outside the World, at the very edge of the Earth. And so they long remained.

At length the curtain rose which was to show England not at the circumference but at the centre of the world. At the very end of the fifteenth century Christopher Columbus discovered America, and within six years Vasco da Gama found that there was a sea-route to India by the Cape of Good Hope. These discoveries discovered England. Their whole meaning was, indeed, not then understood. The "Error of Ptolemy"* which had for thirteen centuries misled men into the belief that between Europe and Asia there lay nothing but sea, still so misled them that Columbus, when he arrived at the Bahamas, believed himself to

* " . . . Ptolemy and the other philosophers, who have written upon the globe, thought that it was spherical, believing that this hemisphere was round as well as that in which they themselves dwelt, the centre of which was in the island of Arin, which is under the equinoctial line between the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Persia; and the circle passes over Cape St Vincent, in Portugal, westward and eastward, by Cangara and the Seras, in which hemisphere I make no difficulty as to its being a perfect sphere as they describe; but this western half of the world, I maintain, is like the half of a very round pear, having a raised projection for the stalk, as I have already described, or like a woman's nipple on a round ball. Ptolemy and the others who have written upon the globe, had no information respecting this part of the world, which was then unexplored; they only established their arguments with respect to their own hemisphere, which, as I have already said, is half of a perfect sphere." ("Letters of Christopher Columbus," pp. 135-136. Printed for the Hakluyt Society, 1870.)

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have reached the eastern shores of Asia* and called his newly-found land the Indies and its inhabitants Indians. That a new continent had been found was not realized till later. Yet, even had it been as believed; had the new continent been non-existent and the land of the world one-third less than we now know it to be—even then the position of England, as so believed, would have gained a vast new importance. For even on that erroneous supposition she would have been enriched with two new open sea-roads to China and India not hitherto suspected, one of them lying due west and one to the south round the Cape. These new endowments must have added vastly to England's importance. Even then she would no longer have been at the end of the world; she would have been for Europe, at the beginning of these two new roads. That would have sufficed to make her thenceforth the chief handmaiden to the world's traffic. But what had happened had, in fact, shown her to be not merely its handmaiden but its mistress. When, gradually, as the years went on, it was found that what had been discovered was not old Asia but new America, when it was realized that that vast continent hitherto only dreamt of by men of imagination but scornfully denied by all men of science really existed and must be added to a vastly enlarged world, then indeed there became apparent the true position in the world of England. Then it was seen that, instead of being as had hitherto been believed at the end of the world, she was at its very centre. The geographer looked at her with new eyes, the merchant with new hopes, the Statesman with a new policy. The few but hardy shepherds and miners who had hitherto inhabited her and had wrung a hard living from sheep and mine, had seen up to now no chance of bettering themselves but by fighting and plunder in

* "When I reached Guana (Cuba) I followed its coast to the westward "and found it so large that I thought it must be the mainland—the province "of Cathay." Letter of Christopher Columbus of 15th February, 1493 ("Letters of Christopher Columbus," 1870, p. 2).

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the kingdoms across their channel and had already shown that in fighting there were no men of any kingdom known to them that could match them. Beyond that they could see nothing. They had not yet learnt from the Flemings the art of spinning and weaving their fleeces. Their wool was carried away from their shores by the Hollanders. The few oriental luxuries they could afford to buy came to them by Alexandria and the Levant, brought by Dutchmen, Genoese and Venetians, then, as long they had been, the merchants of all that the East produced, through the only known road of the Mediterranean.

Now they raised their eyes and saw a new and wide horizon there in the west where the world had hitherto been believed to end. There was a new Asia opened to them, new scenes of adventure and a new promise of wealth if only they were men enough to take to the sea. And they were. The descendants of the men who had conquered France and led a French King captive to London were not discouraged by the claim of the Spaniards, sanctioned though it was by the Pope himself, to the exclusive possession of the new-found Indies, but only filled with the greater determination to win for themselves a share therein. The enemies of God, the "Lutheran English dogs" as the scandalized Spaniards called them, were soon nosing around the new world. Within eighty years of its discovery Sir Humphrey Gilbert published a treatise on the North-West passage to the East Indies and by the end of the sixteenth century, Vere, Drake, Hawkins, Howard and Raleigh and other bold seamen had already challenged the Spanish monopoly. The hundred years' war with France was gone and forgotten. It was no longer Normandy, Guienne and Gascony that were in issue; no longer Rouen or even the lately lost Calais to be reconquered; it was now the riches of Mexico, the mines of Peru, the treasures of *El Dorado*, that gilded man whose very finger-touches were a King's ransom. Spain was the enemy now, not France. To singe the King of Spain's beard in the Netherlands, at Cadiz or on the

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Spanish Main from Trinidad to Panama, and to win from him a share of the trade of America was now the mission of the English. They were still few in numbers. Compared with the Spanish colossus of Spain and the Indies they were insignificant, nor had they any of that military training which had made the Spanish infantry the best in the world. But they were bold and adventurous. They feared not even the Spaniard or his skill at arms. "Against an enemy's sword," said Raleigh, "we shall find ten thousand seven-penny men (waged at that price in the wars) that fear it as little and perchance less, than any professed swordsmen in the world."

Such men as these were of the right stuff for seamen. The Sea has no room but for strong men; and these new seas, mysterious and uncharted, none but for brave men ready to adventure themselves into the unknown and to take their chance in small, ill-found ships with the slender resources of Navigation and navigating instruments then available. These men were found as ready for the Sea as for the Sword. They took their opportunity and that of their island home. They began to be Seamen in the true sense. The newly-found place in the world of their islands did the rest. The position was there. The men were there. England had come to her heritage.

It is necessary always to remember that up to and in the time of the Tudors, England had been essentially a pastoral country and, if anything at all besides, a mining country; so far without manufactures, without foreign trade, almost even without sea fishermen. Her population, estimated at four millions, was small. Her people were mainly a people of shepherds and herdsmen; splendid fighters indeed and always ready to follow a fighting King into France or to any other country where hard knocks were to be given and ransom or booty to be gained; but when they were not fighting, engaged to some extent in mining for coal, tin

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and lead, but mainly in growing and exporting wool. Not only were they then mainly dependent on that growth and export, but it was believed that for ever they must be so and that when England ceased to grow and export wool England must cease to be—for which reason the wise men called Wool “the Jewel of the land,” placed a Woolsack in the assembly of the two first estates of the realm, and seated the Lord Chancellor upon it as a symbol and a perpetual reminder of the narrowness of their horizon. Of manufacturers there were scarce any until Alva chased the Huguenots from the low countries into England, who landed here destitute aliens with nothing but their hands and their skill in the weaving and other handicrafts. In the middle of the fourteenth century, indeed, a few had already been brought over to teach us weaving and the making of clocks; but it was Alva’s cruel tyranny that sent them over in the masses who founded and developed the weaving industry. It was only in Elizabeth’s reign that glass making was introduced by the two Caryes of Antwerp, and paper making by John Spielman—who was knighted for it—while up to 1590 the very sails for our ships were made by the French.

There was, indeed, some foreign trade. But what there was was mainly carried on by the “Easterlings” of Flanders and especially by the Dutch who were, even down to 1619, as Bacon declares, “the powerfulllest nation at the sea that “now is in the world” The Dutch not only imported and exported in the main our merchandise, they also fished our seas. Raleigh was always complaining of this; Bacon was always urging his countrymen to turn their attention to the true gold mines of the Sea within half a day’s sail of our coasts. We were then still mainly a pastoral people; which is made manifest enough by the contemporary writers, but which it is necessary to insist upon because some have supposed that already in the reign of Elizabeth we were great traders.

The truth is that for oversea trading purposes we neither

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had, nor could have, then taken up our position, or done more than begin to perceive what that position was.

When, therefore, Columbus discovered America and Vasco da Gama the Cape of Good Hope road to the East, what they really discovered was England's commanding position for Commerce. Thenceforth she was seen to be the very centre of the habitable world, to be seated "in the seat "of God in the midst of the sea " with the four quarters of the globe all in her hemisphere. Thenceforth the sea-trade of the world was hers if she chose to take it.

Some time elapsed before men even learnt what had been done in 1492 and 1497; some more time before they realized all that it promised for England. But there were among Englishmen some who soon understood what it all meant, men with minds great enough to comprehend and hearts big enough to attempt that oversea Traffic, now no longer confined to the eastern hank of the compass, but opened up as well in the western hank. Of these Raleigh was the greatest and the farthest seeing. He saw what the Trade meant, how little we then had of it, and how it was to be gained; he saw, too, how alone it could be kept. And he called aloud, like a new prophet, to his countrymen to come to their inheritance. In his observations on Trade and Commerce written between 1604 and 1610, he wrote*:
"Whosoever commands the sea commands the trade; who-
"soever commands the trade of the world commands the
"riches of the world, and consequently the world itself."
And he proceeds (writing from the Tower to our lasting shame):

"The merchandizes of France, Portugal, Spain, Italy,
"Turkey, East and West Indies are transported most by
"the Hollanders and other petty States into the east and
"north-east Kingdoms of Pomerland, Spruceland, Poland,
"Denmark, Sweedland, Leifland and Germany and the

* "Sir Walter Raleigh's Works," Vol. VIII, p. 325, 358 and 364. Oxford, 1829.

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“merchandizes brought from the last mentioned Kingdoms
“being wonderful many are taken likewise by the Hollanders
“and other Petty States most transported into the southern
“and western dominions; and yet the situation of England
“lieth far better for a storehouse to serve the south-east
“and north-east regions than theirs doth and hath far
“better means to do it if we will bend our course for it.”

“The Low Countries send into the east Kingdoms yearly
“about 3,000 ships. . . . They send into France, Spain,
“Portugal, Italy from the east Kingdoms that passeth
“through the Sound and through your narrow seas, yearly
“of the east country commodities, about 2,000 ships; and
“we none in that course.”

“They traffick into every city and port-town round
“about this land with five or six hundred ships yearly, and
“we chiefly but to three towns in their country, and but
“with forty ships. . . . The Low Countries have as many
“ships and vessels as eleven Kingdoms of Christendom
“have.”

Raleigh saw the Low Countries with five thousand ships carrying the European trade and with five or six hundred ships carrying the English trade, and the English with only forty ships of their own trading only to three towns; and he saw that it was not good. He discerned the first distant signs of England's great future, saw the unmatched character of her geographical position and told his countrymen how they might best take advantage of it. For he was a man of imagination as well as a man of practice, a statesman as well as a seaman. Seaman, seer and prophet at once, and a writer besides of a musical English, the very note of which has since been lost, he set himself to tell his countrymen what their country was; what its true and natural destinies marked out for it by Nature herself; and what the means whereby, following those destinies, they might become the richest and the most powerful of the nations, hurting none, taking voluntary tribute from all, and for all making life easier and better. He saw the natural advantages of these islands for Trade, at a time when as yet there was no Trade to speak of and when what Trade there was remained in the hands of

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“the Hollanders and other petty states, mainly Easterlings, men of Flanders.” But he saw more. He saw quite clearly that if full advantage was to be taken of these natural advantages, it was essential that they should be used to the full, that they should not be diminished or destroyed by the greed and the follies of so-called Statesmen. He saw that Trade should be, and must be, left free if it were to flourish. And he cited two examples of the right and wrong way as seen in Holland and Genoa. Speaking of Holland, he writes:

“I have diligently, in my travels, observed how the countries herein mentioned do grow potent with abundance of all things to serve themselves and other nations, where nothing groweth; and that their never-dried fountains of wealth, by which they raise their estate to such an admirable height as that they are at this day even a wonder to the world, proceedeth from your majesty’s seas and lands.”

“I, thus moved, began to dive into the depth of their policies and circumventing practices, whereby they drain, and still covet to exhaust, the wealth and coin of this kingdom, and so with our own commodities to weaken us, and finally beat us quite out of trading in other countries. I found that they more fully obtained these their purposes by their convenient privileges and settled constitutions, than England with all the laws and superabundance of homebred commodities which God hath vouchsafed your sea and land: . . .”

“By which privileges they draw multitudes of merchants to trade with them, and many other nations to inhabit amongst them, which makes them populous, and there they make storehouses of all foreign commodities, wherewith, upon every occasion of scarcity and dearth, they are able to furnish foreign countries with plenty of those commodities, which before in time of plenty they engrossed and brought home from the same places; which doth greatly augment power, treasure to their state, besides the common good in setting their poor and people on work.”

“To which privileges they add smallness of custom and liberty of trade, which maketh them flourish, and their country so plentiful of all kind of coin and commodities

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“where little or nothing groweth; and their merchants so flourish, that when a loss cometh they scarce feel it.”*

Then he sets forth the contrary example of the Genoese who had adopted the contrary policy:

“All merchants (he says) do forbear that place where great impositions are laid upon the merchandise, and those places slenderly shipped, and at dear rates, and oftentimes in scarcity, and want employment for the people; and those petty States finding truly by experience, that small duties imposed upon merchandise draw all traffick unto them, and free liberty for strangers to buy and sell doth make continual mart; whereby it appeareth, though the duties be but small, yet the customs for going out and coming in do so abound, that they increase their revenues greatly, and make profit, plenty and employment of all sorts by sea and land, to serve themselves and other nations, as is admirable to behold. . . .”

“There was an intercourse of traffick in Genoa, and there was the flower of commerce, as appeareth by their ancient records, and their sumptuous buildings; for all nations traded with merchandise to them, and there was the storehouse of Italy, and other places; but after they had set a great custom of 16 per cent all nations left trading with them, which made them give themselves wholly to usury; and at this day we have not three ships go there in a year: . . .”†

The contrast between the effects of smallness of custom and liberty of trade and the effects of a great custom of 16 per cent, could not be more plainly put or more urgently enforced. It was a contrast to be taken to heart by England if she was to fulfil her new destiny.

Consider now the situation of Great Britain in Peace and for Trade. The Ocean coast of Europe, including our islands, extends some 3,000 miles run from the North

* “The Works of Sir Walter Raleigh,” Vol. VIII, pp. 356-357, and pp. 360-361.

† *Ibid.*

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Cape in Norway to Gibraltar. For Ocean trade that great stretch of coast line must, however, in fact and in practice be reduced by about one-half. For Sea Trade demands, must have, and will certainly take, the nearest sea-road to the great land-fields of consumption and production. These lie between the Atlantic and the land barriers of the Alps and the Carpathians and are found mainly in Great Britain, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany, Denmark, Russia, Austria and Italy. Wherefore the whole Atlantic coast of Norway, of Spain and Portugal, and the southern part of the Atlantic coast of France, although each of them plays a local part and has a local share in sea-traffic, must be disregarded as avenues of access to the great sea-roads of trade to Europe. As the Map suggests so the fact is, that the working trade coast of Europe, to which all the great lines of traffic are directed, is that part of it (including the British Isles) which lies between the Naze of Norway and Cape Finisterre at the north-western extremity of Spain. The line from the Ocean to the Mediterranean through the Straits of Gibraltar has indeed some importance, yet it may, in a large survey, be disregarded, for the importance of the Mediterranean lies, not in its trade with the Atlantic, but still, as ever, in its trade with the East. In short, it may be broadly said, as it is certainly broadly true, that all the great Ocean roads of trade to Europe approach the continent at some point between the British Orkney Islands and the Spanish Cape Finisterre, and that for the purposes of that trade this portion of Europe, and this alone, is the Great Gate of the Sea. It will be observed that all the great sea-roads from all the world approach this great gate from between S.S.W. and W.N.W. This is true not only of the roads from the two Americas and from the Cape, but also of the road from the Mediterranean, which passes by Gibraltar and Cape St Vincent. The only sea-roads that do not come within the rule are those that approach the European coast in the Mediterranean from the East—roads which before the discovery of America

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were of first importance, as was shown by the vast importance then acquired by Venice and Genoa as their furthest points of approach to the interior lands of Europe which could then be reached by sea; but roads which, as is disclosed by the decline of Venice and Genoa, have now lost all relative importance. The great oversea trade to the great consuming Europe with its great population, is now, in fact, that which, as already said, approaches the European coast, whether from the West, South-West and South, or from the Mediterranean, between the bearings from England of S.S.W. to W.N.W. In the region between the bearing of W.N.W., round through North and East and South to S.S.W., there are no present great sea-roads at all; except for coasting traders; for such of them as might otherwise exist, say from W.N.W. to N.N.E., are at present closed by the ice of the North Pole and the Arctic circle. That within a century or two these last sea-roads may be opened to the navigator through the warming-up of the polar region appears to be likely; it is at any rate possible; and if that becomes realized another segment of the British circle will thus be opened to British trade, under conditions as favourable to these islands as those which give her almost a monopoly of the present great sea-roads. In such conditions our best and nearest road either to China or to California would lie, neither round the Cape of Good Hope nor the Horn, nor even through the Suez Canal, nay, nor even through the Panama Canal. It would lie north-about through the Behring Strait. But that is for the future.

At present, then, the great sea-roads approach Europe on the segment between S.S.W. and W.N.W. and from no other quarter of the compass. And herein lies the vast importance to us of all these facts, and especially of this last—that, coming to Europe on any line whatever between those bearings, the seaman trader is inevitably drawn to the British Isles. They are what he must necessarily make for. If his cargo, whether of goods or passengers, is for the great con-

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suming Europe already roughly defined, he cannot avoid them. In the plurality of cases his cargo is destined for these islands themselves; and even if that be not the case, so tempting and inevitable are they that even then he usually has to call at Falmouth or some other British port for his final sailing orders and the decision as to his final destination to a continental port. Neither Spain nor Portugal would tempt a cargo which has to be distributed in the great consuming Europe, for they lie altogether on its outskirts, and to land a cargo there would be to necessitate a long land journey for the cargo, which it is always the object to escape, for the simple reason that land journeys are for cargoes exactly twenty times as costly per mile as sea journeys. Nor, for the same reason, do any of the French ports on the Bay of Biscay tempt the approaching skipper or the prudent charterer. Brest, indeed, has some attractions, jutting out as it does into the ocean. But Brest also would entail a long land journey to bring the cargo to the bulk of the consumers. From the mere cargo point of view, therefore, the British Islands are indicated as the place to make for. Still more are they from the navigator's point of view. He knows that he will make there a good land-fall, obscured sometimes indeed by fog, but still less often than Ushant is so obscured, where fog and rain are rather the rule than the exception. He knows, moreover, that in and about the British Islands he will find deep water coasts, completely and accurately charted to the least detail, and waters thoroughly well-known to all, well buoyed and well-lit, with many splendid harbours in case of need; while, as he proceeds up Channel, he is certain to meet every sort of pilot of every nationality, persuaded, like himself, to the British coasts for the reason that, because of their position, there are to be inevitably found the majority of sea-traders.

For these reasons, and for some others as well, the great sea-trade coming from the Ocean to any part of the great consuming Europe, comes first to the British Islands, much of it to end there for the time and to be thence dis-

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tributed; the rest to go on to continental ports upon orders there for the most part finally received. These unquestionable facts alone suffice to show the splendid and unmatched position held by our islands.

But there is more than that. So admirably—if the expression may be used—have these islands been laid out, that, as their position in Europe almost compels the Seaman, coming from the Ocean, to shape his course for them, so their configuration invites him into them. It offers the most completely secure and easy access to the British ports. To these ports there are, on every side, wide and splendid avenues. Let the Map speak.

From Ushant to the Scilly Isles is about 100 miles. This is the width at its mouth of the first or English Channel Avenue. It is the most important of all, which, narrowing as it goes, is reduced between Calais and Dover to some sixteen miles, and which gives access to the splendid harbours of Falmouth, Plymouth, Portland, Southampton and London.

The second is the Irish Channel Avenue which opens between the Scillies and Cape Clear, with a width of 150 miles, giving access at once to the Bristol Channel and to the Irish Sea, with the ports, on the Irish side of Queens-town, Waterford, Kingstown and Belfast, and, on the English side, of Bristol, Liverpool and further on of Glasgow.

The third consists of the open sea approach to the whole West Coast of Ireland from Cape Clear to Malin Head, a distance of some 400 miles, with several fine harbours.

The fourth is the North Channel Avenue, some twenty-five miles broad, between Ireland and Islay, narrowing to some fifteen miles between Ireland and the Mull of Cantyre, and giving another access to Glasgow, Liverpool, Bristol and the Irish ports.

The fifth is the approach by the Hebrides and Skye, over a stretch of sea from Malin Head to the Orkneys of some 300 miles, which, however, gives access to no great ports

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until the North Channel (already mentioned) is reached. This is rather a tangle of islets and inlets than a fair avenue, and cannot command the enthusiasm of the trading seaman in time of peace, though it might, upon occasion, offer him some useful protection, dodging-ground, and shelter in time of war.

The next stretch is from the Orkneys to the Naze of Norway, a distance of nearly 300 miles, which represents the mouth of the North Sea Avenue to the British Islands, giving access to all their North Sea ports, such as the Moray Firth and the Firth of Forth, the Tyne, the Humber, Harwich and London.

To whichever part of these islands, then, the Mariner may come, he finds easy access to great ports. At every approach to land, excepting perhaps that by the Hebrides, he reaches an easy way to one of many great ports; while those four great sea avenues which we have called the English Channel Avenue, the Irish Channel Avenue, the North Channel Avenue, and the North Sea Avenue, also give to him, as soon as he has entered them, some considerable protection from Ocean weather, and the prospect of reaching his destination unhindered. That, indeed, is not quite the case with the North Sea Avenue, yet even here he loses something of the rough Ocean, and more and more the nearer he comes to his port.

When all this is considered, it must be manifest that the destiny for Sea Trade of the British Islands is written plain and large in their configuration; that the Statesman must acknowledge what the Seaman knows, that no country in the world offers to Sea Trade so tempting and coercive an invitation; and that, whatever else may be among their duties, the first duty of the inhabitants of Great Britain is to make the best use possible of the matchless advantages given to them by Nature.

There is yet more. Not only are these islands admirably fitted for Trade in times of Peace; they are to the full

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as well fitted for its safe conduct and their own defence in War. Of the six approaches above enumerated, not one could, with certainty, be shut up by an enemy; for that would involve the constant watch and forcible closure of the opening of the approach; and the least of the six is 100 miles across. But the beauty of the situation is that, if one of the six approaches were in fact closed, the other five would still remain open for the trader to take. Unless all the six are closed, and kept closed, nothing is done. And to close all the six would be an impossible task for all the Navies of the world, even were the British Navy itself to disappear. As already said, from Ushant to Scilly is 100 miles, from Scilly to Cape Clear 150, from Cape Clear to Malin Head 400, from Malin Head to Orkney 300, and from Orkney to Norway 300. Here, then, is a total stretch of 1,200 miles, every mile whereof must be guarded and closed or one of the approaches to these islands must remain open. The mere idea of such a guard and such a closing is extravagant. It could not even be attempted, much less achieved.

The configuration of these islands thus affords a certainty that the great Sea Gates that lead to and serve it can never be closed, but must probably all, and most certainly some of them, remain open to Trade, whether in Peace or in War. But the aptness of our situation for actual Warfare itself on the Seas is still more notable. England strikes Europe at Calais as with a blunt wedge. So long as she has any moderately powerful Navy at all she commands the Straits of Dover precisely in the same way and by the same naval means as she commands the Straits of Gibraltar. These latter, which are fourteen miles across, are nearly as wide as the Straits of Dover, which are but sixteen miles across. Neither in the one case nor in the other can the strait be closed, denied, or even impeded by guns on the shore—for the distance is too great.* But what

* From the South Foreland to the opposite French coast at Cape Blancnez is sixteen miles. From Europa Point, Gibraltar, to Leona Point on the opposite coast of Africa is fourteen miles.

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cannot be done by guns on the shore can be done by ships having at hand a friendly port. And, in fact, whenever England may be faced by any alliance between the sea forces of Northern and of Southern Europe, she, by her position on the Straits of Dover, cuts these forces in two. Through the straits they cannot hope to join. In order to do that they must affront the vastly longer and more risky voyage round our islands. This is so tremendous a strategical advantage of our position as, if it stood alone, would go far to ensure predominance at sea as against any European powers, although several of them, or even, as in 1810, all of them, joined together against us. It is near to this strait of Dover that we have in Chatham and Portsmouth two of our great naval stations. From either of the two, or from both conjoined, we can act upon the sea with equal ease against northern or against southern foes, and can to either deny the passage of Dover strait. On the other hand, if either a southern or a northern enemy elects for this reason to avoid the Dover strait, and to go north-about round our islands to join any of our foes on the other side of the strait, then—always with a shorter distance to go—our navy can intercept either enemy on its way to join the other. For they two will then be working round the circumference and we from the centre. These advantages do not belong to naval stations remote from the South Foreland, such as that at Rosyth, in the Firth of Forth, which is far from the central pivot of the Foreland and, therefore, deprived of the power of either-way action belonging to naval forces stationed near to that point. The general line of the British east coast is not, as some imagine, parallel with the coast of Europe in that essential part thereof which lies between Ushant and the Elbe—it is broadly at right angles thereto; as is shown by the dotted lines on the appended Map of Europe. Rosyth is farther from any part of that European coast than is either Chatham, or Portsmouth, or Portland, or even Plymouth. It is of some value for intercepting a north-about movement of any possible enemies coming from or

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going to the Baltic; but even that purpose would be better fulfilled by naval action from our southern naval stations; and it will one day be recognized that the establishment of a naval base so far north and so distant from the central pivot, which was due to a German scare, does but represent a useless, and perhaps dangerous dispersion of our naval force. But this by the way.

Our business in Peace, our duty in War, and our conduct in Policy are alike indicated to us by the place in the world of our islands, and by our own consequent place among the Nations. It is unlike that of any other nation. In its most important features it is different from that of all other Nations. And, as it has resulted in our people being as different from them in tradition, in history, in methods of life and in all outward aspects, so it cannot but dictate to those who appreciate the whole meaning of it, the conclusion that what may be good or even necessary for them is possibly, or even probably, neither good nor necessary for us; and that, if we would work out our destinies we must do so on our own road in our own way.

In those years of Peace, which, despite all have been and still are most numerous in the world, and which we may, without great presumption, expect still further to predominate over the years of War, the position of these islands, with all that it imports, can but bring good and no evil to all Nations. For it brings Trade. And Trade brings profit to both sides to it—so soon as it ceases to bring that to either side it stops of itself—and with profit not alone prosperity but an increase in the kindly feelings and in all social and spiritual intercourse. Let ambitious War-Lords, Berserkers, Knights-errant, and Diplomats more ambitious and less honest than either, shout and protocolize as they may, Trade is the greatest blessing of the earth, the most constant and effectual development of the social instinct which brings one man into contact with another, and enables both to join

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their efforts for the common good. If it be true, then, that the very place of these islands in the world indicates them as the great world-centre of Trade, they in the fulfilment of their manifest destiny are the appointed distributors of blessings to the earth, a destiny happy, splendid and satisfying indeed. All that is needed to fulfil it is to recognize it so completely as to avoid putting artificial hindrances to that oversea Trade which is not ours only but that of the world. The true English note was struck long ago at Runnymede:

“All merchants shall have safe and secure conduct to
“go out of and come into England; and to stay there, and
“to pass as well by land as water, to buy and sell by the
“ancient and allowed customs without any evil tolls.”

These words, penned in 1215, were the forty-fifth Article of the Statute of Magna Charta, and even then they represented no new thing, but the ancient principle which had been departed from and was then reaffirmed and restored. They represented, above all, the principle that merchandising should be encouraged and that it should not be hindered by evil tolls. They represented the spirit of Free-Trade. So true is that that Freedom is old; it is Tyranny that is new. Stephen Langton, Archbishop of Canterbury, was as long before Cobden as Magna Charta was before the Corn Laws.

In Peace then, as our business is Trade, so a principal part of that business is to keep that Trade free. For hindrances to this nothing can make amends; for a shrinking in this, nothing can compensate us—or the world. For us, compared with this, neither Manufactures, nor Agriculture, nor Finance—important though they all be—is of consequence. It is neither in the generous earth, in the mill or the foundry that our indicated primary business lies; it is on the Sea and in Trade.

“The Earth where it is fertilest returns not
“More than three harvests, whilst the glorious Sun
“Posts through the Zodiack, and makes up the year:

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“ But the Sea, which is our Mother (that embraceth
“ Both the rich Indies in her outstretched arms),
“ Yields every day a Crop, if we dare reap it.”*

Let us then in Peace dare and reap; and let us see that no enemy comes by night to sow tares in the harvest.

In War that Sea which in Peace serves us for Trade, equally well serves us for defence to Trade as to all else. For the reasons already given no enemy can cut our communications or stop our material supplies, a fact recognized by the Commission on Food Supply of 1903 in these words: “ It does not appear to us that any effort in this direction “ which it will be possible for an enemy to make would “ cause any material diminution in the over-sea supplies “ of those articles of primary consumption which are necessary to our population.” Our defensive policy in War therefore mainly provides for itself. Our offensive policy is as clearly indicated. It is to do to our enemy what he cannot do to us—to cut his communications, to stop his over-sea supplies of articles of primary consumption, to raise thus the prices of those articles within his borders; and so, by strangling his trade, to produce the distress that will lead him to seek for peace. It was thus we acted, and through thus acting that at last we succeeded, in the long Napoleonic wars when we raised the price of sugar in France to six shillings while we ourselves were only paying sixpence. It was not the shot, sword or bayonet that won Napoleon’s allies from him to our side, it was the raising of prices caused by the refusal to them of the sea-roads. This is still the way for us to victory—a way infinitely more powerful and as infinitely more merciful than the destruction of life. Capture, blockade and every form of stress resulting from broken communications and a denial of Trade—these, applied in modern form and under modern conditions are our means of offence. They are well known and as much dreaded. Duly applied, with

* Grimaldi, in “ The Renegado,” by Massinger, sc. iii.

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such variations as the varied conditions require, they will always be as effectual as always they were. It is on the Seas that alone they can be used. But if there used they will again, as before, paralyse the largest armies in the most remote recesses of the Continent. So long as we retain a predominant power at Sea and use it as it may be used, so long will the boast of the poet remain true:

“Britons, proceed; the subject deep command.

“Awe with your navies every hostile land.

“Vain are their threats, their armies all are vain;

“They rule the balanced world who rule the Main.”

Our conduct towards other nations, or what is called our Policy, is no less surely indicated. Our business is to keep aloof from the European system with its constant conspiracies and wranglings. We do not belong to it. We have nothing in common with its imaginary chalk-line frontiers nor with the supposed necessity, which is an article of faith with European statesmen and diplomats, that their own frontier must be pushed outward into the territory of one or another of their neighbours. Our frontier is the irremovable sea. Our landmarks will not be removed by any neighbour. We therefore can, and we should, keep aloof from all entanglements in European systems of diplomacy, and remain, ready indeed to play a part—as in the Napoleonic wars—when that is made unavoidable for us; but meantime unpledged, uncommitted, to take any part at all. We should hold aloof. When the time comes, if come it does, that we must use our force, and that we need an ally then let us take our ally where we find him and when we want him. We may not want any. But if we do we shall never lack allies in the future any more than we have ever lacked them in the past. Our importance, our strength, our wealth, our commanding position will always ensure that. Thus may we best avoid war; thus most effectually make it when we have to; thus most effectually nurse our power; thus, when the moment comes, most irresistibly exercise it.

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In Peace then our Business is Trade; in War our Duty is to defend our own Trade and to stop that of our enemy; in all times our Policy is to keep aloof from the quarrels of others; and in this Business, this Duty, this Policy we may confidently and safely proceed, relying on the place in the world we are so happy as to hold.

THE WISEST WAY

“AND although the English will no less disdain, than
“any nation under heaven can do, to be beaten upon
“their own ground, or elsewhere, by a foreign enemy; yet
“to entertain those that shall assail us, with their own beef
“in their bellies, and before they eat of our Kentish capons,
“I take to be the wisest way. To do which, his majesty,
“after God, will employ his good ships on the sea, and not
“trust to any entrenchment upon the shore.”

(*Sir Walter Raleigh's Works*. Vol. vi,
p. 105, Sect. IX. Oxford, 1829.)

NAVAL TRAINING

THE SELBORNE-FISHER SYSTEM

THE method of training our future naval officers is a matter of supreme importance, not only to the navy, but to the nation, for upon it will largely depend the efficiency of our future navy and our immunity from invasion.

It is a subject concerning which there have always been widely divergent views, especially amongst those civilians whose study of the general question of education has enabled them to offer opinions and guidance as to the age at which candidates should present themselves for the navy, the method by which they should be selected and the subsequent course of training which they should undergo.

So far back as 1773 some fitful efforts were made at the Royal Naval College at Portsmouth to educate our future naval officers; but it would appear that these efforts were not considered a success. At any rate they were abandoned, and then, up to the year 1857, the boys went straight to sea in sea-going ships, either as first-class volunteers, or later as naval cadets, at ages varying from twelve to fourteen.

In 1857 the "Illustrious" was started as a training ship for naval cadets at Portsmouth, under the auspices of the late Captain Harris, R.N., and Naval-Instructor Inskip.

In 1859 the "Britannia" took the place of the "Illustrious" and was stationed first at Portland and finally at Dartmouth, and in her (for, though the old three-decker was replaced, the name was retained) the great body of our

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naval officers now serving afloat received their earliest training for the Royal Navy. The Dartmouth College came later and was no doubt a move in the right direction, though there were some old sailors who regretted the change and argued that the sooner the boys made acquaintance with the boat and the hammock and felt they were afloat, even in an old wooden hulk, the better it would be for them and for the Service.

The course of instruction for the naval cadets was judiciously modified from time to time so as to keep pace with the radical changes which were taking place in naval architecture and with the encroachments which applied science was rapidly making upon the domain of seamanship, as understood by those generations of naval officers who had hitherto maintained the prestige and the efficiency of the British navy under sail. Gradually, though slowly and reluctantly, the sails gave way to the long-hated steam engine, until at last the navy furled sails and took entirely to stoking.

There were of course great lamentations, as there were by our grandfathers over the mail coaches, but common sense decided that it was inevitable, and, as a matter of fact, the change was far too long delayed, though fortunately the other naval Powers copied our error.

With this brief sketch of the question as an introduction, we may now launch out into the main object of this article, which is to discuss the wisdom—or otherwise—of the great change in the entry and training of naval officers made by Lord Selborne, as First Lord of the Admiralty, under the influence of Admiral Sir John Fisher (now Lord Fisher) as Second Sea Lord, in 1902.

It was on 25th December, 1902, that Lord Selborne presented the British navy with a Christmas box in the shape of a memorandum in lady's maid's English which changed fundamentally the method of selection and the course of training of the future officers of the navy.

Broadly speaking, the famous memorandum decreed that

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the age of entry should be reduced from $13\frac{1}{2}$ – $14\frac{1}{2}$ to 12–13, and that the competitive examination should be abolished, the candidates presenting themselves to be thenceforth selected by a committee of officers and civilians who, after a short interview and the asking of a few homely questions, were to decide which of the small boys would make good naval officers and which would not. But the most startling feature of the new scheme, and that which has been the subject of the most severe and destructive criticism, was the plan for a common entry of the three branches of the naval service, namely, the so-called executive branch, the Royal Marines, and the engineer branch, and the common education of these three branches up to the age of twenty; after which the young officers were to diverge into the three distinct branches and to remain therein for the rest of their careers. The memorandum stated that

“The engineer branch will receive additional pay, and although it is proposed to make the division into the various branches definite and final, every endeavour will be made to provide those who enter the engineer branch with opportunities equal to those of the executive branch, including the same opportunity of rising to Flag Rank.”

Here, then, was disclosed one of the numerous puzzles and ambiguities with which this strange scheme was filled.

The man who had spent his life in the engine-room was to have the same opportunity of becoming an admiral as the man who had served his time as officer of the watch, commander and captain and who had, in all probability, held several independent commands.

It sounds more like comic opera than sane legislation for improving the efficiency of the navy.

And what about the poor marine? He was never to have any chance of becoming an admiral at all, and yet he entered under the same conditions as the others and received the same education up to the age of twenty. Indeed the treatment of the marines, under the Selborne-Fisher

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“reform,” involved one of the greatest anomalies, and offered to that splendid and long-suffering corps about as great an insult, as any blundering legislator could have conceived. For it deprived the marines of their own officers, trained and brought up at their own depot in the best traditions of a body of officers and men who have been for more than a century the backbone of the navy, the admiration of those who know them best, and—as Lord St Vincent said of them—“the country’s sheet anchor in time of national danger.”

And yet Lord Selborne—with a strange lack of humour—stated in his memorandum that

“The Board of Admiralty have studied this question of the education and training of naval and marine officers with prolonged and assiduous care, and they have determined on changes which they are convinced are adapted to the changed conditions of the time and will increase the efficiency and solidarity of the Service.

“These changes are far-reaching, and in some respects sweeping, but the scheme which necessitates them is framed in pursuance of a definite policy, is planned on clear lines, is designed to deal with the problem as a whole and is throughout conceived in a spirit of veneration for all that is best and highest in the traditions of the Service.”

Which sounds very like an advertisement for a quack medicine to cure all ills.

As a matter of fact, these “far-reaching” and “sweeping” changes showed an utter want of care or respect for all that was highest and best in the traditions of the Service. Many important points were left unsettled—to see how the cat would jump. The finest and most efficient corps of marine engineers the world has ever seen was abolished with a stroke of the pen. The marines were insulted beyond human endurance, and as to the “definite policy” by which they were to be officered by naval or engineer lieutenants, lent for the job for a year or two, this had to be promptly

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rescinded and the direct entry of marine officers (which had been stopped) had again to be resorted to. As to the "clear lines," an anxious father wrote to Lord Selborne to inquire whether, if his son volunteered for the engineer branch, he would be in a position to expect that he might command a ship and finally hoist his flag as an admiral. This is his lordship's reply, as published in *The Times*:*

"Dear Mr —,—In reply to the inquiries you have made, I have to say that the words in my memorandum to the effect that the division of the sub-lieutenants into the three branches, Executive, Engineer and Royal Marine, shall be definite and final, mean exactly what they say as regards the intention of the present Board. The point could not be left doubtful. Either there will be interchangeability hereafter or there will not. Either an engineer officer, for instance, will be able to rise to the command of a ship or squadron, or he will not. These are questions which time and experience alone can answer, and the Board, in framing the present scheme, had to be prepared for either event."

Such an answer to a plain question makes one wonder whether Lord Selborne was joking, or, to use a popular expression, pulling the inquirer's leg. For, however ignorant of naval matters that gentleman may have been, he could probably have told his lordship that his son either would or would not be able to rise to the command of a ship or squadron just as he would or would not become a First Lord of the Admiralty or an Archangel. What the father wanted to know was whether his son would or would not, and the information that the point could not be left doubtful must have still further puzzled him, for he had evidently read the original memorandum (published in all the principal newspapers) which informed him, and all whom it might concern, that the scheme was "framed in pursuance of a definite policy" and "framed on clear lines."

And now let us take a glance at the probable effect upon

* January 12th, 1903.

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our steam navy of abolishing that body of practical engineers whom we have described as the most competent corps of marine engineers that the world has ever seen. No one can possibly deny that they were thoroughly competent, nor that they had advanced and kept pace with all the modern scientific inventions and improvements in boilers, engines, turbines and the rest. They were men who had made their profession the study of their lives. They were born engineers. Engineering was in their very blood and bones. Most of them were Scotsmen or North of Englanders; with them engineering was a family tradition, so to speak, and they were recruited from a totally different social class of the community from that which furnished the executives and the marine officers.

In stating this undoubted fact it should be distinctly understood that there is not the least intention of casting any slur upon our engineers. They were, in the vast majority of cases, thoroughly good fellows, with no swagger, nonsense or sham about them. They knew their job and they did it, and they were highly respected by all their ship-mates.

But to this something else must be added. Not only did they know their own job and do it: but nothing was *not* their job, so long as they could repair a break of any sort, or add to the efficiency of their ship or squadron. Hundreds of cases could be mentioned—especially in more modern times—where the chief engineer came to the rescue and saved a situation which had floored the carpenter, the blacksmith, the armourer or the boatswain.

A typical case may be mentioned to show what sort of men our naval engineers were, and what the great majority of them still are.

A large iron-built steam and sailing frigate was lying at Hongkong in 1882 with her rudder in a very dangerous condition. It was a huge gun-metal casting weighing seventeen tons, a balanced rudder with only two bearings, one at the head and the other at the toe. The latter had worn loose

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and made a noise like thunder, shaking the whole ship whenever there was a breeze of wind and anything like a sea on, and it seemed highly probable that in the first gale the ship would lose her rudder, which would break at the head journal and sink to the bottom of the sea.

The carpenter is, of course, the proper person to look after the rudder, but the job of re-boring and re-bushing the toe-plate was entirely beyond his powers, or that of the tools at his disposal, so he gave it up. Hongkong dockyard was applied to, and they gave it up, too, or rather they got out of it by saying that there was nothing the matter with the rudder. They had not got to go to sea in the ship.

Then the chief engineer (his name must be recorded—John Ferguson) was asked if he could do the needed repairs. “Yes, certainly,” said he, “if the dockyard people will lend me a few of their tools, which I don’t happen to have amongst my stores.” The tools were supplied. The ship went to Japan to dock, there being no dock at Hongkong or Kowloon large enough to take her. In forty-eight hours after she was docked the rudder was as good as new.

It was certainly not John Ferguson’s job to mend that rudder, but it was not in him to say so. There are scores like him still serving in the navy, ready and willing to do anything for the good of the Service, and these are the men who are in a few years’ time to be “reformed” out of it!

What, then, are we going to put in their place? A hybrid, lath-and-plaster Jack-of-all-trades, one-third sailor, one-third soldier and only one-third engineer?

It is the old, old story of trying to get a quart of beer into a pint pot. Not even the cleverest reformer has ever succeeded in doing it, nor ever will.

The reader may now ask curiously what reason there could be for such a drastic change in our naval policy. For even reformers sometimes have a reason.

The reason—such as it was—is not far to seek.

Admiral Sir John Fisher came home from his Mediterranean command and took his seat as Second Sea Lord of

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the Admiralty with the new scheme of entry and training for naval officers cut and dried in his pocket, and, having previously secured the support of *The Times* newspaper, he set to work to persuade Lord Selborne that he could attain immortality by fathering a great naval reform and making the British navy twice as efficient as it had ever been before.

His object was apparently to kill two birds with one stone—to abolish the marines and to “dish” the engineers.

It was believed in the navy that Sir John Fisher, who had spent no small part of his senior service in shore billets, never appreciated the splendid services of the marines and wanted to rid the navy of them altogether. He conceived the idea of depriving them of their separate establishment of officers, and thus paving the way for their final abolition. Happily in this he has so completely failed that the direct entry of marine officers has again been established.

And now as to the engineers. Why did he want to “dish” them?

The story is rather more complicated and will take longer to tell.

For some years previous to 1902 there had been an agitation amongst a section of the younger members of the engineer officers of the navy, backed by trade unions and the N.E. Coast Society of Engineers, to “better their position,” as they called it. The older members of the naval engineers, such as John Ferguson and his like, took no part in this agitation. They were not ashamed of their profession: they were engineers and were quite content to be called engineers and had no hankering after titles and duties which had nothing to do with their profession. Not so the younger ones. They had joined the navy as engineers, perfectly well knowing the conditions under which they joined, and then as soon as they had got into the navy and donned the King’s uniform they began to discover that they had grievances. Or perhaps it would be more just to them to

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say that professional agitators outside the navy put it into their heads that they had grievances. They thought they ought to have executive rank and executive uniforms, with the curl on the sleeve, and executive titles. They have been given the latter, and we now have in the navy engineer-commanders, engineer-captains and engineer-admirals, utterly meaningless and silly titles, which do not in any way indicate their duties and only expose them to ridicule. In the same way the army surgeons, who were ashamed of the title "surgeon," agitated until they got themselves called surgeon-major, surgeon-colonel, etc., and then went on agitating until they got the "surgeon" dropped altogether and got to be called "major" or "colonel" *tout court*. So that when a soldier is taken ill, he sends for the colonel or the major instead of the doctor.

It is all very silly and it is generally considered snobbish for any man to be ashamed of his profession. But let that pass. Our business is now with the naval engineers.

So when Sir John Fisher found that the engineers—or rather the young ones—were discontented and agitating, and that their civilian brethren were trying to get up a boycott and stop the entry of engineer students, he conceived the brilliant idea of "dishing" them by forestalling their boycott and boycotting them. Thus the entry of engineer students was stopped, Keyham College was closed, and it was decided that the navy should manufacture its own engineers from amongst the Osborne cadets, who were also to be equally good deck officers and marines, and all were to be trained alike up to the age of twenty, at which age young Jack-of-all-trades would become a sub-lieutenant and be ready to go anywhere and do anything, and then, as Lord Selborne naïvely remarked, he either "would or would not" be eligible to become an admiral and command a squadron. Quite lately the engineer college at Keyham has been reopened, not for the reception of the excellent raw material with which it had been originally supplied, but only to give a finishing touch to the hybrid sub-lieutenants

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who either volunteer, or are to be selected, to become Lieutenants E., i.e. Engineer-Lieutenants.

One of the direct results of the new scheme of entry has been that the whole of that class which formerly supplied the best raw material in the world for the manufacture of naval engineers is now totally debarred from entering the navy at all on account of the expense.

The agitators were thinking only of themselves and not of those who were to come after them.

Needless to say the Selborne-Fisher scheme was regarded in the navy as revolutionary and was subjected to severe criticism, but this criticism came entirely from retired officers (with one or two exceptions of officers on half pay, awaiting employment) who expressed their views in the public Press, as they had a perfect right to do without infringing any of the regulations. Those whose criticisms were adverse to the scheme took the risk of not obtaining further employment.

No officer serving afloat, or in a shore billet on full pay, is allowed to write to the Press or to offer any opinion—publicly—upon the wisdom, or otherwise, of orders or regulations which the Admiralty for the time being may be pleased to issue. This is unquestionably as it should be. Discipline would be ruined were it otherwise. But it carries with it the grave disadvantage that, when some unpractical idealist reformer at the Admiralty wishes to immortalize himself by making some revolutionary change—such as the Selborne-Fisher scheme—the British public are kept absolutely in the dark as to what the general opinion of the navy afloat—the vast majority—may be upon the subject.

A wise administration, not given to self-advertisement and histrionic display, always takes steps to discover the best and soundest naval opinion—that of the officers serving afloat—before making any great and far-reaching changes. This was not done in the case under discussion; yet it is now well known that the great majority of naval opinion was opposed to the new regulations.

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The authors and backers of the scheme were very anxious to stifle all opposition and all criticism as soon as possible and to treat it as an accomplished fact which admitted of no further discussion. Thus *The Times* stated in a leading article on 25th March, 1905, that :

“ the scheme is the best method devised for securing the
“ dispassionate selection of the fittest. . . . The complete
“ success of an experiment so novel and therefore so open
“ to antecedent objections of all sorts is indeed very re-
“ markable and very satisfactory. . . . No longer an experi-
“ ment, but a real and very valuable discovery.”

Saying nothing of the contradiction about the experiment in the above, let it be borne in mind that in March, 1905, the first batch of little boys had only just passed on from Osborne to Dartmouth, but had not yet served afloat, and as there can be no proof of the efficiency of the officers trained under the scheme until the new engineers find themselves in charge of engines and the deck officers in charge of ships, it would seem as if *The Times* had exercised a little less than its usual wit and caution in claiming that the “ experiment ” was then a “ complete success.”

The authors and supporters of the “ experiment ” then tried to saddle Lord Goschen with some of their responsibility for the measure, concerning which they were apparently getting a little bit nervous. Lord Goschen was a former First Lord of the Admiralty and, in the opinion of the great majority of naval officers, he was one of the ablest First Lords the navy ever had. He had given great attention to the entry and training of cadets and had left the matter in a condition which those best competent to judge considered entirely satisfactory.

The attempt to impose some of the responsibility upon Lord Goschen's shoulders was a complete failure, as will be seen from the following letter which he addressed to the Editor of *The Times*, under the heading “ The New Admiralty Scheme ” :*

* *The Times*, January 7th, 1903.

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“ Sir,—My attention has been drawn to paragraphs in the
“ Press which convey the impression that the Admiralty
“ Committee over which I am presiding, and more
“ especially I myself, have prepared the way, to a certain
“ extent, for the scheme of naval training lately announced
“ in the memorandum of the First Lord of the Admiralty.
“ Such a suggestion is entirely incorrect. This scheme, so
“ far as I am aware, is exclusively the work, both in principle
“ and detail, of Lord Selborne and his distinguished col-
“ leagues on the present Board of Admiralty.—Yours, etc.,
“ GOSCHEN.”

It was rather rash of the reformers to try to entrap Lord Goschen, for it was well known—or at any rate ought to have been well known—that he was always most strongly opposed to the new scheme, which completely upset a number of the carefully considered and judiciously applied reforms introduced by him during his tenure of the office of First Lord.

The new-schemers—if we may be forgiven the expressive composite—having failed with Lord Goschen, then tried the United States navy. They said that the Americans were a democratic and thoroughly practical people, that they had already adopted the plan of amalgamating the deck officers and the engineers and had found it a complete success.

This was a remarkably bad and unfortunate shot by the new-schemers, for shortly afterwards there appeared in the *Army and Navy Register* (Washington, U.S.A.), under the usual big headlines of the American Press:

“ British adoption of an American mistake. We can afford
“ to read with a complacency, born of bitter experience,
“ the discussion now going on in British service papers, on
“ the proposition to establish in the English navy a system
“ of all-round education which shall make the naval
“ officer of the future an ‘ executive engineer.’ In the hey-
“ day of our own scheme of line and engineer amalgamation
“ we used to call that officer a ‘ fighting engineer.’ The dif-
“ ference in title, however, is a small matter. The effect is
“ the same whether the adjective is administrative or belli-
“ gerent in its quality, and probably if the British plan is

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“realized there will some day be the same situation in that service as to-day offers its growing menace in ours. . . . It seems strange to talk of specializing when an officer must be capable of discharging the multifarious duties and imparting a knowledge of them to others, such as is outlined by the projectors of this scheme. There is no speciality about it. It is quite the contrary, and the British will find that no man can be trained to thoroughness in such variety of distinctly important tasks. . . . The plan of the British is impractical (*sic*), just as our plan has been found impractical. . . . The British service is about taking the step which this country now realizes, *after several years trial* (our italics) to have been a well-nigh fatal mistake. . . . We are merely in the position of applauding the British adoption of our mistake on the principle that misery loves company.”

The opinion of the U.S. *Army and Navy Register* was confirmed by Mr Maurice Lowe, who writes a monthly article on “American Affairs” in the *National Review*,* in the following words:

“After attempting for five years to make naval officers Jacks-of-all-trades, and fit them to command as well as take charge of the engine-rooms, the scheme has collapsed, as every sensible man predicted would be the outcome when it was adopted as a compromise with the absurd idea that it would settle long-standing difficulties; as if a weak compromise ever had any other result than to increase the grievances of both sides. . . . Far-seeing men pronounced the scheme impracticable. They said it was as absurd to make a patchwork engineer and military man, as it would be to create an engineer-surgeon, who, after three years spent in the bowels of the ship, should then spend the next three years in the sick-bay. They said he would probably be a bad doctor and a worse engineer, as he would be neither one nor the other, and would be unable to keep pace with the progress of his profession. The anticipated happened. Machinery was practically placed in the hands of warrant machinists, who, according to Rear-Admiral Melville, for many years Chief Engineer of the Navy, did not possess sufficient professional knowledge to secure safety; while men with a natural bent for

* June, 1904.

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“machinery made indifferent line officers. . . . Mr Moody, the Secretary of the Navy Department, who to common sense adds courage, and for whom innovation has no terrors, has in effect ordered a return to the former system.”

We have quoted at some length from the American Service Journal and from Mr Maurice Lowe in order that the reader may be able to judge of the success which has attended the amalgamation scheme in that democratic and practical country.

We may now take a glance at the system which was in vogue at the time the Selborne-Fisher scheme was introduced.

During the early part of the second half of the last century the idea of the very youthful entry of naval cadets—the idea of “catch ’em young or you won’t catch ’em at all”—began to lose much of its force. The increasing comfort, not to say luxury, of the midshipmen’s mess, compared quite favourably with the sumptuary conditions of schoolboys of a similar age and there was no lack of candidates for nomination to naval-cadetships. But there was also another reason for raising the age of entry. Very uncomplimentary remarks were frequently made concerning the lack of general education in our naval officers. They might be the best seamen in the world, but they were certainly lacking in the general education of an English gentleman and they compared very unfavourably, in regard to general knowledge, with the officers of almost all foreign navies, especially so in regard to their ignorance of all languages save their own. It was suggested that a year or two longer on shore at a good school would in all probability relieve them from this reproach and that a competitive examination before the Civil Service Commissioners would give the navy the pick of those who offered.

It was generally agreed that competitive examinations were injurious to very young boys, so the age was raised from 12–13 up to $14\frac{1}{2}$ – $15\frac{1}{2}$, and instead of the undiluted

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patronage system which had hitherto prevailed, tempered by nothing but an easy qualifying examination, there was instituted a competitive examination, including such subjects of general knowledge as an intelligent lad of 14 or 15 might be expected to possess. A good proportion of marks was given for Latin and French, with the other subjects usually taught at the best public and private schools, and three nominations were offered for each vacancy, two trials being allowed. This method ensured that the boys would receive the foundation of a sound general education before being subjected to the more technical and narrow curriculum in the "Britannia" and the college at Dartmouth.

By this method of selection the navy got the pick of the best boy out of every three candidates. We say advisedly the "best boy," for, although there may be grave doubts as to the perfection of competitive examination as a test of competence, it is generally true that the boy who fails to achieve a certain position in that thrice-repeated test is lacking either in intelligence or in perseverance and determination.

From this well-thought-out and perfectly fair method of entry, which gave us our present generation of naval officers, which was in harmony with the spirit of the age, and which considerably modified the class patronage that previously prevailed, a step backwards has now been taken to undisguised patronage, with an easy qualifying examination, preceded by the labours of a remarkable tribunal known as the Committee of Selection, which interviews the boys and asks them a few questions, the answers to which are supposed to be a test of their general intelligence and fitness for the King's navy. The questions are such as: Where do you live? Who is your father? How long does a hen take to hatch out a clutch of eggs? Are a cow's horns before or behind her ears?

We are credibly informed that these questions were actually addressed to candidates by the Committee of Selection, and it was in consequence of the latter question

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that the Committee has ever since been known as the "Cow Committee."

Mr Punch's account of an interview at one of these Committees of Selection is probably fictitious. A little boy, aged about twelve, is sitting on a high chair with his legs dangling in the air. A grave and sedate old admiral asks him what put it into his head to desire to become a sailor. "Please, Sir, because he has a wife in every port," answers the lad. Which produces a look of absolute consternation on the faces of the gallant admiral and his colleagues—but, quite rightly, passes the boy.

One of the reasons given in Lord Selborne's memorandum for reducing the age of entry to $12\frac{1}{2}$ was that :

"it corresponds to the age at which boys leave private schools, and therefore to a natural period in the system of education which obtains in this country."

This statement was, however, promptly contradicted by a representative meeting of head masters of private schools, who pointed out that it was a year too young, that this particular year was the most important of all the years, and, in short, that the new scheme upset their whole system of education.

Another reason given for the Selborne-Fisher method of entry was that it would "dish" the crammers. No one will deny that the system of cramming for competitive examinations is, in itself, pernicious and bad for the boys; yet if a fond but honest parent knew that his son was rather stupid, or at any rate rather below, than above, the average intelligence of lads of his age, he naturally sent him to a crammer, as affording the only chance of success. In practice it was found that the lads who had received a sound education at good private schools were more successful than the crammed boys. But no doubt the watchful and energetic crammer occasionally succeeded in supplying His Majesty's Services with a dunce or two; for it is, and always has been, impossible to make even the navy absolutely fool-proof.

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Truly the Selborne-Fisher scheme has “dished” the crammers. It has also dished the natural, proper and eminently successful supply of our unsurpassed naval engineers; and it seems highly probable that it will dish the quality and efficiency of our future deck officers, as a large amount of their time will have been wasted in having their young brains stuffed with matters which will be of no use to them, with the inevitable result that (all brains being limited in capacity) they will have acquired less of the knowledge which would have been of use to them in their future career.

The evil effects of the present method of educating our future naval officers and the great waste of time involved in the Osborne and Dartmouth curricula are fully dealt with in a well-informed article which appears in the *Fortnightly Review* for April, 1914, under the joint authorship of Doctor H. B. Gray and Admiral W. H. Henderson.

These critics begin by pointing out that :

“it is admittedly a very costly scheme, based as it is on
“the principle that the country should furnish a large
“proportion of the expenses involved in the secondary
“and technical education of its future officers from the
“ages of 13½ to 21—i.e., a course lasting (on an average)
“over 7½ years.”

But, they add, if it can be shown that this is absolutely necessary, “then the British taxpayer must foot the bill
“cheerfully.”

They then proceed to show that it is not only not necessary, but that the whole course of instruction is opposed to both the theory and practice of all the best traditions of a sound and logically consistent education for such a specially technical service as the navy.

They argue that the boys are entered much too young; that the commencement of a technical education at that early age has a deadening effect upon the minds of the lads; that it cramps initiative, puts them all into a narrow groove, herds too many little boys of the same age together

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to admit of that natural development on the lines of diversity of intellect and independence of thought and judgment, which are qualities of such supreme importance in a naval officer; and, in short, that the system produces "a monotony of type," which is most undesirable and quite opposed to the best traditions of our navy.

Doctor Gray and Admiral Henderson effectually dispose of the argument that the so-called "Custance Committee" (1912) approved of the Selborne-Fisher Scheme of entry and training. It did nothing of the sort. It was not asked to offer any opinion as to the wisdom, or otherwise, of the general policy of the scheme. The terms of the reference submitted to that committee dealt only with details and not with general principles. The details were of considerable importance, and the Committee was called to consider and report upon them in consequence of the grave defects in the original scheme which had become manifest during the ten years it had been in operation.

In short the Custance Committee was simply told to try to make the best of a bad job.

Before we take leave of the subject we propose to take a brief flight into the seductive regions of prophecy and endeavour to make a forecast as to what will be the probable consequences of this hastily adopted naval "reform," unless the Board of Admiralty make such fundamental alterations therein as will save the navy from the grotesque idea of trying to make the same man a master of three trades.

First, then, we shall at any rate be reasoning by analogy if we suggest that the consequences to our navy will in all probability be similar to those which ensued in the United States navy from the adoption of a scheme framed on similar lines. These consequences (in the words of the Chief Engineer of the American navy, already quoted) were that:

"machinery was practically placed in the hands of war-rant machinists, who did not possess sufficient professional knowledge to ensure safety; while men with a natural bent for machinery made indifferent line officers."

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It may no doubt be contended that the American scheme of amalgamation was different from ours, inasmuch as they entered their prospective admirals and chief engineers much older, and therefore had not time to teach them *everything*, but that with our very early entry and our elaborate, technical, high-pressure system of education, extending over seven-and-a-half years, we shall be able to endow our lads with an amount of knowledge and experience which the much older American “ensigns” were unable to acquire.

On the other hand, it seems not improbable that our much-educated engineers of the future, who have sought to acquire proficiency in at least two different professions, each of which took their predecessors all their time to learn, may not prove themselves equal to the double *rôle*, and that consequently the management of the boilers and machinery of our warships will fall into the hands of those warrant machinists who proved (in the U.S. navy) to be unequal to the responsibility placed upon them.

Without any great strain upon the imagination we can picture to ourselves what will probably happen when the first of our universally trained young gentlemen proceeds to take charge of the engine-room of one of our light cruisers, with her turbine engines of 22,000 h.p.

He will have under his orders one or two “warrant machinists,” or “artificer engineers,” as we call them in the British navy. All will go well until there happens to the machinery one of those little accidents—infinite in variety—perhaps trivial in character, but which has not come within the experience of our young Jack-of-all-trades. Then there will surely be trouble. The practical working men will want to do one thing and the young man of all the talents and all the theories will want to do another, and will give his orders accordingly, with results which will be at least doubtful and possibly disastrous.

Certain it is that there will not be that harmony and confidence and respect for authority which prevailed in the engine-room when every member of the staff knew that

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the chief engineer was a master of his profession, not only in theory but in practice, and had probably had more actual experience than any of them.

Under the new methods we may muddle through somehow, but we shall assuredly suffer from lack of that efficiency which has hitherto prevailed in the engine-room departments of the British navy. The working men, the men raised from the ranks, so to speak, will do the work and the chief engineer—or whatever title he may rejoice in—will be the figure-head. But the men who do the work will now, in their turn, naturally want more pay, more relative rank, more stripes on their sleeves and a “better position.” They will all be members of trades unions, and we may, without doubt, look forward to a repetition of the same cycle of agitation, the same threats to boycott the navy, which the Selborne-Fisher scheme was mainly designed to frustrate.

This unpractical idea of trying to amalgamate two—if not three—distinct professions has, oddly enough, been brought into operation just at the time when all other professions are adopting specialization in an increased degree.

The therapeutic art has been so invaded and complicated by the discoveries of science that we have our eye doctors, our ear doctors, throat doctors, nerve doctors and many other specialists. Why? Simply because it was found that one poor human brain was incapable of acquiring all the knowledge and all the experience necessary to attain to the highest efficiency in the different branches of the medical profession. Yet, to set a parallel case, are we to train our doctors as physicians, apothecaries and architects all in one, or even to revert to the days of the surgeon-barber?

We have our civil engineers, military engineers, electrical engineers, hydraulic engineers, and we *used to have* our marine engineers; but it has now become of so little consequence that the latter should be pre-eminent in their business that they are no longer to be “specialists,” but amalgamated with another profession!

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We have now traced the genesis and progress—so far—of this much-advertised naval “reform,” and have also ventured to predict some of its probable consequences to the efficiency of our steam navy, unless we revert once more to the common-sense plan of recruiting our engineers of the future from the same source which gave to us our incomparable engineers of the present, and also return once more to a later age of entry and a more rational method of selecting our future deck officers than that afforded by the Cow Committee.

THE NAVY

“**T**HE royal navy of England hath ever been its greatest defence and ornament; it is its ancient and natural strength; the floating bulwark of the island; an army, from which, however strong and powerful, no danger can ever be apprehended to liberty: and accordingly it has been assiduously cultivated, even from the earliest ages.”

(Blackstone's *Commentaries*, Bk. 1,
p. 418.)

THE CAUCUS AND THE SALE OF HONOURS

REVOLT AND REMEDIES

AMONG the many tasks which these present times are setting for future historians, none will be more instructive than that of estimating the attitude of the English democracy towards the beginnings of what, in the first number of this REVIEW, was bluntly described as the New Corruption. A few years ago the existence of this corruption was utterly unknown to the people as a whole. No one outside the immediate circle of the Caucus suspected it for an instant; and honours bestowed upon his subjects by an English King were still regarded as intrinsically and unquestionably honourable. To-day all that is changed; and it is nowhere denied that any commercial adventurer, with nothing to recommend him but his gold, may, by suitable payments of cash to a party fund, buy just so many of the dignities of ancient English honour as he is willing to pay for.

This startling admission of private gold into public affairs is evidently a distinct challenge to every element in our system of government. Weakening and utterly dishonouring to the aristocracy it is an even greater menace to Democracy itself, which is threatened with submersion beneath a flood of wealth and the rise to power of a naked Plutocracy. From such a prospect all classes are equally interested in delivering us; and if now, with a

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full knowledge of the facts, the English people are seen to be unwilling or unable to protect themselves against it, they will deserve that odious fate which, though common to democracies in all ages, will in all its certain developments be particularly odious here.

Happily, signs are not wanting that a revolt has begun. In the first place the Caucus which, as the recipient of the cash, is the immediate root of the evil has had to face more than one mutiny in the constituencies. In Westmorland, at St Pancras, in Derbyshire and at Coventry the Caucus has been defied, the local party association divided, and the voice of independent conviction has made itself heard. These are cheering signs; though it must be admitted that such revolts up to now have been distinguished rather by weakness and rarity than by that strength and numbers which alone could upset the Caucus power.

Meanwhile several proposals have been made for directly dealing with the evil of Caucus tyranny. Among these the most notable are the demand for the audit and publication of the accounts of the Party Funds; the suggestion that the Prime Minister should be required whenever an Honour has been granted to set forth the grounds upon which it is given; and, finally, the proposals contained in the "Bill to prohibit the traffic" in Recommendations for Titles or Honours" introduced into the House of Commons by Mr Oliver Locker-Lampson on the 19th May last.

As to the demand that the accounts of the Party Funds should be audited and made public, we fear that this would avail but little. For, apart from the difficulty of adequately defining these Funds, there is the further difficulty arising from the ease with which any payment which it was desired to conceal could be diverted from them and so altogether escape both audit and detection. The only value of such an audit (and it is not a negligible one) is that it might throw such light upon the scandals of the past as to reinforce the demand of those honest men who now cry in the wilderness

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of rottenness for some effectual means of abating this acknowledged but cloaked dishonour.

The suggestion, however, that whenever an honour is granted some public statement should be made of the reasons for the grant is at least useful. The inclusion of such a statement in Patents of Peerage is not at all new in England. So early as 1319, for instance, we find the Earldom of Louth granted to John of Bermyngham

“for the good and laudable service which our prudent and
“trusty John of Bermyngham recently did Us in Ireland
“during a combat between the said John and some of Our
“adherents there under his command, and Our enemy the
“rebel Edward Bruce and his accomplices and supporters . . .
“in which combat, as it pleased God, the said Edward and
“many of his accomplices perished.”

In the Patent of the Earl of Carlisle, three years later, mention is made of

“the good and laudable service which Our prudent and
“trusty Andrew de Harcla recently did Us in defeating
“Thomas then Earl of Lancaster and other rebels and de-
“livering them when defeated up to Ourselves, by the
“assistance of the Divine Compassion.”

In 1450 the Earldom of Egremont was granted

“on careful consideration of the great and voluntary
“services, honours and labours which Our prudent and
“trusty Thomas Percy, Knight has on so many occasions
“rendered Us, and continues to render.”

And again, special precedence is granted to the Earl of Warwick in the same year as follows:

“In consideration of the uprightness, energy and circum-
“spect and redoubled forethought of the character of
“Henry, Earl of Warwick, who sets himself in the forefront
“for the defence of Our Duchy of Aquitaine, and for the
“defeat of the force and fraud of the enemies and rebels
“against Us in those regions and the neighbouring localities

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“ . . . and in the hope that this accession of dignity will add
“ to his uprightness and energy in Our interests. . . . We
“ have granted . . . that . . . he be the First Earl of the
“ Realm.”

Baron Howard of Effingham's Patent (1 Mary) begins with a long relation (by this time usual) of the benefits of an order of Peerage. . . .

“ We consider nothing more prudent and praiseworthy
“ on the part of Our princely Predecessors than their dis-
“ tribution of rewards to the faithful, diligent and energetic,
“ and their singling them out for preference. . . . And in
“ imitation of their custom, taking into mature considera-
“ tion, after much thought, the noble descent, the fixity
“ of purpose, the uprightness and energy in war, together
“ with the other virtues of Lord William Howard, Kt., . . .
“ have created him a Baron.”

In 1660, much recital is expended by Charles II on the Duke of Albemarle. After a flourish in Mary's manner

“ We have determined to place Our much loved and ever
“ faithful counsellor George Monk, Captain General of Our
“ armies of England, Scotland and Ireland, as well as Our
“ Master of the Horse and a Knight of the Most Noble
“ Order of the Garter among the number of those who We
“ desire should be decorated with especial marks of honour
“ and Our favour, since he is no less eminent among the
“ select few in the nobility of his descent than by his own
“ character.”

Here follow genealogical details, and the document proceeds:

“ Since G. Monk, springing from this origin, and coming
“ into contact with Our Royal House, on his mother's side,
“ seems most worthy of whatsoever title of honour, and
“ might in any case in some sort demand admission to what
“ We design for him, yet We Ourselves owe it that there
“ should be no need of commemorating his ancestors' merits
“ seeing that, adorned with all warlike glory from his earliest
“ age, he has performed many splendid actions by land and
“ by sea, whilst in the late entire upheaval of Our Kingdom,

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“ he has exceeded every commendation earned by all men,
“ present, past (and we had almost said, to come), for he has
“ rescued, and by the force of his example restored the Laws
“ from the Licence of Tyrants—the common Liberty from
“ a most unworthy Slavery—the Nobility from contempt—
“ Religion from indecency and the unbridled attacks of every
“ heretic—and, finally, Ourselves from exile and the most
“ severe misfortune.”

Forty-two years later, the Duke of Marlborough's Patent is equally full and careful in testimony . . .

“ Lately Our Envoy Plenipotentiary to the States
“ General, when it seemed almost certain that (so to speak)
“ France would become Europe, he far surpassed the opinion
“ which all had formed of his clear-sighted ability and
“ wisdom in transacting affairs. Kings and Princes divided
“ no less by State policy than by the localities of regions and
“ skies, he happily brought together in the closest league and
“ the study of the general advantage, with watchful care and
“ suavity of manner. The suspicions and injurious rumours
“ which from time to time arose between the English and
“ the people of the Low Countries to such an extent as to
“ threaten disaster to the common cause, he allayed and
“ extinguished with admirable dexterity, so that We may
“ hope for a lasting friendship and harmony among the
“ neighbouring peoples. . . . And moreover, expert from his
“ earliest age in every kind of military affair, he was made by
“ universal consent leader of the Allied forces, and set right
“ a wretched and almost (hopeless) state of affairs. The
“ whole of Spanish Guelders he subdued to the Duke of
“ Burgundy in the face of the French army. He took Liege
“ and captured many well-fortified towns and citadels
“ completely garrisoned by the enemy's chosen troops
“ almost by a miracle of valour and celerity, at an unfavour-
“ able time of year.”

From these extracts it is clear that, so far at least as Peerages are concerned, there is no novelty in the proposal that their bestowal should be accompanied by a recital of the reasons for their grant. And certainly, in the case of some recent grants, the prospect of having to compile such a recital for publication would have had some deterrent

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effect upon the Minister recommending them. Yet it is hardly to be supposed that insistence on such a recital would by itself suffice to stop the present evil. A panegyric of each modern recipient of an honour is in fact habitually and instantly provided by the daily Press on the announcement of each Honours List; and though, occasionally, the material provided must seem, even to the practised weavers of Fleet Street, a little thin, the resulting paragraphs show that even in the most apparently unpromising soil an expert search for disinterested virtue is never entirely hopeless. Nevertheless it seems eminently reasonable that a public which frequently knows nothing of its greatest men should have some opportunity of appreciating them adequately when their greatness has been finally discovered and rewarded; and from that point of view we should like to see the ancient practice revived both in the case of new Peerages and also in connection with the grant of any lesser honour.

We are not unduly optimistic. A bald recital of the truth is not to be expected, perhaps not even to be desired. For the truth would often read somewhat as follows:

We consider nothing more prudent and praiseworthy than the distribution of rewards to those singled out for such preference by the First Lord of Our Treasury. We are informed by our trusty and well beloved counsellor Herbert Henry Asquith that it is the recent but laudable custom of Our Kingdom so to single out such persons as by generous gifts to a Junior Lord of Our Treasury have rendered themselves worthy in his opinion, after due and balanced calculation, to be so rewarded, and have by virtue of such gifts enabled the said Junior Lord to maintain a fund; designed firstly for the comfort, relief and support of such members of the Commons' House of Parliament as seem likely, with single-minded diligence and fixity of purpose, to support by their votes in that House every project, device, and scheme whatsoever, indicated to them for that purpose by the said Herbert Henry; and designed secondly for the maintenance of that vast multitude of importunate hirelings who, as long experience shows, are needed to persuade and compel Our loving subjects (contrary to their

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own erring and insolent desires and inclinations) to choose such single-minded members to represent them at Westminster. We are further informed that the same custom prescribes that whenever the name of any person is submitted for this purpose to the First Lord of Our Treasury by such Junior Lord without other cause assigned, then our said First Lord, carefully abstaining from all inquiry, shall thereupon assume that such generous gifts as aforesaid have been duly made by such person, and shall single him out for preference accordingly.

Now, therefore, the name of Richard Roe having been so singled out for preference by our trusty and well beloved Herbert Henry without cause assigned (and although neither We, nor as We believe any of our loving subjects, have heretofore ever heard of the said Richard Roe) We, relying upon the laudable custom aforesaid, have created him a Baron.

Such expedients, however, are at best but indirect methods of handling the matter; and it is the great merit of Mr Oliver Locker-Lampson's recent Bill that it proposed to Parliament itself, for the first time, a remedy designed to be both explicit and direct. For reasons which we shall consider later we think that the particular plan proposed by Mr Locker-Lampson is misconceived; but the manner in which its introduction was received by the House shows at once the extent of the evil, the terror exercised over the House itself in these matters by the two Front Benches and the urgent need of some specific remedy such as the Bill proposes.

The attitude of the present House of Commons towards the whole subject was plainly shown on the 1st May last, when this Bill stood as second order of the day. The first order was a Bill dealing with the advertisement of watering-places—a subject which, at first sight, appears to be of slight public importance and such as might have been adequately disposed of in an hour or two. Yet, according to a familiar device of the House when it desires to shelve a following subject, the whole of that day's discussion was devoted to the watering-place Bill; and when, at the end

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of the debate, the division on this grave question came to be taken, members on both sides lingered and dallied in the division-lobbies for so unconscionable a time before passing out between the tellers at the doors, that, on the matter being called in question in the House later, Lord Robert Cecil indignantly asked the Speaker whether it was in order "for honourable members deliberately to obstruct because they do not desire another Bill to come on."

These proceedings show clearly enough that the present House of Commons does not desire even to consider the subject of the Sale of Honours. Nor is the true reason of this far to seek. The two Front Benches or, more exactly, the two party organizations on which they depend and whose orders in these matters they have to obey, are both resolved to avoid all discussion of the subject; and, on this resolve being made known to their respective followers in the House, the few Members who desire such a discussion find themselves confronted by a universal hostility which they are powerless to break down. The Bill on this occasion, therefore, was not discussed at all. But its promoters were at least able to afford to the country one further proof of the well-known reluctance of democratic assemblies to deal either faithfully or at all with the authors and paymasters of their own corruption.

Among the few powers still left to the private Member, however, is that of moving that leave be given to introduce a Bill on any subject; and on the 19th May Mr Locker-Lampson in a speech which, under the so-called (though non-existent) Ten Minutes Rule, was necessarily short, moved for leave to introduce his Bill to prohibit the traffic in recommendations for Title and Honours.

"I may be asked," said he, "what evidence I have that such traffic in titles takes place. If I really required any evidence I had it that Friday a fortnight ago . . . when the Bill dealing with the advertising of watering-places was discussed for the whole afternoon; honourable

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“Members divided three times upon it; loitered along the Lobbies, and raised rather frivolous points of order, so as to avoid discussion on my Bill.”

And then, having observed with equal wit and truth that “while the Chancellor of the Exchequer caters for the million, the Chief Whip of the Party caters for the millionaire,” he concluded by saying plainly that, speaking for himself, he could only say how proud he would be to earn an honour honestly and how disgraced he would feel to buy one from the Chief Whip of his Party. The reply to this direct charge against the Chief Whips of both parties having been made by a gentleman named Hogge who, far from attempting to deny the charge, thought that there were “good reasons why we should continue to have a traffic in titles,” a Division was taken on the question that leave be given to introduce the Bill; when 207 Members voted for its introduction and only 42 against. As to which it is notable that no fewer than five Members of the Government, Mr Birrell, Mr Churchill, Mr Buckmaster, Mr Hobhouse and Mr Mackinnon Wood voted in the majority, while the minority contained other members of the Government, Mr T. W. Russell, Mr Handel Booth and a number of Irish Nationalists. As the result of this Division the Bill was ordered to be brought in and read a first time and was set down for its second reading on the 25th May. But that was the end of it. For when, on the 21st May, Mr Locker-Lampson asked the Prime Minister

“whether, in view of the large body of general support accorded to the Traffic in Titles (No. 2) Bill on its First Reading, he would adopt it as part of the Government’s legislative programme or afford it facilities for a Second Reading,”

Mr Asquith replied that the Government would do neither; and the Bill has in consequence necessarily been dropped. Such is the attitude towards this matter of the present House of Commons and its present leader.

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Coming now to the actual scheme of Mr Locker-Lampson's Bill, it consists in prescribing severe penalties of fine and imprisonment for various definite offences specified in the Bill. Thus, any Minister of the Crown who corruptly submits to His Majesty the name of any person with a recommendation to His Majesty to confer upon such person any title of honour or dignity; any person who corruptly induces a Minister to submit to His Majesty such a recommendation of some third person; any person who offers or promises to another person corruptly to procure the submission of his name or that of any other person to His Majesty with such a recommendation; and any person who corruptly procures such a recommendation of his own name to His Majesty; all these are to be liable to heavy punishments.

And the expression "corruptly" is defined to mean

"in consideration of the payment or promise, directly or indirectly, of any money or valuable consideration to the funds, or for the benefit of any political party, or any association, organisation, society, or club, established or maintained, or to be established or maintained, partly or wholly, to advocate or advance the purposes of any political party."

The Bill thus simply aims at declaring certain acts of corruption to be crimes. But the truth is that each one of them is already a common-law misdemeanour, already and duly punishable as such. The law on this point was clearly stated on the 1st July last by the Court of Criminal Appeal in the case of a Colonel sentenced for accepting bribes. It had been argued for the Colonel that the indictment did not disclose any indictable offence at common law; and the judgment of the Court dealt specifically with that contention in these words:

"It was said that there was no common law misdemeanour because a Colonel was not a public ministerial officer, but the Court thought that a public officer was one who

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“discharged any duty in which the public were interested,
“more particularly if that officer was paid out of moneys
“provided by the public. And a ministerial officer was in
“their opinion simply an officer who was not a judicial
“officer. They considered that a Colonel of a regiment was
“clearly both a public and a ministerial officer. . . . They
“thought that there was ample authority for holding that
“whenever an officer had a duty to do something in which
“the public was interested, to bribe him to act contrary to
“his duty or to show favour or partiality in the discharge
“of his functions constituted a common law misde-
“meanour.”

If, then, the Colonel of a regiment is a public ministerial officer it can hardly be doubted that a Minister of the Crown is also one; and, if so, it is plain that where any such Minister can be shown to have allowed himself to be influenced, contrary to his duty in the discharge of his functions, by any person, both that person and the Minister himself can be suitably dealt with and punished by the existing law. The real difficulty, indeed, arises not from any defect or insufficiency in the law, but from the profound secrecy surrounding the facts which, unless it can be broken down, must always render legal proof impossible. And the defect of Mr Locker-Lampson's Bill, regarded as a practical remedy, lies in its failure to provide or even to suggest any method by which this cloud of secrecy may be pierced.

Yet the scandal, being now universally admitted to exist, can hardly be left to flourish unchecked; and, despite all difficulties, some remedy must be found. It might indeed be supposed that the mere discovery of its existence would cure it; and that Whips and Ministers alike would henceforward refuse to carry it on. In time, no doubt, the dream of a stately and enlightened populace soberly controlling its own high destinies without regard to Caucuses and wire-pullers may be realized. But so long as enlightenment appears rather to dazzle than to clear the elector's vision, so long will Whips, Caucuses and Party Funds exist. A

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democracy which is for sale will probably always be bought; and all that can be hoped for is so to control the processes of purchase as at least to preserve intact the foundations of the State.

That convinced adherents of a political party should desire to assist it is natural and proper; and there is, from this point of view, nothing immoral in making disinterested gifts of money to a Party Fund. But there is all the difference in the world between such a gift and the kind of bargain transaction we are now considering. The case here is that of an unworthy man who pays money to the Chief Whip of a party in power and undertakes to ask no questions as to its application, in return for which the Chief Whip agrees to degrade his office by recommending the unworthy man to the Prime Minister for a public mark of signal Royal favour. The Prime Minister in fact knows, but is carefully not expressly told, that the cash has passed. The recommendation thus prepared is made; and the Sovereign, innocently relying on the advice and good faith of his Minister, grants the favour desired. That is the transaction, grossly illegal and even more grossly improper, against which some defence must be found, and we fear that it is vain to look for it in the hearts of Caucus politicians.

In such a case the Prime Minister, the Chief Whip and the unworthy Man are all clearly guilty at the least of misdemeanour. But, as has been said, the whole difficulty is one of Proof; for the facts are all enshrouded in a haughty silence. And, if they be questioned, the defence always is, not a denial of the payment or of the subsequent grant of the honour, but an indignant repudiation of all connection between the two. In these circumstances it is plain that unless some means exist of establishing the facts nothing further can be done. How, then, can the facts be procured?

We know of no other way than that of obliging those persons who alone know them to state them. With this object we would suggest the drafting and consideration of a short Bill providing that, in accordance with ancient precedent,

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the grant of every Honour in future should be accompanied by a recital of the reasons for the grant; by a Declaration on the honour of the recipient that he has paid and will pay nothing to any person for it; and by a further Declaration by the recipient of the total amount of all sums in excess of Ten Pounds paid by him without valuable consideration to any person or institution whatever within a period of five years before the date on which the Honour was granted.

Such devices, and indeed all similar suggestions for the suppression of this evil, are not remedies. At best they are obstacles which may make harder the paths of its perpetrators.

The whole of this gross scandal is but one further fruit of the false doctrine that the Minister is not the servant but the Master of the King. Against that doctrine we, at any rate, have consistently protested. We hold it to be false in law and productive in practice of the gravest mischief; yet it exists, is taught and widely believed, and, until it is uprooted and destroyed, will continue to exercise its baneful influence upon the whole of our public life.

KNIGHTS MADE IN THE FIELD

“**K**NIGHTS therefore be not borne but made, either before the battell to incourage them the more to adventure their lives, or after the conflict, as advancement for their hardinesse and manhood already shewed: or out of the Warre for some great service done, or some good hope through the vertues which doe appeare in them. And then are made either by the King himselfe, or by his Commission and Royall Authoritie given for the same purpose, or by his Lieutenant in the Wars, who hath his Royall and absolute power committed to him for that time.”

*(The Commonwealth of England, by
Sir Thomas Smith—London 1635
—p. 42.)*

THE ENGLISH WAY

OLD AND NEW

“**E**NGLISH of the English, he had something in the fibre of his mind which revolted from cosmopolitanism in any form.” These words are worthy of note and remembrance. Unfortunately many of our able and conscientious public men, statesmen, politicians and publicists, are for ever looking beyond these shores for social ideals and constitutional suggestions. In spheres of political evolution wherein England has been used to take the lead, she seems now inclined to follow one of the infinite variety of continental roads.

For centuries our constitutional laws have been the envy of other States and the object of their imperfect imitation. In modern times our social legislation has kept abreast if not ahead of popular aspiration and the nation's needs. The fruit of forethought, and the result of intelligent anticipation, have been political stability amid the crash of continental revolution. The habit of our statesmen has been to redress grievances in time, by methods suitable to the idiosyncrasies of the English people, to their historical, sentimental, and to their social requirements, without reference to the experiments of other nations. The clarity of vision characteristic of our leaders of political thought has not hitherto failed them. Guided by moderating influences, and stimulated by the writings of able political and economical writers, followed by the balancing judgments of statesmen who looked to practical as well as

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theoretical results, England steered safely through the European cataclysms from 1789 to 1848 with an immunity from harm which added to the respect and admiration, nay, the wonder, of continental nations.

The epigrams of Voltaire, the visions of Rousseau and the poison of Karl Marx, left little trace upon the practical legislation of a series of Parliaments during the fifty years from the passage of the Reform Bill to the death of Lord Beaconsfield.

Mr Gladstone was an empiric, which is not necessarily a reproach to a statesman who cannot avoid being also a politician. But even he held fast to the English tradition. He would gladly have imposed his ideas of political liberty upon the nations of Europe, but he never looked beyond these shores for inspiration or example. His faith in himself, his confidence in the English habit of mind, and his reliance upon his own insular imaginative faculties were complete. When he contemplated, for purely tactical reasons, the creation of an Irish Parliament, subject to the Assembly at Westminster in which his life had been spent, he turned with asperity from continental or colonial models. It never entered his mind that there was anything to be learned by England from political experiments overseas. He, too, was English of the English. His underlying sympathies were with Pitt rather than with Fox, with Saxon rather than with Norman tradition. In his eyes Napoleon would have loomed as a glorified Bomba, and he would have been the last Englishman in the world to send supplies of comfits and literature to St Helena.

We seem to have strayed into another atmosphere under the influence of German philosophy and colonial bounce. The mixed races of the vast Western Hemisphere, through their venal Press, and the mongrel democracies taking syndicalistic form on the Continent of Europe, appear now to throw a new glamour over the intelligence of English writers and statesmen. They proceed to borrow and advocate plans for an Elective Second Chamber to be

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composed of plutocrats and intellectuals, after the manner of the Dominions, and they acclaim "Social Reforms," such as the Insurance Act, copied from Germany and utterly unsuited to English requirements. Globe-trotting members of Parliament, having spent a few months in Heidelberg, Canada or the United States, and fresh from student theories and the tinned meats of colonial rhetoric, or journalists primed with the confidential utterances of subordinate colonial officials, flood platform and press with ill-digested schemes, delivered in the superior manner of citizens of the world.

A more insidious type is the philosophic politician, educated in German Universities, an alien in thought and habits from our healthy Oxford or Cambridge lads—those stupid, sensible, gentle-minded thickheads whose fathers have made England. He clouds the senses of his fellow countrymen with phrases whose obscurity he advertises as clear thinking, and passes off political tactics as honest endeavours at improvement.

Then, again, we find the political journalist, hitched on to the chariot of some prominent rhetorician, subsidized by wealthy aspirants to "honours," and concealing under the guise of an independent critic of public affairs the acid partisan and determined log-roller.

To these men whatever is English, and whoever has stood for England, are anathema. In their eyes a pro-consul, who has taken mighty risks for his country's sake, is a charlatan or a criminal: a knot of Englishmen daring much for the Empire, a tyrannical oligarchy: any insurrectionary faction, a people rightly struggling to be free. These men, safely ensconced in armchairs within hail of Fleet Street, see in English soldiers sacrificing life itself for the country mere agents of barbarism. So far as they can see, "the people" means one class of their countrymen, the class they flatter first and afterwards betray. The noble by inheritance or achievement, the supreme in intellect or character, the rich by prudence or hard work, are not to be

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counted as components of the "nation"; and their utterances, however wise, are to be stifled by any chance popular chord to which they contribute no note. These notions are the froth of 1793, and the far off echo of a craze, whose ideal of manhood was Marat and of womanhood a *Tricoteuse*. Of such—not wholly, yet in the larger part—is the faction that calls itself Liberal. The fine quality of mind that found expression in Mill's Essay on Liberty or in Bagehot's Monograph on the Constitution, the grim patriotism of Freeman, and the splendid insularity of Macaulay, characterize no longer the Liberal Party in our political conflicts. The historic sense is lost. All precedents to such men smell musty, and the constitutional reformer, as presumptuous and arrogant as he is ignorant and inconsiderate, prefers the method of Siéyès to those of Grey or of Gladstone.

The Parliament Act was a revolution by due force of law. As such it was accepted by the House of Lords and was imposed on the Nation. The old symbols were observed, and the structure of Parliament was left intact. Not for the first time, in revolutionary phases of our national story, limitations were imposed upon hereditary authority and power. Yet the shape of our Parliamentary system remains. The King, Lords and Commons are still nominally the elements of government, although the relations between them are fundamentally altered. Changes so drastic in character as to render the working of the Legislature uncertain and dangerous have been accepted and adopted, in spite of the natural misgivings of all prudent men. There has been no strong and sustained resistance to the Parliament Act; and the probable cause of this should be sought for in the temperament of the English, in their love of ancient forms, and their ingrained indifference to politics other than as a kind of sport, the exaggerations and aberrations of which they are accustomed to disregard.

At this stage there enters the cosmopolitan constitution-monger. An absurd preamble was affixed to the Parliament

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Act in deference to the wishes of a few persons who, unconvinced in their hearts by the diatribes against the House of Lords, yielded their better judgment only on terms. These terms were cunningly devised to allay their natural fears of unchecked rule by a single Chamber—that unchecked rule being however admitted for a period long enough to serve the purposes of the Party leaders who contrived the Act.

There is much that is pitifully comic about these leaders of Democracy. Mr Labouchere used to say that if power is placed in the hands of the many they would use it for their own benefit. Mr Lloyd George and Mr Churchill are always telling the “classes” that power has passed, and has rightly passed, from their hands into the hands of the many. This achievement, they would have us believe, is in its final stages due to a beneficial Radical Administration over which they two exercise so great a degree of control that the many should be ever personally grateful to them. And yet these Leaders of Democracy, these revilers of the Aristocrat and the rich, are surreptitiously engaged in recasting a Second Chamber, which may well prove to be stronger and more obstructive than the House they have destroyed, and they are proposing to fasten on the necks of the many such a yoke as may effectually prevent them from exercising those powers which they are told are their birthright.

Like their forerunners, like Mirabeau, like the Girondists, the English Radical leaders flatter the “people” and secretly intrigue against them.

Instead of the House of Lords, with its noble history, its patriotic devotion to the honour of England, exercising—in most cases—only a veto of delay, and—in most cases—a very limited power of revision, but with no other rights or powers, and unable, from its constitution, and because of its lack of popular authority, to resist in the long run a popular chamber when that chamber is vehement, and the nation is vehement too; instead of this, these Radicals

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and professed Democrats are contriving a Second Chamber or Senate, on a continental or colonial model, which is not unlikely to exercise over the popular chamber a very different kind of influence and domination.

Imagine an Assembly, chosen by indirect election, filled with intellectuals, retired Civil Servants, and elderly persons hardening into that obstructive and critical mood inseparable from advanced middle age, and reinforced by faddists, cranks and conceited people out of real touch with current requirements, but firm in the consciousness of work accomplished, yet without much hope in the future. That is no exaggerated description of the Salad of a Senate devised by the leaders of the Democracy, and about to be foisted on their dupes—if in any way possible—through the advocacy of a well-primed Press.

After whatever fashion the powers of such a Chamber are defined by Statute, its composition is bound to bring it into sharp conflict with the House of Commons. Elaborate safeguards such as a joint session, in the event of irreconcilable difference between the two houses, will prove to be unavailing from the point of view of the Radical, who professes a desire for drastic and rapid legislation upon democratic lines. The powers of obstruction, revision, delay and destruction in the hands of any Second Chamber, however constituted (if it be in possession of any power at all), are infinite when used by men determined to enforce their opinions, and with nothing to fear.

A House of Lords with everything to fear, upon an aristocratic basis, composed of men with everything to lose and nothing to gain, has always hitherto proved powerless in the long run to resist the popular will. A cosmopolitan Second Chamber, with nothing to lose, and everything to gain by notoriety and display, would prove a very different body, as the experience of the United States, of Canada and Australia has amply demonstrated.

There is no need to contrast the achievements of Aristo-

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cratic and Democratic forms of Government. It matters little to-day whether, as Strauss and Renan agreed, all civilization has its origin in Aristocracy and is the work of Aristocrats. Their day is past. Even members of the House of Lords are now found to extol Democracy and pose as Democrats. This may be a passing phase, for Aristocracy, turned out of the door, has a way of coming in again at the window and reasserting itself in the conduct of public affairs. Just now Democracy is in the ascendant, and the word is on the subservient and flattering tongues of all men. So be it. But what is the object and aim of the modern democratic legislator? Even he, with his self-apportioned salary of £400 a year, must realize the distinction between ordinary legislation and legislation which may be called Constitutional. Is he necessarily averse from adopting a special procedure when dealing with the latter? Does he condemn, in principle, the plan adopted by the framers of the American Constitution, who drew so marked a distinction between social and constitutional change? His cosmopolitanism should induce him to favour this distinction. Moreover, he cannot but realize that his experimental, and always doubtful, treatment of economics and social laws is concerned with enactments that affect the everyday life of the workers, the redistribution of wealth, the reapportionment of profits, as well as the conditions of labour; and that political machinery is a totally different matter that here, as in America, demands a different treatment.

Possibly some intelligent Democrat, encouraged by the example of the United States, might be willing to concede a distinction between social and constitutional legislation. It might suit him to adopt political mechanism which would facilitate the quick passage of measures designed to give the people what they want, and at the same time would render constitutional changes impossible save by a slower process. The American plan possesses these attributes. So does the Swiss. Cosmopolitan minds should turn favourably

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to these examples. Is it asking too much of the Democratic intelligence that it should endeavour, adopting Aristocratic and well-tried methods of procedure, to scan the gradual evolution of the English Constitution in the past, and make some endeavour to graft on to the Parliament Act, and on to Parliament as it stands to-day, a process which would meet the case? Several expedients have been suggested by political thinkers from Bentham and Hume to Mill and Sidgwick. The Democrat might study them.

Our Constitution, once wholly an unwritten one, is now partly written. Many of the powers of the Crown, and of the House of Lords, and of the House of Commons itself, have been defined by Act of Parliament. The Provisional Collection of Taxes Act is perhaps the latest, and not the least important example.

Instead of tinkering up a shoddy cosmopolitan Senate, that is never likely to command respect, or exercise much moral authority; that is almost certain to produce endless friction, and to require constant revision; might it not be worth the while of the framers of the Parliament Act to reconsider that extraordinary Statute, and to try and adapt it to our needs? The experience of three years is to hand. Its advantages—a few—and its blemishes—many—are beginning to be understood. Examine its working in the light of experience, and under the glare of Democratic ambitions. Is there, for instance, any single Democrat in the House of Commons, and are there many outside of it, who would not wish to be a Lord? Would any one of these millionaires, for instance, who subsidize Radical newspapers, choose to be a Senator and wear an Alderman's robe, in preference to being a Lord and wearing scarlet and ermine? Even for an Intellectual, an Order round the neck, or a Garter round the knee, has been known to possess charms.

Will the Haberdashers of politics ever really bring themselves to do anything to put an end to these things? Will they not rather—for once in company with more sensible

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men—bring pressure to bear upon the party which they adorn in some such words as these?

Why not then keep the framework of the ancient House of Peers, with its ceremonial and prestige? Never mind the atrabilious editors of newspapers. This is a question for their proprietors. It is a great feather in a man's cap to be My Lord. Is the source of such gratifying honours to be dried up for ever? If so the Liberal Party is ruined. It is just as easy to gerrymander the existing House of Peers in the interests of Democracy, as to create a brand new Colonial Senate, with indirect election, minority representation, aldermanic nominations and all the rest. And how far more dignified and satisfactory in the long run! Why not an extensive creation of real Life Peers, summoned by genuine writs, issued through a dignified Clerk of the Parliaments, coupled with a small admixture of hereditary legislators, chosen by the ancient Peerage, acting as an Electorate just to give the Second Chamber historic flavour?

Leave us then the House of Lords, and our Stars and Garters, to which all good Radicals aspire in their dreams. Within these limits, alter the Constitution as you will. If Democracy will insist upon Triennial Parliaments, it would be highly distasteful to the recipients of £400 a year, and to Ministers who look to five years as the minimum term of Office and its emoluments; but it would undoubtedly improve the working of the Parliament Act. If Democracy will consent to differentiate between procedure when a Church is to be robbed, or a limb lopped off the Empire, or a limitation placed upon the few prerogatives of the Sovereign or the few powers of the Lords, and the procedure when an Insurance Bill, or a Land Bill, is to be hurried through Parliament in time for an Appeal to disinterested and uncorrupted constituencies, we might even put up with the Parliament Act, and forget its preamble.

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If in any case crude experiments in Finance are to be the vogue, if the House of Commons is to exist merely for the purpose of recording the will of a high-handed Minister who happens to have captured the political machine, if the demagogue is to be installed as autocrat, and the alien plutocrat as the enlightened diffuser of knowledge, leave us, at least, our old and, above all, our new nobility!

THE ALLEGED BRITISH EMPIRE

THIS country was once called England and that alone. At the dawn of the sixteenth century it was peopled by some four millions of herdsmen, shepherds and miners, with as yet scarce a manufacturer, and even but few sailors among them. Few were the Englishmen and small their country. But they were dogged, sturdy fellows, always ready to go anywhere to fight and to plunder, and usually successful. They had overrun neighbouring kingdoms, larger, stronger and more civilized than their own, had crowned an English King in a foreign capital, had led a foreign King captive to their own shores. They were not ashamed of being few and their country small. They were the more proud of it and of themselves. This "little world," this "little body with a mighty heart," Shakespeare calls it. He was apparently a little Englander.

The feudal dependency of Wales was made part of the Kingdom in 1536. The "Lord of Ireland" proclaimed himself in 1542 its King, and there began the Kingdom of England and Ireland, which the Union with Scotland in 1707 made into the Kingdom of Great Britain. The Union with Ireland in 1801 produced what was then held to be the final form of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.

When Colonies were first conquered or settled they were held to be rich prizes won by English valour or English discovery and destined only to the further glory and profit of England. For the sake of England's trade Chatham himself

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held that they had no right to “ manufacture even a nail for “ a horseshoe.”

But besides the Colonies there was the great conquest of India, achieved in the eighteenth, and rounded off in the nineteenth, century. In 1877 this was proclaimed an Empire: so that at the accession of our present King, the Colonies, protectorates and an infinite number of territories of all kinds had been brought in, and the whilom King of England is now become King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of all the British dominions beyond the seas; and Emperor of India. The King of England has become in some sense the King, and in a more complete sense the present overlord, of more than one-fifth of the earth's surface and near one-fourth of its inhabitants.

It is to be remembered that, except in the loosest of speech, there is no British Empire at all. There is certainly no British Emperor. And if, therefore, there be a British Empire, it must be an Empire without an Emperor, which is very strictly a contradiction in terms. Originally a title of honour conferred by an army on a successful general, and identified later with the name of the ruler who swayed the vast dominions of Rome, the word Emperor has always since been coveted by monarchs; not only because they have, like other men, been so foolish as to desire honorific if empty titles, but also because they have usually been even more foolish than other men in the desire to be falsely believed great warriors. Monarchs who never set a squadron in the field, nor ever heard a shot fired except at pheasants, revel in military titles and uniforms. There are those who especially glory in the name, conferred by themselves on themselves, of War Lord and who would especially lament to be known by the far nobler name of Peace Lord. But in fact there is not now, nor ever was, a British Empire in any true sense of the term. That there is an Emperor of India may be believed, for an Act of Parliament declares it; but there is neither a real nor even a nominal Emperor of England, Scotland or

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Ireland, still less of the "self-governing" colonies of Canada, the Cape and Australasia. For these last there is responsibility indeed, but only the least trace of sovereignty, and none whatever of empire. In fact, what is called the British Empire consists of a congeries of peoples bound together by the loosest ties of authority that exist, or that ever perhaps existed. These peoples are indeed a family, strongly linked together by bonds of race, religion, language, sentiment and history—bonds which, it may be hoped, will subsist and strengthen. But they do not form an Empire in any accurate sense of the word. Nevertheless, this reservation being made, the word will be used, because it is current.

This dominion, this Empire, embraces every variety of race, people and colour, with every variety of laws, Roman, Mohammedan, French, Dutch and English, every variety of rights enjoyed under its rule and every degree of duty owing to it. To some extent at least, all these lands and peoples are within the pale of the Constitution. To the largest extent they are entitled to be dealt with according to its principles. Great, indeed, is the variety and complexity of the problems to which these principles are applicable.

Let it be noted in passing that the sum of the aggregate public revenues of the various oversea colonies and countries embraced in the British Empire is appreciably greater than that of the United Kingdom itself. Except in the case of India and Ceylon (which indeed produce over one-half of the revenues of these countries) Parliament has nothing to say to their revenues. Yet for the security of all these countries the United Kingdom is responsible.

The people of the Empire over which the Sovereignty extends are 410 millions, men, women and children. The electors of the United Kingdom are in 1914 barely over eight millions of men; roughly one-sixth of the Kingdom's people and one-sixtieth of the Empire's. The majority voting of the eight millions designate every few years the Party that shall for the next few years predominate in the

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House of Commons and rule in the country, while the minority designate the Party that shall criticize and oppose. In the end it is some four millions at most who effectually designate those who are to have an active part in the Sovereignty—four millions out of four hundred million. The People, at best, means but few. It has an occasional share in the formation of the Sovereignty, but that is all. The people, having named its delegates, has come to the end of its constitutional powers. It is no part of the Sovereignty.

The British Empire of 1914 is then a very different thing from the English Kingdom of 1314. Even if we take Ireland and the Palatinate Counties of Durham and Lancaster into consideration this remains true. Ireland was much less populous than England, and such population as it had was white and Christian. The powers of the Palatinate Counts and Bishops were strictly limited. The dominions of the English Crown were on the whole homogeneous and concentrated. From Magna Charta to the Bill of Rights—i.e. through our whole constitutional development of the formulæ of government—England was more or less of a concentrated whole. Are our constitutional doctrines applicable to the heterogeneous elements that have gathered round it since? In a word, is the Empire “British” in politics as well as in police?

It is “British” inasmuch as the British army and the British navy police it. But is it “British” in idea? Scotland, and, on the whole, Ireland have absorbed the English constitutional tradition: “British” remains the best description of that spirit which arose out of the Scotch Covenant as well as out of the English Charter. In the times of stress and expansion—under Anne, under the Georges, against Napoleon, against Nicholas, the “British” spirit of freedom and fair play became conscious of itself and its power. It needed, or seemed to need, no further embodiment in formula. It had found its best expression in Mansfield’s judgment that a slave cannot breathe in Britain. Beside the half-ecclesiastical notes of the National Anthem

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it had ranged the triumphant and wholly secular chorus, "Britons never, never shall be slaves." Unfortunately it never troubled to define slavery. And this, inevitable as it was, made two mischievous developments possible. It became possible to represent industrial conditions as slavish—which they are not—and to represent bureaucratic mastership as not being inconsistent with freedom—which it is.

A street-corner orator is sure of a cheer if he addresses his audience as "Slaves of your inhuman employers!" He never dreams of calling them slaves of the School Inspector, the Sanitary Inspector, the Insurance Committee, the Labour Exchange, or the Town Clerk's clerk. To such an extent are we ruled by words! His children may be taken and beaten at the bidding of one official, his windows may be opened at the dictate of another, his dog shot by another; his employment may be dictated by a fourth, his power to change it denied by a fifth: every avenue of life may be stopped for him—yet he is not a slave until a private employer offers him a job!

But, if it has been obscured in its native home, the British idea of Constitutional Freedom has crossed the seas. Slavery—*eo nomine*—has had to go, not only in Britain, but in the torriddest colonies. In Jamaica, in India, in Demerara, in Ceylon, in Fiji, there is no such thing as a slave: although there may be several men who look very like it. And political slavery—subjection to the arbitrary dictates of rulers—is following legal slavery. Everywhere the demand is being made that the official shall not ride roughshod over the native. It is this demand, and no doctrinaire desire for western institutions, that gives its alarming strength to what is stupidly styled Anarchism in India. India does not want legislatures. What she wants is less legislation and more respect.

At present this is not a movement which has made any great headway. In this regard the Empire is still a great deal more Imperial than British. It is very far indeed from

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being a democracy. It is, as we began by observing, a narrow oligarchy of some one per cent. Yet, when we analyse the sway which these oligarchs exercise, we shall come across some curious facts.

1. Their sway over the great and growing communities of Canada, South Africa, Australia, Newfoundland and New Zealand is almost accurately zero. Sometimes it has been said—Mr Chamberlain once said it—that such a colony could and would be coerced if it failed in due consideration for the interests of British subjects. No one says so to-day. South Africa deports British subjects, and even such a Cabinet as our present Administration refuses to contemplate the possibility of contradicting it, though urged by the Labour party to insist on the right of the men to return. Newfoundland, indeed, sees her fishery legislation superseded by British Bait Acts—but that is because she is small, and because her antagonists are the United States of North America.

2. Their sway over the Crown colonies and India is in practice a very restricted one. Broad lines of policy—such as a policy of trade in cotton—or a system of shipping regulation, they may be able to enforce. But from any really effective interference with the daily life of the people they are precluded by practical considerations. Just as it is practically impossible for them to direct the course of Foreign policy, so it is impossible for them to govern Crown colonies. Knowledge is insufficient, and plainly insufficient. The Colonial Office and the governor on the spot, in practice, need apprehend little, if any, interference.

3. Their sway over so-called Protectorates (though this is a small matter) is somewhat greater. Protectorates of the modern variety were apparently the invention of General Jervoise, the quondam Governor of Singapore, who, on annexing Perak, sagely determined that “it would be inconvenient” to give its people the character of British subjects. The Governor therefore retained on the throne a dummy sultan, who was to move as his British “adviser” pulled the wires. And this transparent device is supposed to prevent

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our Courts from inquiring as to whether these British-administered territories are British or not. The absurdity of the supposition that they are not British territory appears clearly from the fact that the British authorities cannot get out of the habit of treating them as such: Parliament has recently actually been persuaded to legislate for “protectorates” (see the Merchant Shipping Act, 1912), with which it has, on the Jervoise theory, no more to do than with Germany. Still, the sorry fiction of their independence places these districts more completely under the control of the Colonial Office than are ordinary Crown colonies where the inhabitants are recognized as fellow-subjects by the Courts. The same applies to the vast territories ruled by the “feudatory” princes of India.

The unitary Empire ruled by a single omnipotent Parliament therefore dissolves on examination into a loose federation. Over the greater extent of it the Imperial Parliament has little actual power. It is needless to discuss what might happen if it directly legislated for such places. The practical fact remains that it does not and cannot. Imperial Federation, then—the dream of a Rosebery, an Argyle, and a Chamberlain—we have, in a sense, already. We have the various local sections of the Empire going their own way in local legislation, with a common organ (not, it is true, an impartially selected organ) for preserving the peace and securing the common defence. The Admiralty cable with the red strand at its core (as Lord Brassey once said) is no bad instrument of union.

Were this the place, it might be interesting to trace the development of the modern doctrine that it is impossible to impose the will of the Imperial Parliament by force on a self-governing colony. It is not any theory of the impropriety of coercion as a policy that is the foundation of the doctrine. Those who decry the possibility of coercing three hundred thousand men in Natal will talk glibly of reducing a million in Ulster, and do in fact coerce millions in India. The doctrine appears to be nothing but a fearful recollec-

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tion of the revolt of the American Colonies. "Come what may," we may imagine we hear Official Persons whispering, "we must never again try to dictate to a Colony." Dictation was tried in Quebec in 1838, and the result was to confirm the official belief that it cost more than it was worth. On the other hand, coercion succeeded in the eighteenth century in Scotland and Ireland, and in the nineteenth in India. Within the United Kingdom, therefore, and in Asiatic possessions, coercion of whole populations remains an accepted possibility. White colonies, for this quite accidental reason, are regarded as beyond its pale—except Newfoundland. Had the event of the American war been different (as might easily have been the case but for the intervention of France) we might at present be living under a very different regime from that which we enjoy.

What that system is, we have seen. It is a loose Federation, the members of which enjoy very varying measures of autonomy, and very varying types of constitution, ranging from the naked ochlocracy of Australia and the gubernatorial autocracy of St Helena to the refined polity of Quebec and Ontario.

As a corollary from these considerations, it follows that the character of the Empire, outside the British Islands, is not in any distinctive fashion British. No one would think of America as British. But can it be affirmed that Canada or Australia is much more like Britain than is America? Would the casual emigrant feel much more at home among the dollars and cars of Toronto than among the cars and dollars of Philadelphia? Is the violent social legislation of Australia, or the American regard for the sanctity of contracts, nearer to the traditional British ideal of fair play and common sense? The fact is that the great colonies have struck out their own lines of development. They are becoming less British day by day, not in sentimental theory, but in practice. As to India and the Crown Colonies, no one pretends to govern them on British lines, or to represent them as permeated with British ideas.

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We have, then, on analysis, no such military Empire as the Roman, Alexandrine, or Assyrian, with a single autocratic Emperor, whose will would be obeyed in any and every part alike. Neither have we any over which Parliament can exercise its sovereign power as it does in these islands. Really, the so-called Empire is a Federation: the word is misleading, and not even ornamental, now that Empires have come to connote, in the mouth of the people, Music Halls and variety artists. Is there any hope of permanence for that Federation, and any advantage in expressing it in formal terms of constitutional union?

We have sometimes been urged to cement the Empire by fiscal bonds. It would scarcely be kind to dwell at length on this proposition, which once seemed so glittering and attractive, and from which the golden varnish has of late worn so disastrously away. Preference for colonial agricultural products has been recanted as a possible British policy. Preference for British manufactured goods is emphatically rejected as a conceivable colonial one. "Free Trade within the Empire" suits neither Norfolk, Melbourne nor Bombay. Clearly, it is not Compulsory Trade that is going to unite the Empire, North, South, East and West, in the bond of fraternal unity. The idea seemed to flatter our business instincts: it seemed sensible, if cynical, to ground our Imperial unity on common business interests. But it has conspicuously failed as a unifying agent: it has only accentuated the inevitable divergences of interest between different parts of the Imperial whole. We must look elsewhere for an augury of continued existence and cohesion for the Empire.

So long as it embodies a single idea it will have the best possible guarantee of permanence. And, with all its defects, it does embody a single idea—one of the happiest that ever occurred to mankind. It does stand for what may be briefly described as *Minding Your Own Business*. It was not as conquering crusaders, but as plain business men, that most of the British pioneers went forth. We are not all of the

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same language; we are not all of the same religion; we are not all of the same colour; we are not all of the same culture. But we all desire to be let alone to manage our own affairs.

Jews and Gentiles; Malays, Kanakas and Canucks; Tamils, Papuans and Maltese; Yorkshiremen, Chinese and Pathans, we all desire to be let alone.

There are not many stirring or pathetic passages in the current Law Reports. But a citizen of the British Empire must feel some thrill (even if a lawyer) in perusing the case decided a few years ago on the status of the Unified (Romanized) Greek Church in Canada. At home in Europe the Galicians or Ruthenians in certain districts, originally Orthodox Greeks, were forcibly Romanized. Permitted to retain their Greek ceremonies, they were made tributary to Rome and forced to accept the Tridentine creed. When they emigrated to Canada, they reverted to Orthodoxy. Why? "Because," as they express it with quaint pathos, "we have come to a country where there is no 'must'!"—where people, so long as they behave themselves, are let alone.

This is the secret of the British Empire. To let alone, and to see that others are let alone, is the heart of that British fair play which is only another name for free play—"laissez aller et regardez passer." It means tact, and considerateness, and a sense of proportion. There has been nothing so Greek since Phidias. It means Peace, moreover. If we let each other alone, we shall not quarrel. The Pax Britannica is the correlative of the Ratio Britannica.

So long as such a spirit obtains, so long the Empire, so-called, will last. Composed of States respecting each other's spheres, firmly resolved not to tolerate or to contemplate internecine warfare, the British Empire is capable of indefinite extension as a true Federation—none the less genuine because composed of dissimilar elements and resting on elastic understandings rather than on rigid formulæ. But if that spirit dies out, the Empire dies with it. There is

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nothing else to keep it together except force, and in times of stress force may be met by stronger force. Socialism is the enemy of the Empire, not because it is opposed to expansion, but because it is given over to meddling. Let the tide of bureaucracy rise higher in the councils of the Empire, and that Empire must before long fall to pieces, or else become a military autocracy. A socialistic Britain will inevitably insist on enforcing terms on the Oriental dependencies to prevent their competition. From that clash of interests the collapse, or the military subjection, of the whole Empire must ensue.

No formal schemes of Imperial Federation will save it in such a case. All such schemes rest on a mathematical balancing of votes which (as we see in Ireland) is useless when vital interests are concerned. An outvoted India would be none the less an injured and indignant India. Majority voting can only decide minor questions. Bare majorities can only decide trivial questions. The great use of Federation would be to enable the statesmen of the Empire to meet in friendly council, each with an equal claim to a hearing and to respect. The present picnics for ephemeral colonial politicians, styled Imperial Conferences, at which the politicians lecture and are lectured by the Colonial Secretary for a few days, do not command universal admiration, or (to be frank) much interest. Such more or less secret conclaves may be beneficial, but with all the desire in the world to find them impressive, the ordinary mortal is inevitably drawn to thoughts of Tooley Street. The millions of India: the budding intelligence of Africa, bursting into bloom in the hot suns of the Shirê and the Zambesi: the swirling influx of Chinese, Burmese and scarcely less remote Slavs and Poles: how is all this represented in the "Imperial Conferences" of a polite Secretary of State with a dozen pushful advance agents?

Therefore our last word must be one of reverent agnosticism. We do not know how this thing is going to develop. There are signs of hope, and signs of danger. Formal frame-

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works of union may in some ways do good; but, if evil days are upon us, they cannot stave off disaster. Only one thing is certain: that meddling over-government will inevitably produce ruin. Whether we can avoid it seems more than uncertain. Whether the British tradition of personal independence is likely long to survive in these islands may perhaps be doubted. Within the last thirty years it has become evident that it has undergone a change of which the salient characteristic is insincere familiarity. By a simple glance at the popular papers, the advertisements and entertainments of the day, and a mental comparison with their predecessors of 1880, it will be apparent how fast and how far we have travelled. In some ways America has travelled still further, despite the lip-service there paid to Liberty. An atmosphere of insincere familiarity is fatal to personal independence and to that self-contained and balanced fairness which is the essence of British freedom and British Imperial success. Intrusion is the note of this side of Americanism. Self-restraint is characteristic of the British type. It may degenerate into isolation. There is some truth in the picture of the travelling Briton, remonstrating with the stranger who has warned him that his cigar has dropped a spark on his coat — (“Why, sir, your coat-tails have been “on fire for ten minutes—and I never ventured to accost “*you!*””)—yet without that disinclination to meddle with the affairs of others, of which this is the humorous exaggeration, the British Empire would hardly have been built up, and will certainly not be long maintained.

We may well add to our national virtues the frank interest of the American, the poetic imagination of the German, the delicate grace of the Latin races, the intense singleness of purpose of the Japanese. But nothing will compensate, in this matter of Empire, for the loss of the spirit of “live “and let live”—of the plain unvarnished habit of Minding our own Business.

THE CITY AS PEACE COMPELLER

MR NORMAN ANGELL

NEARLY a hundred years ago, a small body of Dissenters, mainly Quakers, formed themselves into a Society for various purposes, the chief of which were to promote permanent and universal peace, and to diffuse information tending to show that War is inconsistent with the spirit of Christianity and the true interests of mankind. Its last annual report shows that the Peace Society thus founded continues in 1914 to be a body composed mainly of Dissenters from the Church of England, although amongst its thirty-eight vice-presidents are to be found the Bishops of Hereford and Lincoln, five Deans and three Canons, in company with the Reverend John Clifford, M.A., D.D. (America) and Mrs Ormiston Chant. No fault can be found with the unremitting support the Dissenting Churches have given to their Peace Propaganda. There has been great and continuous effort, not without much sacrifice of time and money. As far back as 1840 prizes were offered for essays on Arbitration. In 1843 there was held under the Society's auspices that first Peace Congress which adopted and forwarded to fifty-five governments, through the usual diplomatic channels, fifty-five copies of a resolution urging all governments to recognize arbitration and to introduce its principles into all Treaties. In 1848, 1850, and 1851, it organized further Peace Congresses in Brussels, Paris, and Frankfort respectively, and in 1851 it rejoiced over the great Hyde Park Exhibition which was thought to

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foreshadow the millennium. The Crimean War was a sad setback, but, in one of the protocols of the Treaty of 1856, there is a solemn recognition of the principle of Arbitration, which was adopted by England, France, Russia, Austria, Prussia, and Italy, and subsequently by forty other governments who were formally invited by the Congress to give their adhesion to it. Mr Gladstone, speaking in the House of Commons, cited this protocol as a great triumph for humanity, and the Peace Society claimed the credit.

The prearranged surrender (incorrectly termed an Arbitration) of 1872, which settled the Alabama claims so unjustly and so unfairly to Great Britain, is claimed as another trophy of the Society's bow and spear. It also appears from a statement made by the Secretary that the Society has distributed millions of tracts, and has conducted Special Missions to Sunday Schools, and finally that in 1894 it submitted to Lord Rosebery a "National Memorial for Arresting the Growth of European Armaments." The Rescript of the Emperor of Russia convening the first Hague Convention is said to be identical with this Memorial. But to-day no one believes that the Hague Convention was assembled to promote Peace. The undoubted object was to clip the wings of Great Britain, to restrain Germany, and so to allow a free field for that adventure in Eastern Asia which inflicted such an unexpected blow on Russia's power and prestige.

When we contemplate the honest work of the Peace Society, continued through three generations, it seems odd that, since the publication of the "National Memorial" of 1894 which the Emperor of Russia is alleged to have adopted as his text, the Expenditure of Europe on Armaments has increased so rapidly that the Society has been obliged, within the last few months, to alarm us by circulating a new tract showing in detail the expenditure of the European nations on their fighting forces in the completed year 1911-12. From this leaflet it appears that 490,080,696 Europeans maintained in their armies—including Reserve

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Forces of all kinds—35,872,833 men, and in their navies 827,477 men, at a cost, for both, of £340,459,606, to which a sum of £296,184,950 is added to represent the value of the profitable labour lost to the Community. The gross National Debt of all these countries is stated at £5,675,938,923, whose service entails an annual charge of £290,376,286. So that out of a total revenue in all Europe of £1,294,490,473, no less a sum than £570,835,892 goes, in time of peace, in war services, and in repayment and interest on debt—mainly the result of past wars.

We may assume, therefore, that the Peace Society has made no headway for twenty years, and that the time is now ripe for an effort in another direction in which, be it said with regret, the appeal to Christianity and human morality and our sense of right and wrong must be allowed to take a back place. The new effort is an attempt to set up against those predatory instincts of man which prompt him to Pillage by War, those other predatory instincts which urge him to the more certain acquisition of Wealth without War. Needless to say we refer to the economic pressure of trade and commerce which we all know is based on Credit operations, whereof War is the enemy and the destroyer.

It is no doubt true that the negative result of the Boer War from the point of view of the improvement of the material interests of our country set us all thinking. The War cost £225,000,000, and involved the sacrifice, through death on the field of battle and in the hospitals, of 24,434 valuable lives. The events which have since occurred, such as the retrocession of the country to a Boer Government, and the extinction of any effectual British influence in the Union of South Africa (to say nothing of the Deportation of the Nine), have caused a great self-examination. People remember that the late Mr Chamberlain induced us to guarantee a loan to the Transvaal of £35,000,000 at $2\frac{3}{4}$ per cent, on the pledge, conveyed by him to the House of Commons, that the mine-owners would in return pay £30,000,000 cash down in three years towards the expenses

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of the War. The Transvaal got the loan. The mine-owners have provided neither thirty million pounds nor thirty pence, and have no intention of so doing. Unkind people have said that it was this pitiful failure of Mr Chamberlain's Imperial Mission which induced him to raise the spectre of Protection. Be that as it may, the City has been realizing, in its own slow fashion, that even a victorious War absorbs a vast amount of Capital and pays no Dividend.

Within the last four years a writer, hitherto unknown, has crystallized into one or two short expressions all that has been vaguely incoherent in our mercantile minds, and has thus started a new movement of thought, which it is impossible for statesmen in any country to ignore or neglect. The question he puts to the world must be examined in the light of knowledge and experience. The verdict may negative the thesis or may accept it with acclamation. That is immaterial for the present. It is one of the live issues of the day. No one denies its importance. Money in abundance has been forthcoming to investigate its truth or falsehood. Lord Esher has lent the inquiry the weight of his name, and Sir Richard Garton, "the Glucose King," has placed a large sum of money in the hands of the inquirers so that fear of expense may not limit its scope. Mr Norman Angell is a man of the moment. He is the latter-day Peace Society. Editors, leader writers, reviewers, the magazine prophets of foreign events, fill pages and columns with criticism and comment on Norman Angellism. In short, if his theories be justifiable they must sink deep into public opinion throughout the world, and influence all future foreign policy.

What then has Mr Norman Angell done? He has asked himself and the world a question. He wants to know if it is any longer possible in the comity of highly civilized countries that a victorious war between any two of them should bring any material gain to the victor? He answers his own question in the negative, and sets out his reasons in at least four good sized volumes published at various times in the last five years, and in countless newspaper articles, letters

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and lectures. A monthly periodical, *War and Peace*, founded to propagate the new doctrine, already enjoys a considerable circulation. He has appealed from the soldiers and the diplomatists to the "City" in its widest sense—to the merchants, bankers, traders and manufacturers of the whole civilized world and the millions of work-people dependent on them. He is extraordinarily slipshod. He writes the English of Fleet Street. He repeats himself over and over again. He uses the same illustrative arguments in every book, almost in every chapter. His metaphors are apt to be mixed. Here is a typically confused and verbose passage from his latest work, which nevertheless puts his whole case in the briefest compass:

"Now I want you to recall for a moment the propositions
"with which I started this paper, namely, that the relations
"of states are rapidly modifying in obedience to changing
"conditions—the greater division of labour set up by
"quicker communications; that this intensified division
"of labour sets up a condition of necessary interdepend-
"ence between those who share the labour; that this inter-
"dependence in its turn involves a necessary subsidence of
"the factor of physical force between them; that not only
"does this subsidence of physical force necessarily weaken
"the rôle of political control, but the very complexity of
"the division of labour tends to set up co-operation in
"groups which cut right athwart political frontiers, so that
"the political no longer limits or coincides with the econ-
"omic frontier; and that finally, partly as the cumulative
"effect of all these factors, and partly as the direct effect of
"devices born of the necessity of co-ordinating such factors,
"you get what I may term telegraphic financial reaction—
"a condition of sensibility by which the organism as a whole
"becomes quickly conscious of any damage to a part; that
"the matter may be summarized in the statement that
"military force is more and more failing of effect and must
"finally become—I think it has already become—economi-
"cally futile."

But he possesses the earnestness of feeling, and the enthusiasm, common to all great propagandists, which at once explains the attention his works have received. His books

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have been translated and published in five languages, and have run to eight or ten editions in each. He has been invited to expound his views before the United Service Institute, the British Association, the Institute of Bankers, the Cambridge Union, various German Universities, and innumerable Societies in different European countries. The singular result has been that the most active defenders of the existing justification of warfare—that it pays to conquer—are continually being converted, if not to the full Norman Angell view, at any rate to the necessity of obtaining support for his teaching if any decided step towards peace, or even reduction of Armaments, is to be made in our time. For what is the use of the armed camp, which Europe is to-day, if, when the explosion comes and the *débris* is searched, nobody is to be any the richer?

Mr Norman Angell differs from the old Pacifists in that he accepts Armaments as inevitable under the present conditions, and has no particular sympathy with those political groups whose efforts are directed solely towards limitation of the growth of armies and navies. It is sufficient for his purpose to call our attention to the fact that the only effect of a strengthening of armaments in one country is an equivalent strengthening of those of its threatened neighbours, so that in the end the relative position remains as in the beginning.

It is unfortunately only too easy for him to furnish instances of this particular folly. The mischief usually begins with Germany, which is distinguished by being at once the most intellectual country in Europe, and the one in which the most intellectual of its citizens have the smallest share in the government. When Germany builds warships, England builds ships in reply, Germany builds more ships, England builds twice as many, Germany strengthens her Naval Law once more, and we go ahead with our ship-building faster than ever. The relative sea-power of the two nations remains the same. Countless millions of money have been spent on both sides which might have been

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applied to the remunerative works of Peace and to the improvement of social conditions in both countries. The balance remains adjusted. The ships, the product of all this money and skill, become in a very few years as useless as last season's millinery, but the Capital Expenditure on yards and equipment for producing these great weapons of War, and the workmen specially trained to the intricate processes of manufacturing guns and armour and engines, cannot readily be diverted to reproductive industries. It would require heroic measures, and great popular sacrifices in both countries, to adjust either the Capital or the Labour now applied to armament to the manufacture of the humble ploughshare and its like, and even if both countries were in absolute accord as to disarmament there are all the other countries to consider.

Not content with this acute competition with Great Britain for the command of the sea, Germany, some two years ago, decided to augment her Peace Army by 267,000 men, presumably to establish a final numerical supremacy over France. The German Government last year made a War levy estimated to yield £50,000,000, proportionately chargeable on the capital value of the estate of every property owner in Germany, to finance the initial expense of this great increase of men with the relative new barracks, guns, horses and equipment, and of course the expense of maintenance of the added men will be a fresh annual burden on the German taxpayer. The French immediately replied in the only way open to them, the numerically weaker nation, by making their conscript soldiers remain with the colours for three years instead of two. Their current budget shows a deficiency of £54,000,000 accumulated over past years, and, so far as can be estimated, of £28,000,000 on the Budget of the current financial year. Students of history will remember that the evil days of France have invariably been associated with Deficits. The Deficit which Colbert could not avert brought about the downfall of Louis XIV's great scheme of predominance in Europe; the Deficit which Necker

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could not relieve was a determining cause of the French Revolution. In both cases the complete breakdown of taxable capacity under an unwise and oppressive Fiscal system caused the calamity; and the same cause will as surely produce a similar effect. But even if France could fund her Deficit it is certain she can find no more white men. It is rumoured that she is organizing a black army in Africa. Its use in Europe might be held a crime against the race—but that will not stop France. Her ally, Russia, is this year strengthening her Peace Army to a total of 1,460,000 men, and massing the best and most prepared of her soldiers on the German and Austrian frontiers. If overwhelming armament is intended to promote Peace by inspiring fear of War, as the rulers of Germany maintain and practise, it is nevertheless obvious that a crisis is close at hand. The world cannot bear the strain. There is not enough Money or Credit.

A soldier's theory of the necessity of War is founded on Fear. It is a singular thing that whenever a retired Field Marshal or General talks or writes on National Defence he assumes that his country is, and will remain, so weak that it would be murderous folly to lead its troops to repel an invader. This is common form in all countries and of all soldiers. The ancient warrior is always striving to make his compatriot's flesh creep. It is true that, when the soldier goes to war, he displays courage and does his duty fairly well—very well if he avoids mistakes. But either the trade of War is so unattractive that the best men do not touch it, or uncompromising obedience to foolish orders in youth so weakens the calibre for leadership, when the time comes to lead, that the great soldiers of the world, from the earliest times of history, can be counted on the fingers. The inference is that military opinion, even when expressed about the affairs of its own trade, is not worth much, and the City will be well advised to ignore the jeremiads of these elderly gentlemen who shatter its nerves, and to rely on its own weapon as in 1911, when the threat of financial

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panic in Germany made by the Berlin bankers, stopped a War.

Sailors break out less often. But suppose that the Government of seven years ago had been frightened by one of our periodical scares, and had borrowed £100,000,000 to build an invincible fleet. To-day that fleet would be little better than scrap-iron, and very angry the City would be if the Government came down for another £100,000,000 loan to build ships of the latest design to replace these obsolete monsters, whilst the mob is taught to scream as before, "The Country in danger."

We may take it as axiomatic that in the present grouping of the European Powers, all expenditure for warlike preparation, and all additions of men made by one group, will be immediately countered by the provision by the other of an equally large expenditure and an equally numerous addition to the available men. Unless the Germans, who set the pace, cry a halt, it seems very doubtful if these gathering navies and armies can pass away without an appalling war. It should of course be the task of diplomacy to avoid this issue. There is, however, little hope from diplomacy, so long as it is conducted in secret, and until the diplomatic service is manned by business men, who will substitute straightforward business methods for the chicanery, spying and deception which are the distinguishing marks of so many of the professional diplomatists who, under present conditions, get Europe into trouble. They are usually persons of small intelligence and abnormal self-appreciation. Their little tricks, their *secrets de Polichinelle*, and their tortuous ways are usually despicable, but they cannot help this, for they are working on principles invented before the conditions of modern Commerce were evolved. One of them, the Comte de Garden, has expounded these principles in the following words:

"Every State, in its external relations, has, and can have,
"no other maxims than these: Whoever by the superiority
"of his forces, and by his geographic position, can do us

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“harm, is our natural enemy. Whoever cannot do us harm,
“but can, by the extent of his forces, and by the position he
“occupies, do injury to our enemy, is our natural friend.”

Dr Jayne Hill, who was United States Ambassador to Germany, says:

“The assumption which lies at the foundation of classic
“diplomacy is that every State is seeking to appropriate
“for itself everything in the world that possesses value,
“and is restrained from doing so only by the resistance it
“may actually encounter.”

Observe there is not one thought given, in either definition or assumption, to the necessities of modern trade and the Credit system, or to its diplomatic value. Mr Norman Angell points out to the mercantile community—to whom he chiefly addresses his appeal—that it would be impossible to frame any two sentences embodying views more inimical to the necessities of Commerce. He has indeed based his theory on the fundamental misconception that inspires these utterances. What he says is not new. Cobden and the Free Traders had said it years ago and it had been forgotten. A Government as such cannot benefit by interfering with or trying to guide the trade of its subjects. It may, and often does, hinder and injure it. It can impose Import Duties and Export Duties, and sometimes pretend to help it by differential railway rates, or subsidies to shipping. But the richest country in the world is that in which, so far as is humanly possible, the Government leaves its merchants to manage their own affairs.

Consider for a moment Comte de Garden's phrase: “Whoever . . . can do us harm.” The first point that occurs is that the Comte believes it possible that one country can attack another and, if victorious, can march off with its movable wealth both in the shape of an indemnity, and of actual material plunder in the good old way, and that the real and only motive for war and preparation for war is the enrichment of the country whose plans are so laid

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as to gain the victory. Otherwise how can one country harm another? Not surely by plundering it, for the loot remains acquired to the individual officer or man. Not surely by trading with it, although there are patriots even in this country who are equal to taking that view. But, as Mr Angell points out, if such a thing were true, the greatest gain that could happen to any country would be the complete blotting out of its neighbours by a new Flood. Then they could not interfere any longer with the other's progress. But the country, which had hoped to thrive on its neighbour's ruin, would no longer have any neighbour to trade with, and its isolation would be but the beginning of its own commercial and national decline.

What would be the financial result of a War between England, an island power, and Germany, a land power, with a dangerous navy not strong enough, however, to establish command of the sea? War would have been preceded by lengthy diplomatic excursions and alarums, and newspaper articles working up bitter antagonisms. The diplomatists would have set in motion all the machinery of the reptile Press for inciting popular passions in both countries. There would be in both a steadily falling Stock Exchange, a steadily rising Bank rate, a slow and poisonous contraction of legitimate trade, a stiff rise in Marine Insurance Premiums, a quiet calling up of all naval and military reserves, a good deal of unemployment, and a small increase in the price of bread and other necessities of life. All this in both countries would destroy tens of millions of Credit before war commenced. Then matters come to an issue. War breaks out—it would scarcely be formally declared till afterwards. There is a complete crash in the Stock Exchanges of both countries, and a fall in values—that is to say in credit—in twenty-four hours equal to the cost of a six months' war—fifteen per cent all round is a moderate estimate. There is a run on the Savings Banks, and a suspension of the Bank Act, or its equivalent. Such things happened in the past, but not all at once, and often the full

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strain was not felt for years after the war had begun. The great difference, the great fact to be considered, is that nowadays everything will happen all at once. In Germany in 1911 the fear of war over Agadir nearly closed the Berlin Bourse. The Berlin "City" saved the situation by forcing the German Foreign Office to modify its language and its pretensions. The German Foreign Office did not really care about Morocco. It only thought the opportunity a favourable one for provoking a quarrel with France, for which it had been manœuvring for years. But when the sensible and enterprising merchants of Berlin heard what was going on, and were face to face—even before the final crisis—with Banks failing and industries closing down, they stepped in and stopped the projected war. The infamous part of it all was that, under present Diplomatic conditions, the whole Morocco dispute came as a complete surprise to the community in every one of the three countries most concerned—to England most especially, where at the very crisis, Mr Lloyd George's warlike threats of 21st July were dictated to him, and typewritten for him, by Sir Edward Grey (without the previous knowledge even of the Cabinet), and were uttered to a meeting of Bankers who listened in shocked surprise. If war between Germany and England ever should come about, it will necessarily be due to the secret blundering and open blustering of the diplomats and the press. There can be no conflict of material interests between the two countries. There is no part of the enormous Empire of Britain into which Germany's trade cannot enter on equal terms with our own, no neutral market where competition is not conducted under equal conditions. Surely, under such circumstances, the sooner, in every country, the narrow-minded and badly-trained gentlemen who are responsible for the conduct of Foreign Affairs are made to realize their impotence by the undistinguished money grubbers of the "City," the better. The "City's" duty all the world over is to refuse loans to belligerents during war. It does not do that duty. The worst

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offender in this respect is the French "City." The French "City" alone made the second Balkan War possible, and we are surely not uncharitable in hoping that it may never see its money again.

The Balkan States supply an instructive object lesson of the truth of the new theory. They joined as Allies to fulfil an object which they had discussed and contemplated for years, namely, the exclusion of the Turk from Europe. They met with astonishing success in the early stages. They had a chance within a few weeks of the commencement of the War to make a glorious peace which would have satisfied their aspirations for fifty years to come. But their rulers, and notably one Daneff, a Bulgarian, were so inflamed with arrogance and hate that they refused this great chance, and continued the war to the point of exhaustion. Then they made a patched-up treaty with the Turk and swung round on each other. They were not highly civilized communities it is true, but they had been making good progress since the Treaty of Berlin. They fought this second war to utter exhaustion. Then Rumania, who had not fought at all, slipped in, and took, without fighting, a considerable territory at the mouth of the Danube as the price of assisting to bring about peace. Bulgaria now lies prostrate, panting for revenge, but quite unable to obtain it without the help of her secular enemy the Turk. Her small Credit is gone, she has lost at least a tenth of her available manhood, and the various commercial enterprises, in which European capital had been interested before the War, are for the time being suspended. It will be a generation, or perhaps two generations, before she can hope to stand where she did three years ago. Greece has acquired new territories, especially in the Archipelago, but it is already evident that the cost of their administration and defence will be a heavy burden on the mother country for years, and there is no reason to suppose that any special increase of her trade or industry will follow. The new possessions will get their cotton goods from England, their silks from France, their

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tobacco from Turkey, just as before. There could be no more complete illustration of the economic futility of War, or of the importance which commercial men should attach to the full recognition of this futility. If Mr Norman Angell is right, then it rests with the Bankers of all nations to enlighten their Governments on the doctrine he preaches, to insist on less secrecy and more control, and to strive everywhere for the formation of Foreign Relations Committees on the United States model.

Let us consider our own position as free citizens of a free country. Sir Edward Grey is a man of exceptional ability and plain straightforward speech. His loss would be irreparable to his party in Parliament, and grievous to many in the Nation. Yet it does seem preposterous that this one man should—not once but many times—have been allowed to take steps of which the Nation has been kept entirely ignorant, and which might at any moment—possibly at times of the greatest commercial difficulty and pressure in the City—have plunged us into the gravest disaster. The first demand which the civilians, who have to pay the bill, should make of the officials, who incur it, is that the secrecy of diplomacy should be abolished. It may be said that if this secrecy, this possibility of confidential intercourse, did not exist, nations would constantly be taken by surprise by facts accomplished to their detriment. That does not matter. They always are taken by surprise now. The first Foreign Minister who declines to listen to information offered him under pledge of secrecy, by an Ambassador, will have taken a step in the direction of Peace which cannot easily be retraced.

All wars, however, are not due to a hope of diminishing an enemy's strength, appropriating his wealth or his dominion, or destroying his commerce in neutral markets. It is a weak point in the new Pacifism that no attention has been paid to the best means of avoiding wars to which reluctant Governments are forced by outbursts of national passion—such as the famous war of Jenkin's ear in the eighteenth century. If Mr Benton had been murdered by an

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officer of any European power engaged in war with any third power, it might have been impossible to restrain our people from joining in the fray had satisfaction been refused. A few days' thought, and time for examination, enabled us to accept Arbitration over the case of the Hull fishing boats, yet even then we came very near to war, and it was only at the last moment that Mr Balfour altered the tone of a speech which would otherwise have made the maintenance of peace all but impossible. Such events may happen again, and unless a means is found, by general agreement, of providing an automatic Arbitration at the first breath of trouble, they may and probably will lead to war, even if, as Mr Norman Angell would desire, all our present diplomatic theories are abandoned by their authors. But Arbitration for all cases will never be accepted so long as our present forms of Government, our present press and our present human nature subsist. Neither Sovereigns of the absolute type, nor Diplomats, nor Generals, nor Admirals, nor even Peoples would submit to Arbitration in all and every case. We must still reckon with, and can never rule out the risk of, irresponsible outbursts of passion until the day—much too far off to fix—when all the nations are so highly civilized and organized that any and every one would be utterly and finally ruined by war. Even then it is by no means certain that, in any State, mere majority rule will always suffice to force a large and powerful minority to accept laws which that minority choose to regard as oppressive. Could a majority of Capitalists and their dependents force a maximum wage on Labour, or could a Labour majority force a minimum wage on Capital, if Labour were resolved that the maximum was too low, or Capital that the minimum was too high? The very economic doctrines which Mr Angell preaches might force a conflict under such conditions. For a mere strike would decide nothing for Labour. Or, if we go back into the past, could any kind of fear of economic destruction of wealth and prosperity have averted the French Revolution, or the Civil War in the United States?

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It will be seen that we only favour the new doctrine to the extent of agreeing with the truth of the general proposition that the most highly civilized nations can derive no benefit from a victory over one another. The acceptance of this as truth by all nations would undoubtedly do away with many wars. But it would not prevent all. And the nations will not accept it until they are ready to accept the doctrine of Free Trade upon which the new argument really rests. It is hard to find a Frenchman who does not believe that the French over-seas colonies are France's possessions to do what she likes with, and that the rule which practically prevents foreign nations from trading with them makes for the prosperity of France. The conclusion is that if the whole of Africa were a French Colony, France would cling to the monopoly of African Trade unless and until somebody prevented her by force. If we come to think of it, that was the very issue brought to trial at Agadir. Under similar conditions conceded to her, France might be willing to allow Germany to monopolize the trade of South America, or Great Britain the trade of Asia. This is the old Mercantile theory, naked and unashamed; wherefore, if Mr Norman Angell wishes to convert France to the belief that a successful war would do her no economic good, and that her fiscal system is rotten, he must turn his attention to shaking the pertinacity with which every Frenchman clings to Colbert's antiquated policy. In Great Britain his message falls on minds ready to receive it, trained by more than half a century of Free Trade, and taught by experience that trade is a series of transactions not between nations, but between individuals and bringing profit to both sides. In Germany he finds a certain school more or less prepared to accept Free Trade and its consequences. But the adherents of that school are not to be found amongst the Prussian Junkers who rule Germany, and it is to them he must address himself, with the knowledge that, even if he conquered their intelligence, their pockets, thriving on the import duties on grain and meat, would clog its free exercise. To sustain these duties on food,

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Junkerthum is quite prepared for a war to seize lands and possessions over-seas. They would secure, if they could, a monopoly, on the French system, of the trade of these possessions, and offer the advantages of the monopoly of such trade to German manufacturers as a compensation for the continuance of the food duties. That is a danger not to be ignored. The difficulty of meeting it, of convincing the Junkers that their trade system, if adopted, would reduce Germany as a trading nation to the level of France, is not lessened by the fact that their material interests tend to drive them to adopt it. The next serious difficulty which Mr Norman Angell and his friends have to overcome is that, even if every highly civilized nation accepted his thesis to the fullest extent, it does not by any means follow that the acceptance by all their subjects would be equally complete.

There is one craft which would surely stand to profit by war, even more than it does by preparation for war, and that is the craft of the Soldier and the Sailor, and of the army of hangers-on who supply, without regard to nationality or patriotic duty, these gallant men with the means of killing each other. Although it may be conceded that soldiers and sailors are induced to follow their occupation by an inborn love of their country, to say nothing of its laws of conscription, where they exist, and the pressure of hunger where they do not, yet there is no reason to attribute any patriotism to the makers of armaments or the vendors of supplies. For Krupp and Armstrong and Creuzot are just as eager to supply the potential enemy of their motherland, or two of her actual allies if fighting each other, with all they require for the fight as if the combatants were their own fellow-countrymen. We do not forget how the Vickers-Maxim one pound quick-firer—commonly called the pom-pom—slaughtered our own brave fellows on Spion Kop. Such people might argue that, even if it be to the economic ruin of any two nations to fight each other, there might nevertheless be a gain to the third, the neutral, supplying the

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other two with the means of death. Then there is the possibility of nation number three coming in as *troisième larron*, in the fashion set by Rumania quite recently, and forcing both combatants to lay down their arms and make cessions of their territory and citizens to the intervener, whose credit may not have been much affected, whose resources may have been undiminished by the war in which he did not engage, and who walks off with the spoils himself—as indeed did Rumania. What does Mr Norman Angell think of the possibility of making profit out of the misfortunes of others, and how does it affect his argument?

So much for the tradesmen who make war possible. They will not be easily suppressed. But they are not half so difficult a problem to Mr Norman Angell as that which is afforded by the Soldiers themselves. Some of them are proud of their achievements in the field; others are desirous of distinguishing themselves in future campaigns; all of them have been absorbed in studying old wars and plotting new ones ever since they entered the nursery of their Military Colleges. They possess enormous power in their respective countries. In Great Britain, for instance, they have suppressed the Channel Tunnel, wherein they were possibly right. In Germany they have reduced civilian life to a mere *état de tolérance*. In France they have succeeded in compensating for the lack of natural increase in population by adding fifty per cent to the length of service with the colours in the active period of training. In all three cases public opinion has struggled a little and finally succumbed to the inevitable, although it has known from bitter experience that, when the cannon do go off, not more than one in twenty of the great and eminent army commanders who hold the power in Peace possesses any aptitude at all for exercising command in War. Yet they strive to dominate in all countries, and do dominate in most, having indeed in all the special favour of the Government, whether

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monarchical or republican, which is often dependent on them for putting down rebellions against itself.

How does Mr Norman Angell propose to make the rulers of Germany—the Army, the Navy, the Diplomats—believe that a war between Russia and Germany would be destructive to both countries, if events like these cannot convey the lesson? On the whole, war is in the interests of certain poor and powerful people in Germany. In no case will they be dissuaded from it by the contrary interest of their own common people, the bourgeois and the Social Democrats.

Here then are two great obstacles in Mr Angell's way—the Soldiers and the Armament group, whose favouring of war is justified by that very sentiment of material interest, the existence whereof he so strongly denies. Has he forgotten that it is not nations which compete in trade, but individuals? Can it not be said with truth that just as certain individual merchants have a real interest in peace, so certain individual citizens of great influence have a real material interest in war, and that war is really brought about by individuals in Governments and rarely, if at all, by nations?

War and Peace, the Norman Angell journal, in its February issue, endeavours to build up an active policy for its new pacifists, and in so doing has raised against them two other hostile groups which will be difficult to overcome. First the editor stirs up the financial experts, to whom the fantastic and impracticable suggestion that, in our country, the Income Tax should be earmarked to meet expenditure on Armaments, is like a red rag to a bull. Suppose, when power was given in 1902 to levy a general Education Rate, some portion of the rate had been earmarked for religious instruction, what a success the Passive Resisters would have scored! In the same way, if the Income Tax were specially earmarked for Armaments, how should we persuade the Quakers to pay it, especially if they carried Passive Resist-

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ance to the extent of the hunger strike? It is in fact quite absurd and unsound to try to allocate any tax to any special expenditure. If the underlying motive for this wild idea is that it is the Income Tax payers who promote and favour armaments, the answer is that the suggestion is ridiculous, the truth being that Income Tax payers are just as much divided on these questions as the rest of the community and, being better educated, are easier to convince of the necessity of ending the present *impasse* before Armageddon ends it for them.

The next suggestion has been made before by many people who have attained greater eminence than Mr Norman Angell, notably, for instance, by the late Lord Chancellor, Lord Loreburn. It is that we should accept the principle of the immunity of private property at sea. Mr Norman Angell's adoption of such a doctrine means that no credence can be attached to his disavowal of the possibility of disarmament until times are ripe for the change. To induce Great Britain to abandon the right of capture of enemy ships and goods at sea would be to disarm her very effectually.

How else, than by driving the enemy's ships and merchandise off the sea, can Great Britain succeed in war? What other pressure can she bring to bear on any enemy land power than by using the humane, bloodless and effective way of stopping its commerce until the pinch is so felt that the enemy is forced by his own merchants to sue for peace? *Que messieurs les militaires commencent!* For what is the parallel case on land? Full power is given to a General commanding an invading army to burn, ravage, and destroy private property on land, and persons, too, on his own mere opinion that this destruction is necessary to the success of the campaign he is conducting. No Court intervenes. No question of compensation or prize adjudication can be raised. A ship captured at sea can appeal to the duly constituted Prize Courts, which administer law settled and confirmed by the procedure of centuries of practice and the rulings of great and learned judges. The British Admiral, according to *War and*

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Peace, is to be prevented from capturing the German ship or the German goods, whilst the German General, if once he effects a landing, may burn, destroy, confiscate, and ravage the English countryside. It will be time enough to talk of immunity of private property at sea when foreigners of all nations, and Britons also, have been educated up to the main Norman Angell thesis. This will not be to-day or to-morrow. A beginning must be made. The final stages will be taken in time, though not we fear before another great war between two or more first-class powers gives new proof that war brings in its train no wealth for the conqueror. Amongst the very last of these final stages must be the abolition of capture at sea, which, without enabling Great Britain to dispense with navies, would, as Mr Norman Angell must admit, maim their action, and bring about, with naval impotence, a sequence of disasters to our country which we are not ripe to suffer.

A much more practical suggestion towards peace, which the City should be glad to welcome, is made by Mr Arthur Ponsonby, who insists on the necessity of a better intercourse with, and understanding of, foreign nations. We, as an island power, are particularly out of touch with our neighbours across the water. Our education, elementary or secondary, is not conducted on such lines as to give our young folk the slightest idea of what foreign social and domestic life is like, or how far foreign feelings and passions are influenced by surroundings. We know, of course, that unlimited mischief is done in every country by school histories. These bundles of lies instil into the growing child malice, hatred and jealousy. The most glaring iniquities in this respect are perpetrated in the handbooks which pass for history in the schools of the United States. But now that the American Universities are beginning to turn out historians of the first distinction, there is a movement on foot in their country to cut out the false passages which distort the mind of the American child and embitter him against England, and to replace them by accurate and considered records of

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what really happened in 1776 and onwards. Our own smaller histories for use in schools are not so provocative of criticism. Their sins are those of omission. The average middle-class boy of sixteen leaves the Secondary School imbued with the belief that this country of ours has never been beaten in war, that our sailors are invincible, and our soldiers free from every kind of fault, and that in all our numerous wars with other nations we have been invariably right and they invariably wrong. If peace is to ensue, the new Pacifism must begin with the young, and teach them the real truth about foreign countries, their policies, their methods and their acts, extenuating nothing and setting down naught in malice. It is just there that there is the best hope of real progress towards the reign of common sense.

There are certain elementary principles by adherence to which Great Britain can probably avoid war. The first is the complete and total avoidance of European entanglements and commitments. If European powers quarrel and the issue comes to war, we, the Island Power, can always exercise our greatest strength by intervening if and when it suits us, and not before. The very fact that our possible attitude in a given event should be unknown is a great influence making for Peace, and the new Pacifists should try to bring our people and our rulers to see the colossal strength of this neutral position. More than once in history, and as lately as 1900, has an attempt been made to marshal the European nations in arms against these islands. Such attempts have always failed, and always will fail, if only because the potential allies know quite well that they would destroy each other in their fight for the lion's skin, after the lion has been skinned, assuming, of course, that the lion had not saved his skin—as he probably would. Therefore it always seemed very unfortunate that King Edward infringed this principle of non-intervention by his semi-official, semi-private visits to the European capitals unaccompanied by his responsible Foreign Minister to take note of any engagements he might have entered into. It

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is not easy to induce foreign potentates to believe that the King of England is debarred by our Constitution from binding his people to Alliances, or even Understandings, save upon the advice of his Ministers. The intervention of a Back Bencher in the House of Commons secured as a compromise that the Permanent Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs at any rate should accompany His Majesty on his tours abroad. But it is doubtful to this day if we really know what commitments bind us to France, although it has been officially declared that no alliance or even understanding exists in writing. As to this it is worth remembering that the most binding pledges men enter into with men are those which are not committed to writing but rest upon their word of honour. Mr Angell's friends must not ignore the importance of this point, linked up as it is with the greater question of the abolition of secret diplomacy to which we have already referred.

It would be idle to pretend that at the present moment the outlook is favourable for continued Peace. There is really only one saving factor—the City. Without that, war would have been declared by somebody a year ago. In the present state of armaments and military science the issue of any war is too doubtful for the City to gamble about. Nor is the Russo-Japanese result forgotten in higher places than the City. It nearly shook the Tsar off his throne, and, had Russia been more enlightened, it must have done so, whether the Tsar was to blame or not. Suppose Germany beaten in war, Austria annihilated, the Italians grasping the hands of their blood brothers the French and glad to be free from the nightmare of the Triplice, what would be the position of the German Emperor and his dynasty? Imagine the French and the Russians at the gates of Berlin, the outbreak of the Social Democrats against the throne, the helplessness under such conditions of a Government which has always spurned and despised the German common people. Or, alternatively, imagine the Germans at the gates of Paris, the Republic fallen, the President a fugitive, and a

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military Dictator, resting on the beaten remnant of an army, exercising the supreme power. Peace has no greater safeguard than the fear in monarchs and rulers that Revolution will follow defeat. Victory is in the hands of the gods, and it is a mere matter of chance on whom the laurels fall.

The more deeply this question is examined the more clear it is that on one side stand the Dynasties surrounded by the amorphous mass of civilians—millions of them—who have no effective power in any State. Their interest is Peace, almost at any price, provided it is coupled with free liberty to trade, to buy where they like and sell where they can, under the protection of the Law, and ultimately of Force, to secure the sanctity of the contracts they make. Over against them on the other side are ranged the official classes, the Chief Officers of the Army and the Navy—the tradesmen who deal in Government, War, and Diplomacy. The spread of intellect weakens the forces of officialdom all over the world. When that weakening is complete, War will be, not at an end, but so remote that it will never be fought for a purpose which is not clearly grasped by those whose lives and fortunes are staked to make it good. In those days to come the true cause of quarrel will be set out before the first shot is fired. When that point is reached the first shot will not be fired in any hurry.

A GENTLEMAN'S AGREEMENT

THE PANAMA CANAL TOLLS

IT would be affectation to deny that not a few on this side of the Atlantic are inclined to think that the citizens of the United States, collectively at any rate, are devoid of the sense of fair play. This belief has begotten a distrust of American methods which has been considerably enhanced by the political antics of the American-Irish party, that *ingrato popolo maligno* whose baneful influence has had the same degrading effect on American political life as is now being produced by their kinsmen upon that of England. Whatever may be the origin of this distrust recent events must suggest, even to the most hostile critic of American methods, the advisability of revising his opinions.

For a right understanding of the Panama tolls question we must go back to the first half of the nineteenth century. For some years previous to 1850 the advisability of joining the Atlantic and Pacific oceans by a ship canal had been fully recognized. Scientific opinion hesitated as to the relative advantages of two proposed routes; one across the isthmus of Panama, the other across the republic of Nicaragua by way of the river San Juan and Lake Nicaragua. The latter was the more favoured; it was however feared by the United States that England would acquire a preponderating influence over the canal on account of the protectorate over the Mosquito coast, which had been claimed by us for a couple of centuries—almost from the

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time when the first white settlement was made on that coast by the agents of an English chartered company. But in 1850 an agreement was arrived at between the two countries and embodied in what is known as the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. By this it was agreed: (1) that in the event of such a canal being constructed it should be under the protection of the United States and Great Britain, and that the shipping of the two countries should be on terms of perfect equality in the use of it; (2) that neither of the two countries should obtain or maintain for itself any exclusive control over the canal; and (3) that neither should colonize or assume or exercise any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast, or any other part of Central America. It will be observed that whilst the United States gave up nothing, England abandoned its protectorate over the Mosquito Indians.

Nothing was done for another thirty years; then a French company was formed by M. de Lesseps for the construction of a canal across the isthmus of Panama, the excavation of which was begun in January, 1882. Seven years later the canal company failed and a receiver was appointed; but in 1894 excavation was resumed by a new company formed under the direction of the French court.

The idea of an American inter-oceanic canal being constructed by Europeans was unpalatable to the United States; and, in 1886, an association was formed in New York to build another canal by the Lake Nicaragua route. Three years later the Nicaragua Canal Association developed into a company. Work was begun and by 1893 a thousand yards had been excavated. This was all, for in that year the company was bankrupt and work ceased. The desire however for a canal belonging to, and under the control of, the United States persisted, and the American Government decided to undertake its construction. The Nicaragua route was adopted because it then seemed unlikely that the French company would be willing to dispose of its rights in Panama; but in the spring of 1901 that company obtained leave of

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the Colombian Government to transfer them to the United States.

The Clayton-Bulwer treaty however stood in the way; and it was necessary for the United States to approach the British Government. Negotiations resulted in the appointment of Mr Hay, President Roosevelt's Secretary of State, and Lord Pauncefote, British Ambassador at Washington, as plenipotentiaries. A treaty, since known as the Hay-Pauncefote treaty, was signed by them at Washington on 18th November, 1901; the ratifications being exchanged on 21st February following. By this treaty it was agreed that a canal might be constructed by the government of the United States; and that, subject to the provisions made by the treaty for the "neutralization" of the canal, that government should have the exclusive right of regulating and managing it. The rules adopted as the basis of the "neutralization" and embodied in the treaty were substantially those of the Suez Canal Convention of 1888; and by the first of these rules it was provided that:

"The canal shall be free and open to the vessels of
"commerce and of war of all nations observing these rules,
"on terms of entire equality, so that there shall be no dis-
"crimination against any such nation or its citizens or
"subjects, in respect of the conditions or charges of traffic
"or otherwise. Such conditions and charges of traffic shall
"be just and equitable."

The treaty difficulty having been overcome, Congress, by a bill passed in June 1902, authorized the President (1) to acquire, by a payment of \$40,000,000, the property and rights of the French Panama company; and (2) to obtain from the Colombian government the control in perpetuity of a strip of land six miles wide. Should he fail to do these things, he was authorized to continue the construction of the Nicaraguan canal and to obtain from the governments of Nicaragua and Costa Rica the necessary territory. The French company was willing to sell; and a treaty was negotiated with Colombia for the cession of the territory.

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But the Colombian government failed to ratify the treaty and the next move was the secession of the province of Panama from Colombia and its recognition as an independent republic by the United States of America. This was in November, 1903. Three months later, a treaty was concluded between the United States and Panama, by which the latter, for the sum of \$10,000,000, ceded its rights over a strip of land across the isthmus ten miles wide, five miles on either side of the centre line of the canal. Three months later again, in May, 1904, the government of the United States took possession. It is impossible here to dwell upon the magnificent work done by the American engineers, upon the care shown for the health of the army of labourers employed and upon the triumph gained over the appalling insanitary conditions which had caused the failure of all previous attempts. It must suffice to say that the excavation was brought to a successful conclusion; that a canal some forty-six miles in length has been constructed, for the most part eighty-five feet above sea level, at a total cost of some \$400,000,000; that the pestiferous swamps of the canal zone have become a tourist resort for the wealthy; and that the name of Goethals will live as a record of one of man's greatest victories over obdurate and reluctant Nature.

When the end of the excavation was in view, the necessity arose of settling and making known to the world the conditions under which the canal would be worked. These conditions were embodied in the Panama Canal Bill which was passed by the House of Representatives on 23rd May and by the Senate on 9th August, 1912. Incidentally the bill provided that no tolls should be levied upon vessels engaged in the coast-wise trade of the United States, and that when tolls for ships of commerce were based upon net registered tonnage they should not be less than the estimated proportionate cost of the actual maintenance and operation of the canal, *other than for vessels of the United States and its citizens*. The probability is that when these provisions were inserted in the bill there was no idea of

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infringing or even straining the provisions of the treaty; and certainly in regard to the coast-wise vessels the motive for the exemption appears to have been simply to injure the trans-continental railway interests. Mr Lodge, Senator from Massachusetts, emphasized this point when speaking in the Senate in April last. He recognized, he said, that "legislation of late years had proceeded largely and in "some cases entirely upon the desire to injure some one"; that "the principle of destruction" had of late been more powerful than that of construction; and that "the hope of "conferring benefit has been secondary to the eagerness to "inflict punishment and loss, without regard to guilt or "innocence, upon all who suffer from the odium due to "success." The cries of the Anglo-Saxon suffering from Celtic misrule seem to be much the same on either side of the Atlantic.

But, whatever the motives of those responsible may have been, the provision for exemption clearly collided with the intentions of the American and British governments in 1901 as expressed in the Hay-Pauncefote treaty. Therefore on 8th July, when the bill was before the Senate, Mr Mitchell Innes, our Chargé d'Affaires at Washington, communicated the objections of the British government to Mr Knox, President Taft's Secretary of State. This protest was published on 11th July; but, regardless of it, a month later the Senate, by forty-seven votes to fifteen, passed the bill, without excising the objectionable passages. Mr Taft then sent a message to Congress suggesting an amendment providing for the submission of the points in question to the Supreme Court of the United States. Congress refused to accept the suggestion, and on 24th August the President signed the bill. At the same time, he issued a memorandum setting out his views on the subject. He contended that there was nothing in the Hay-Pauncefote treaty which precluded the United States from allowing its own shipping the use of the canal upon any terms it thought fit; and as to discrimination of tolls in favour of that shipping, he argued

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that while the Panama Canal Act seemed to vest the President with discretion to discriminate it did not compel him to act on the power, and consequently it was unnecessary to discuss the policy of such discrimination till the question should arise from the exercise of the President's discretion.

Mr Taft's reasoning did not commend itself to Sir Edward Grey, who, in the following November, sent a dispatch to Mr Bryce, our Ambassador at Washington, for communication to the Secretary of State. The Foreign Secretary expressed the opinion that the President of the United States had not fully appreciated the British position. If, he pertinently remarked, the rules in the treaty were, as avowed by Mr Hay, the consideration for the abandonment of the restrictions on the United States imposed by the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and these rules only secured to Great Britain most favoured nation treatment; then the value of the consideration was not apparent. The effect of the objectionable clauses, he contended, would or might throw a greater burden, in the way of increased tolls, on the shipping of other nations, and this would clearly be a failure of compliance with the rule in the treaty. He recalled too, that the government of the United States had protested against a system of rebate of tolls introduced by the Canadian government, regarding it as a violation of equal rights secured by the treaty of Washington of 1871; and that the result of its protest was the abandonment of the Canadian position. The British government, he concluded, had no manner of doubt as to the validity of its claims; but at the same time it recognized that "many persons of note in the United States, whose opinions are entitled to great weight" took the view that there had been no infringement of treaty rights. This being the case, the British government was quite prepared to submit the matters in dispute to arbitration.

In reply to this, on 20th January, 1913, Mr Knox telegraphed a dispatch to the United States Chargé d'Affaires

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for communication to Sir Edward Grey. In reality this was an answer to the suggestion of arbitration, which was not desired by the American Secretary of State. His contention was that the Canal Act, to which the British objected, did not fix the tolls, and that they had taken no account of the presidential proclamation (dated the day before Sir Edward Grey's dispatch) which did fix them, and put at rest "practically all of the supposititious injustice and "inequality" suggested as being possibly consequent on the administration of the Act. That being so, it would be time enough to discuss arbitration when British vessels had actually suffered from inequality of treatment or from inequitable tolls and when the resources of diplomacy had failed.

The last diplomatic contribution to the controversy was made five weeks later, when Mr Bryce (four days before President Taft went out of office) replied by a short note in which he dissented from the view taken by Mr Knox, that no actual injury had been done to British interests. The power conferred on the President to fix lower rates for ships of the United States was in itself a denial of the right of British shipping to equality of treatment. And the proper way to settle the dispute was to refer the matter to arbitration, of which the United States had been for so long a foremost and consistent advocate.

When later on arbitration was proposed in the Senate it was opposed on various grounds. Mr O'Gorman, leader of the Irish-American party, rejected it because he thought that the President, Mr Woodrow Wilson, would name as representatives of the United States those who shared his views in favour of the British claim. Mr Stone, Senator from Missouri and chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, would have none of it because in his opinion the United States could rightly exercise absolute sovereignty over the canal and everything connected with it. A third Senator, Mr Bristow, of Kansas, would no more submit this question to arbitration than he would submit that of

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building a railway in Alaska or one regarding the improvement of the Mississippi! To secure arbitration a two-thirds majority in the Senate was required; therefore arbitration was impossible. Mr Root, one of the Senators from New York, formerly Secretary of State in President Roosevelt's cabinet, who wanted arbitration but recognized the impossibility of getting it, roundly accused the Senate of only agreeing to arbitration when they wanted it for themselves; when another country wanted it the cry was "Never furl the American flag at the behest of a foreign country." All of which renews the doubt whether arbitration will ever take the place that its advocates desire. If the meaning of a disputed treaty is not proper food for a court of arbitration such tribunals will be cattle ill to bait.

Whilst the diplomatists were, at the end of Mr Taft's administration, discussing the matter in the ponderous and leisurely manner characteristic of their calling, Mr Root made an active effort to get rid of the objectionable parts of the Panama Canal Act. On 21st January, 1913, the day after the dispatch of Mr Knox's note, he introduced a bill for their repeal. In introducing it, he pointed out that in a long succession of treaties, official declarations and congressional resolutions the United States had guaranteed that their canal policy should be "one of disinterested action for the common benefit of mankind" and not, he said, for their own selfish advantage; and further that they had only been able to get the right to build and operate the canal under the Hay-Pauncefote treaty upon that understanding.* The bill was sent by the Senate to its inter-oceanic committee and shelved.

Mr Woodrow Wilson assumed office as President on 4th March, 1913; and in the following month Mr Root introduced another repealing bill in the new Congress. Like its predecessor, this bill was referred by the Senate to its inter-oceanic committee, of which Mr O'Gorman was now chairman, and like its predecessor it was shelved.

* See *The Times*, 22nd January, 1913.

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The President himself, however, was deeply interested in the question of repeal, and set to work to bring it about; and his action was not the result of diplomatic pressure. For this we have the direct testimony of Sir Edward Grey; whilst Lord Bryce, speaking at the London dinner on Independence Day, alluded to the courage with which Mr Wilson had come forward to do an act which would expose him to opposition and misrepresentation. A third repeal bill was introduced—this time in the House of Representatives which passed it on 31st March last. It was then received by the Senate, and in the usual course submitted to its committee on inter-oceanic canals which returned it a month later without making any communication in regard to it.

In the Senate there were some who opposed repeal from dislike of the railway interest, some from mere antipathy to England and the desire to twist the tail of the British lion, and some from an honest belief in the legal right to discriminate, coupled with the inability to see that an insistence upon literal legal rights is often such gross injustice as must involve dishonour. *Non ragioniam di lor*—we pass them by to think only of those who placed honour and justice before all else—of the Senate who, we believe, represent all that is finest and noblest in a great nation. Three speeches were especially impressive—those of Mr Lodge, Senator from Massachusetts, of Mr Root, from New York, and of one who is less known in this country, Mr Le Baron Bradford Colt, of Rhode Island.

Mr Lodge expressed the opinion that under the terms of the treaty the United States had a right to exempt its own shipping, in whatever trade it might be engaged, but admitted that the opposite view was fairly arguable. In spite of this opinion he urged repeal on the ground that, in deciding the question, the United States should take into account the opinion of other nations; and in this he found support in the declaration of Thomas Jefferson that the impelling reason for making the Declaration of Independence

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was "a decent respect for the opinions of mankind." Mr Root, wanting arbitration and knowing his wish to be impossible of realization, emphatically contended that repeal was necessary to the national honour and that principles long professed by the American people should not be repudiated. Of these two Senators one believed the actual law to be in favour of the United States, the other, in desiring arbitration, apparently thought the point debatable, but both appealed to the sense of justice of the American people and demanded repeal whatever the legal position might be. Mr Colt, on the other hand, dealt with the matter strictly from the legal standpoint. We have alluded to the fact that he is but little known in this country. This is because he only abandoned law for politics a couple of years ago; when he resigned his seat on the bench of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, next in importance and dignity to the Federal Supreme Court, to represent his native state in the Senate. His speech was a masterly exposition of the law, and for the most part might have been delivered from the bench in a judgment between the parties.*

Mr Colt began his speech by declaring that he was in favour of repeal because he believed that the Panama Tolls Act placed the United States in an indefensible position before the nations of the world in regard to its treaty obligations; and because he believed that that Act violated the meaning and intent of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty. In a great international controversy the United States had entered judgment in its own favour, without submitting the case to arbitration, without giving the other party an opportunity to be heard. What they had before them was simply a contract made in 1901. The only question was what the parties had agreed to at that date; and this was not affected by what the United States would do in 1914. As to what was agreed upon in 1901, "the surrounding conditions and

* The speech is reported in the *Congressional Record*, 1914, 1st June, pp. 10331-10334.

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“circumstances demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt
“that it was the intention of the parties to include the
“United States in the rule of equality.” Nor did the fact
that the United States had since become sovereign of the
zone affect the question, for, just before the final draft of
the Hay-Pauncefote treaty was submitted, a provision was
added* by which the United States passed “from a pro-
“spective proprietor of a canal to a prospective sovereign
“of the territory on which the canal is built and this cove-
“nant binds the United States to the obligations of the
“treaty in case she should ever become the territorial
“sovereign.” This closely reasoned speech should be
read in full to appreciate its weighty appeal, at once to
national honour and to legal justice. On the conclusion of
what was, in the opinion of many, the finest speech heard
in the Senate for a generation, the senators from both sides
of the house crowded round Mr Colt to offer him their
warm congratulations.

The bill passed the Senate on 11th June by fifty-two
votes to thirty-five, but with an amendment (proposed by
Mr Simmons, Senator from North Carolina) which leaves
open for future determination the right of the United
States to discriminate in favour of its own citizens. The
House of Representatives accepted this amendment; and
then it was approved by the President.

While President Wilson and those Senators and Repre-
sentatives who set store by the national honour doubtless
express the feelings of the great bulk of the American
people, there are always some who would take advantage of
any opportunity afforded by a strict interpretation of the
law to repudiate an engagement, and it is much to be feared
that these may still cause trouble to Mr Wilson and those
who have acted with him. If such is the case, it will be

* Article 4.—It is agreed that no change of territorial sovereignty or of the
international relations of the country or countries traversed by the before-
mentioned canal shall affect the general principle of neutralization or the
obligation of the high contracting parties under the present treaty.

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some consolation to them to know that they will have the sympathy of the right thinking and honourable men of all nations, and that their high-minded action has already drawn to them a sincere admiration too seldom evoked in the realm of international politics.

There are few if any examples in recent history of treaties having been accorded such respect by any nation—few, if any, examples of respect given to a treaty which the nation believed to be against its interests at a time when there was nothing to outweigh the benefit to be derived from repudiation.

It must ever be remembered that, on the whole, America believed her interpretation of the treaty to be legally supportable—that she had no reason to dread any action by Great Britain—that she believed that it would pay her to act upon that interpretation—and that her power so to do was unquestioned and unquestionable. Under those circumstances she has deliberately acted against what she believed to be her interest, in deference to the opinion of other nations and because she believed them to have understood her promise in the sense hostile to her claim. The spirit which makes a man pay his gaming debts or his statute-barred debts—the recognition of what is known as a gentleman's agreement—has been all too rare among sovereign States; and America has set an example of honour and straight dealing to the civilized world.

A PRIVILEGED CASTE

THE TRADE DISPUTES ACT, 1906

ONE afternoon, about the time when the Trade Disputes Bill was in the House of Lords, a few men were discussing politics; and there entered a Conservative Member. In his eyes was a joyful twinkle—an unaccustomed phenomenon in those days of tribulation—and he announced that the Lords were going to pass the Bill. It scarcely seemed an occasion for joy, and there was heard a note of question. "You don't understand," said the Conservative Member. "It's a splendid piece of tactics really. Lots of Liberal Members in the Commons hate the Bill, but the Government got them to vote for it by telling them that, as the Lords were sure to throw it out, they could keep themselves right with their trade union constituents, and still be easy about their business. And now the Lords are going to dish them. The Act, of course, will be frightfully unpopular in the country, and it will do the Government no end of harm."

That was in 1906. The Lords passed the Bill. The Government is still in, and (not being moved thereto by any formidable expression of popular ill-will) has not disclosed the smallest sign of repentance.

It may be doubted, however, whether the Liberal Government would have introduced the measure—at least in the same form—if it had possessed then the knowledge of to-day. In 1905 the party had been out of office so long that it was not inclined to be scrupulous in the matter of

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election promises, so it adopted the "Down with the Taff Vale Judgment" cry in order to secure the Labour vote. When the new Parliament was elected it showed for the first time what looked like a strong independent Labour party in the House; and the new Liberal Government made haste to conciliate it, at any price. It has since learned the vital fact that in the House the Independent Labour party is futile and impotent, and a Liberal Government never stands in the smallest danger of being turned out by it. But in 1906, unaware of these things, and regardless of aught but its own safety, the Government introduced its sop to Labour, as it regarded it. The Lords sold the pass, for the sake of scoring a paltry and (in the event) worthless party point. So the measure is on the statute book, wedged into the framework of our law; and only a bold Administration will tackle the troublesome, but necessary, task of dislodging it. For though thinking men of all classes and politics admit the radical mischievousness of the Act, and every strike, every judicial decision under the Act, every uprising of the ugly head of Syndicalism, furnishes fresh reminders of this mischievousness, and no one attempts to defend it, it is recognized that the Act has conferred privileges upon a large body of voters, who would hug those privileges if an effort were made to take them away, partly because of the natural selfishness which always operates when a privilege is threatened, and partly because this particular privilege is a valuable asset in the Capital and Labour struggle. This recognition has paralysed those who see the evil of the measure, and has produced an apparent acquiescence. Yet acquiescence is betrayal of the first principles of freedom and equity—equality of all men before the law.

This is no violent exaggeration or rhetorical declamation, and the best way to prove its moderateness of statement is to examine the Act itself, section by section, with the judicial decisions which have interpreted it. With regard

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to these latter it may be said that for the most part they have arisen, not so much, as do most cases on statutes, out of the complexity and obscurity of the legislature's language, but because men have found it hard to believe that the Act is really as bad as its plain terms indicate. Such litigants have been disappointed.

The first section of the Act extends the relief against the law of conspiracy which had been granted to trade unions in the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875. The law of conspiracy, which, put shortly, means that an act may be wrongful if done in combination, though a like act done by one person, or by several not in combination, is not wrongful, has been surrounded with a good deal of obscurity, and has been the subject of decisions not easily reconcilable with one another, and we need not stay now to discuss this difficult subject. It is sufficient to record that the Act of 1875, in order to legalize strikes, relieved trade unionists from liability to criminal prosecutions for conspiracy in respect of agreements or combinations to do acts in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, if such acts committed by one person would not be punishable criminally. And this first section of the Trade Disputes Act extends the immunity to civil process. Such immunity is, of course, important to the fighting work of trade unions, and if it is desired to endow these combinations of workmen with effective striking force, immunity in respect of organized acts which would not be unlawful if done by single individuals almost necessarily follows. There still remains, however, the question, which is at the root of the law of conspiracy, whether an act, lawful when done by a single individual or by isolated individuals, should not be regarded in law, as it is in fact, as a much more serious affair for the person aimed at, when it is done by a number of men acting in concert. But there we may leave the matter: it is not the gravest, or the most patently unjust, provision of the Trade Disputes Act—though in passing we should note that bodies upon whom are conferred such

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formidable powers should be carefully prevented from abusing their strength.

And now see how the next section carries out this principle. It is the famous "peaceful picketing" section; as an effort in humour it has attained a pre-eminent position among both ancient and modern enactments. Subsection 1 ordains that

"it shall be lawful for one or more persons, acting on their
"own behalf, or on behalf of a trade union or of an indi-
"vidual employer or firm in contemplation or furtherance
"of a trade dispute, to attend at or near a house or place
"where a person resides or works or carries on business or
"happens to be, if they so attend merely for the purpose
"of peacefully obtaining or communicating information, or
"of peacefully persuading any person to work or abstain
"from working."

The second subsection repeals the paragraph in the "picketing" section of the Act of 1875, which confined lawful picketing to attendance at houses and works for the obtaining or communicating of information. So the substantial change made by the Act of 1906 is that "peacefully persuading any person to work or abstain from working" is added to the legitimate functions of workmen on strike. The leading case of *Lyons v. Wilkins* ([1899] 1 Ch. 255) had made it plain that, under the Act of 1875, while it was lawful to attend at a man's home or place of work to obtain or communicate information, it was not lawful (in the words of Lord Justice Kay) "to picket the works or place
"of business of a man by persons who are distributed and
"placed there for the purpose of trying by persuasion to
"induce the workmen of that man not to work for him
"any longer, or to induce people who want to work for
"him to abstain from entering into an agreement with him
"to do so." Such conduct came within the "watching and
"besetting" which the Act of 1875 declared to be a punishable offence. Trade unions could not try to compel people not to work. "No one has ever," said Lord Justice Lindley,

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“and no set of people have ever, had that right or that power. If Parliament chooses to confer it on trade unions it will do so as and when it thinks proper, and subject to such limitations as it thinks proper.” The Parliament of 1906 did think proper to confer it (under the name of “persuasion”), and the only limitation it thought proper to make was the introduction of the adverb “peacefully.”

The section also emphasizes the permission to “more persons” than one to combine in the business of peaceful persuasion—a point to which specific attention was not called in the Act of 1875. But it is of the essence of the matter. Smith’s efforts to persuade Brown that the dignity of Labour demands abstention from work might, or might not, prove cogent; but Smith, accompanied by a hundred of his friends, blocking up the road to the factory, and combining their powers of persuasion, is a different proposition. It is still quite peaceful—indeed, peacefulness is more thoroughly guaranteed: perfect serenity reigns when one finds himself against a hundred. But “persuasion” is a somewhat euphemistic name for the operation. The Court in *Lyons v. Wilkins* used a much more appropriate term when it called the practice “compulsion.”

True, the penalties for intimidation prescribed by the Act of 1875 are unrepealed, and it remains an offence to use violence or to intimidate a man or his wife or children, or to injure his property, to follow him about persistently or for several to do so in a disorderly manner, to hide or take away his tools or clothes, or to “watch or beset” his abode or place of business. But these provisions are in fact a mere mockery of protection to a man when the law winks at five hundred men attending a recalcitrant worker’s house or factory to “obtain information”—as to whether he is likely to attempt to go to work; to “communicate information”—as to the inconvenience which will ensue if he does; to “persuade” him to “abstain from working”—with the police in inadequate numbers at a respectful distance.

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Even the permission to haunt the immediate neighbourhood of factories and workmen's houses, which this section confers upon strikers, has not satisfied some of them. The inimitable Larkin was the hero of an attempt to extend the meaning of the words "at or near" to "within" private property. But in his case—*Larkin v. Belfast Harbour Commissioners* ([1908] 2 I.L.R. 214)—the Irish King's Bench Division decided that even the Act of 1906 does not go so far as to permit pickets and persuaders to enter without leave into a private house or grounds. But as the road outside is practically sufficient for the picketer's purposes, the position has not been much mitigated by this decision.

Attention should be drawn to one other feature of this section, for an essay in sardonic humour should not go unrecognized: the right to picket is extended to the masters. This brilliant idea had not occurred to the framers of the old picketing section in the 1875 Act—but we will recur to the subject later.

Section 3 next claims our attention. It is designed to get rid, so far as strikers are concerned, of an old principle of law, embodied (but confusedly) in a number of judicial decisions, that it is an actionable wrong to induce a person to break a contract of employment into which he has entered with another person. And, in order to make a complete job, the exemption is also extended to interference with the business or employment of others, and with a man's right to dispose freely of his own capital or labour. The section runs:

"An act done by a person in contemplation or further-
"ance of a trade dispute shall not be actionable on the
"ground only that it induces some other person to break
"a contract of employment or that it is an interference
"with the trade, business or employment of some other
"person, or with the right of some other person to dispose
"of his capital or his labour as he wills."

This is the section which definitely makes it clear that an outside agitator may call upon a body of men to throw

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up their work, even without notice, and so in defiance of their contracts, thereby entailing the ruin of a business and widespread suffering among innocent women and children—and no action for the damage thus caused will lie against the instigator. It is not the right to strike which is given by this enactment, even the right to strike without notice, but the right of outsiders to force other men to strike. And the politicians who inspired, or approve, this invitation, in the name of Labour, to interfere with the workman's right to work, are the same persons who demand, in the name of Labour, the passing of a "Right to Work Bill"! We shall need to consider this section again in the light of judicial interpretation, but that will be most conveniently done after we have looked at the next section.

Section 4 runs:

"An action against a trade union, whether of workmen or masters, or against any members or officials thereof on behalf of themselves and all other members of the trade union in respect of any tortious act alleged to have been committed by or on behalf of the trade union, shall not be entertained by any court."

Then follows an obscurely-worded subsection, which is judicially treated as an insoluble riddle, relating to the trustees of a trade union, but with that we need not bother.

The confessed purpose of this section was to get rid of the famous Taff Vale judgment—and it did it with a vengeance. It will be well shortly to recall this case. Some years ago "the Taff Vale judgment" was on democratic lips throughout the country, and the words were conspicuous even among the varied and heated party cries of the 1906 election. Wherever demagogues gathered together the phrase was spat out with venomous emphasis, as though it represented the acme of tyranny and the machinations of the Evil One. Constant repetition of this kind had its due effect, first upon the minds of the ignorant, and then upon the politicians who trade upon the passions of the ignorant. The Trade Disputes Bill was the result.

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Yet the actual point decided in *Taff Vale Railway Co. v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants* ([1901] A.C. 426) was really one of technical procedure. "A trade union, "registered under the Trade Union Acts, 1871 and 1876, "may be sued in its registered name." That is all, in the terse headnote to the report.

What provoked this decision? There had been a strike on the Taff Vale Railway, and the company had applied to the Court for an injunction to restrain the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants (whose leaders had fomented and were conducting the strike) and its agents from watching or besetting the railway or the residences of workmen, in violation of the law as to picketing, as it then stood. Mr Justice Farwell granted the injunction. The Court of Appeal set it aside, on the technical ground that a trade union could not be sued in its registered name. The House of Lords found that this technicality was unsubstantial, and restored Mr Justice Farwell's judgment. It was not argued that the union and its officers were innocent, but only that, owing to the curious constitution of trade unions, the law could not get at them. The present Lord Chancellor, then Mr Haldane, who argued the Society's case, did, however, try to relieve the cynicism of the plea by contending that the immunity was right, as well as technically valid, on the ground that ability to sue a trade union for the improper and illegal acts of its officers might conceivably exhaust funds intended for the benefit of widows and orphans. Lord Macnaghten furnished one reply to that argument when he pointed out that the advocates of trade unions had, in their Royal Commission report, objected strongly to any separation of the fighting funds from the benefit funds of trade unions, which they regarded as, in their own words, "tantamount to a proposal to suppress unionism by statute." Another reply would have been that an ordinary individual is not held immune from the consequences of his wrongful acts because any damages he incurs diminish the amount

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of money which his widow and orphans will enjoy after his death.

This last-named consideration indicates what a serious infringement upon the equality of all men before the law it would have been had the Legislature enacted that, for the future, a trade union's benefit and fighting funds should be kept separate, and the former exempted from liability for wrongs committed by the union. But the Parliament of 1906 was not content with going even to that length. It preferred to decide that wrongful acts, if committed by trade unions or their members or officials, should cease to be wrongful, and that these privileged ones should be placed above the law, in a position where they could inflict any harm they liked upon the community and individuals, and remain scatheless, and that even funds got together for the very purpose of fighting employers should be sacred against any claim for damage wrought by the union's wrongful acts. It is no wonder that some have refused to believe that Parliament can have really meant anything so monstrous as appears from the words of the third and fourth sections of this Act, and have gone to the Courts for confirmation of their hope. But the Courts have had little consolation to offer, and their decisions have only served to bring the iniquity of the Act into bolder relief.

Let us look first at the leading case upon the third section—*Conway v. Wade* ([1909] A.C. 506). Conway was a boiler scaler and a member of the Amalgamated Union of Labour. For some breach of the rules of the union he had been fined, but he did not pay the fine to the branch, and some years afterwards joined another branch of the same union. He obtained work at Messrs Readheads, and afterwards received promotion, which appears to have annoyed his fellow-workmen. This matter of the unpaid fine was used by them as a pretext for grumbling, and it was brought to the knowledge of Wade, the district delegate of the union, who went to see the foreman at Messrs Readheads, and informed him that there would be trouble with

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the other men if Conway remained at work. This intimation was effective, and Conway was discharged. He also appears to have been prevented from getting work elsewhere. Thereupon he brought an action against Wade, claiming damages for procuring his dismissal and preventing him from getting other employment. The substantial defence set up by Wade was that there was a "trade dispute," and consequently he was exempt from liability under section 3 of the Trade Disputes Act. The jury found that there was no trade dispute, and the case then went to the higher courts to determine whether Wade's conduct was protected by the words of the third section—"an act done by a person in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute." The Court of Appeal thought that it was, but the House of Lords determined otherwise. Lord Loreburn expressed the view that "a mere personal quarrel or a grumbling or an agitation will not suffice," and that the words "mean that either a dispute is imminent and the act is done in expectation of and with a view to it, or that the dispute is already existing and the act is done in support of one side to it." But Lord Atkinson put most clearly the reason for the judgment when he pointed out that the jury had not believed Wade's story about pending trouble among the men if Conway remained; and so his action was not in furtherance or, properly speaking, in contemplation of a trade dispute. Or, in Lord Shaw's words, the phrase "in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute" cannot be carried "beyond the region of a trade dispute, either actual, impending or probable, and into the region of private animosity." So Conway won his case on the ground that Wade's action was prompted by private animosity, but the judgment only emphasized the lamentable position, that, where anything in the nature of a dispute between masters and men, or among the men, is in progress or is contemplated, the men are free to commit any act they choose, however illegal, if they think it will further their cause, without being answerable for the damage done.

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Some, too, of the comforting words of the law lords as to the necessity of a genuine trade dispute being in contemplation, have on later consideration been discounted, and, not being necessary to the decision, must not be relied on as representing the law.

And notwithstanding Conway's case, it takes little to constitute a trade dispute. That was made evident in the subsequent case of *Gaskell v. Lancashire and Cheshire Miners' Federation and Others* (28 *Times* Law Reports, 518). There trade union officials approached colliery owners, and told them that if they continued to employ certain men who had not joined the union the Federation would call out its men, and so stop the work in the pits. The colliery owners at once suspended these non-unionist men, and afterwards discharged them, and when they sought redress against the Federation and the officials who had brought about their discharge, the Courts told them that the wrong had been committed in contemplation of a trade dispute, and there was no remedy for them.

The Court of Appeal made a yet more dispiriting interpretation of the width of the expression "trade dispute" in the case of *Dallimore v. Williams and Jesson* (29 *Times* Law Reports 67). There the Court appraised the full value of the definition section in the Trade Disputes Act,* which says that

"the expression 'trade dispute' means any dispute between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment, or the terms of the employment, or with the conditions of labour, of any person, and the expression 'workmen' means all persons employed in trade or industry, whether or not in the employment of the employer with whom a trade dispute arises."

Thus, said the Court of Appeal, though the workmen are not engaged in a dispute with their employer, or among themselves, but the wrongful act (in this case of inducing

* Section 5 (3).

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a breach of contract) is the work of outsiders—officials of the union—the protection of the Act applies, when those outsiders are fomenting a dispute between an employer and his workmen. This decision whittles down the small amount of relief against the Act which the House of Lords appeared to have granted in *Conway v. Wade*, but it is so much in consonance with the plain reading of section 5 that it is not likely to be further contested. In this case of *Dallimore v. Williams and Jesson* it was further held that a person may be entitled to the protection of the Act, notwithstanding that what he does is not done entirely in furtherance of a trade dispute, but that in doing it he is also actuated by spite.

But though an individual, seeking the protection of section 3 for his wrongful acts, must show that they were done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, a trade union, which is provided for by section 4, is under no such limitation. The words of the first subsection of section 4 are quite general. “An action against a trade union . . . shall not be entertained by any court.” And an action “against any members or officials thereof on behalf of themselves and all other members of the trade union in respect of any tortious act alleged to have been committed by or on behalf of the trade union, shall not be entertained by any court.” The organized trade union is, of course, immensely more powerful to inflict harm than are isolated individuals, yet whereas some show of excuse is demanded from the weaker assailants, the stronger are freed from any restrictions. Certain societies are exempt from all responsibilities before the law. That would be remarkable enough were these societies of so radically inoffensive a character that there was no danger of their inflicting harm upon others (when, of course, the grant of immunity would be superfluous), but these societies of working men have, as their chief object, the very purpose of inflicting harm upon others! It is amazing.

It is so amazing that a judge of the High Court has found

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it difficult to believe that these unions were endowed with even more complete immunity than the individuals catered for in the third section. Mr Justice Darling, in *Richards v. Bartram* (25 *Times Law Reports*, 181) held that trade unions were amenable for their wrongful acts unless those acts were done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute. Otherwise, that learned judge remarked, "unions could be guilty of slander, libel, assault, and "battery, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution, "and the person aggrieved had no remedy against the "union. If that were law it gave a trade union a privilege "to do untold harm and to inflict inconceivable damage, "and to remain absolutely untouched by any law in the "land." But that is the Law, though Mr Justice Darling could not believe it when the point came before him in this case. In a case, however, decided by him a few months earlier—*Bussy v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants* (24 *Times Law Reports*, 437)—he had held that a trade union itself did enjoy absolute immunity, but that its officials did not.

The real interpretation of section 4 was given by the House of Lords in *Vacher and Sons v. London Society of Compositors* ([1913] A.C. 107). The five learned law lords who took part in that judgment were unanimous and emphatic. Messrs Vacher and Sons had begun an action for damages for conspiracy to libel and for libel against the Society and its two secretaries. From the amended statement of claim it appears that from a "Compositors' Fair "List and Guide to the London Printing Offices," issued by the Society, and sent from the Society's offices to customers of Vacher and Sons, that firm's name was omitted, and that a letter addressed by the Society's organizing secretary to one of Messrs Vacher's customers contained statements charging the firm with unfair dealings and harsh treatment of employees and exclusion from its employment of trade unionists. Instead of delivering a defence the defendant obtained an order putting a summary end to the

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action, on the ground that, whether guilty of libel or not, the Court could not entertain any action against them, by virtue of section 4 of the Trade Disputes Act. It was not averred that the libels had been published in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute. Messrs Vacher's counsel contended that this was necessary, and that the words relating to a trade dispute, though not appearing in the section, must be implied, since the subject of the Act, according to its short title, was "Trade disputes," and the first three sections specifically referred to trade disputes, as did also the second subsection of the 4th section (relating to actions against trustees). The law lords, one and all, repelled these arguments. The proper title of the Act was "An Act to provide for the regulation of Trade Unions and Trade Disputes"; the various sections were independent of one another; and the first subsection of section 4 could only be read in its plain, unambiguous terms, without the introduction of any qualifying words. To quote from Lord Haldane, "I find no context in the Act read as a whole which indicates an intention to cut down the literal meaning of the wide language of section 4 subsection 1." So Messrs Vacher's attempt to get justice for a libel upon them failed; they were bundled out of court: the law of England can give no redress for a wrong when it is committed by a sacrosanct body of workmen formed for the purpose of fighting employers and opposing such of their fellow workmen as do not agree with them; and the fact that the employer and his men are working together harmoniously, without a thought of any dispute, makes no difference to the freedom of this outside body to commit any wrong it likes. It does not even matter that the person injured is neither an employer nor a workman. Your property may be destroyed, your business ruined, your good name besmirched, your very person violated—no matter: if the wrongdoer is a trade union or its members or officials acting on its behalf, you cannot get a penny of damages from that union's funds. That is the law.

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So far as concerns the omission of words relating to a trade dispute from the first subsection of section 4, that was probably an oversight upon the part of our legislators and their draftsmen—though it was not for the Courts or the House of Lords in its judicial capacity to speculate as to what the House of Commons and the House of Lords in its legislative capacity would have done if their members had troubled to think. The mischief lies with the legislators themselves, who don't trouble to think, who have other matters of vital import—the chances of office, moves in the party game, and so forth—to occupy their attention, inasmuch that, as one of them ingenuously said, “We “Members haven't time to think.” Nor do they appear to have found time to denounce this iniquitous measure on the frequent occasions when they address their constituents upon the political situation.

Such then, again, is the law. How shall a remedy be found? We must strive of course for the repeal of the Act, and in the meantime whatever can be done to mitigate the injustice must be done, and if possible done in such a way as will assist the efforts for repeal.

Let us consider this last-named course first. The Act, as the Courts have reminded us, is so plain and so sweeping in its terms, as well as so bad, that one may well be prompted to ask whether in the working of it any sort of amelioration is possible. But examine the Act again.

Take first the picketing section—section 2. Realizing the shameful character of the privileges it was conferring upon one class of the population, the Government of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity made a poor attempt to save its face by conferring the privilege of picketing upon persons “acting on their own behalf, or on behalf of . . . “an individual employer or firm,” as well as of a trade union, and enabled them also “to attend at or near a house “or place where a person resides or works or carries on “business or happens to be, if they so attend merely for the

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“purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating information, or of peacefully persuading any person to work.” The Government and the Labour Party of course smiled at each other when these words were introduced: it is the trade union, and not the employer, which pickets; so there was no harm in giving this humorous appearance of fair dealing all round. But—why should not employers picket? Why should they not engage an adequate number of men to attend at the striking workman’s home, for the purpose of peacefully obtaining from him information as to his real sentiments concerning the strike; for the purpose of peacefully communicating to him the information that if he likes to turn up at work, such and such terms will be given, and pickets will always be present in sufficient strength to guard him from molestation in the streets or at home; for the purpose of peacefully persuading him to go on with his work, and not to sacrifice himself and his family to the designs of interested agitators? There are practical possibilities in this direction well worth the attention of employers. There are genuine strikes where the workmen have failed to obtain decent terms from their employers, and where they are convinced and unanimous in pressing their claims. The employers, in such cases, would soon obtain from their pickets information which would show them the need for making a proper settlement. But there are the other strikes—and they are the more frequent nowadays—where the men concerned are not dissatisfied, but come out in simple obedience to outside orders. Some of them believe in the wisdom of the union leaders, or enjoy the fun of the fight, but there are many others who would much prefer to remain at work—who would remain at work if they dared. An employers’ picket would be very helpful with them. And the practice might grow to such dimensions that the Labour agitators would become much less enamoured of a privilege of which the employers availed themselves with corresponding freedom.

The same cynical conferring of privilege upon masters as

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well as men is repeated in section 4. "An action against a "trade union, whether of workmen or masters . . . shall "not be entertained in any court." Why do not employers register themselves in trade unions? They might do it locally, or in their trades, or in one great national union, such as has been recently proposed. It would be interesting in the event to see to what extent the Courts would hold all the industrial organizations of the country exempt from the consequences of any wrongful acts chargeable to them. The general public might feel a shiver of apprehension; but in proportion as that freedom from liability was demonstrated, would the absurdity and the appalling mischievousness of the Act be manifested, and its end hastened. Moreover, employers would find it worth while so to register themselves, in order to put themselves so far as possible upon an equality with the workmen, and as a measure of protection against liability for damages—in a case, for example, where they had expressed themselves with freedom concerning an agitator's conduct, and were unable to obtain sufficient evidence to justify every word uttered.

But no one living under this country's laws, whether an employer or a member of the general public, or even a workman, should rest content until the Trade Disputes Act is repealed. With the employer repeal is a matter of elementary, but justifiable, self-interest: in his case acquiescence, or apathy in striving for repeal, is mere folly in a business matter. The general public is concerned as it is concerned with any bad law; if not personally inconvenienced, it is in the public interest that all the laws of the country should be as good as it is possible to make them, and in particular that laws embodying vicious principles of inequality and unjust privilege should be removed, for they let down the whole fabric of the law, and so breed dangerous contempt for it, and, besides, have a contaminating influence, one bad law breeding another. But it is wrong to assume that the general public is not directly concerned in the Trade Disputes Act. What person who has saved any money at

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all is not, through his capital, an employer? And every member of the public stands to lose, as a consumer, as a citizen, from the results of the conferring of such a damaging privilege upon one side in the Capital and Labour warfare.

But it is in the interests of the workman—or rather the organized workman—that the Act was passed, and it is the possibility of his class consenting to repeal that will primarily engage the attention of the politician, to whom we have to look for repeal. At first sight, this seems rather a hopeless problem. As was said at the beginning, natural selfishness prompts men to hug any privilege with which they have been endowed, and this particular privilege is also a valuable asset in the Capital and Labour struggle. It would be idle to minimize this consideration; but too much may easily be made of it. It is not so very formidable; it certainly presents no insuperable barrier to repeal.

But what arguments can you address to the workers? it may be asked. There are cogent arguments. First, let us get clearly in mind who the men are whose extraordinary privileges it is proposed to curtail. And we can best do that by a process of elimination. They are not the whole of the working classes. There are still very large numbers of workmen—a considerable majority—and men with votes (it is necessary to insert this for the sake of the politicians) who are not members of trade unions, and to whom the Act, therefore, makes an enfeebled appeal at best. There are large numbers of workmen, both within and without unions, who only acquiesce with sullenness in, or who actively hate, trade union tyranny (and the electoral ballot box is secret). Besides these two large classes of workmen who have to be subtracted from the supporters of trade union privileges there is another very large class, composed of the men who, while entertaining no objection to unionism, are nevertheless in fact lukewarm supporters of it, whose interests are centred in other matters. There remains the residuum of men who take an active part in the affairs of their union, and are in most cases keen politicians and Socialists or Syndical-

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ists. They are really a stage army, just as in the Conservative or Liberal Party the active body of consistently interested party men is only a stage army. Still, the knot of active politicians whips up a lot of supporters at an election, and so among the trade unionists the large class of more or less indifferent members must be counted as supporters of the active spirits when occasion arises. At the same time, this large class is for the most part open to argument. Thus analysed, it will appear that the number of those with whom argument is useless, or all but useless, is not so very formidable.

As to the nature of the arguments to be used, surely it is best to go straight to first principles. The true democrat, every freedom-loving man, hates privilege. The law should be the same for every man. To the poor man, especially, equality before the law is a principle of vital moment. The Trade Disputes Act infringes that principle. It makes a privileged class before the law. True, the privileged class happens, in this instance, to be the workers' class, but not entirely; for it does not help, but oppresses, the worker who does not relish the agitator's strife, but wants to be left in peace to earn his living as best he can. So to the workers as a whole it is by no means a privilege, but only to the pugnacious spirits among them, and the professional agitators who live upon them. Even, however, were it a privilege of use and enjoyment to the whole working class, the fact that it is a privilege would remain, and so by its continuance it helps to maintain in our social life that reign of privilege from which the poor and weak suffer, and which the democrat and the lover of liberty denounce.

This argument will perhaps not convert the whole of the working classes and their champions. Among Socialists and Syndicalists, who believe in the Class War, and see the vantage ground which the Act gives them, it will fall idly upon their ears. But to large numbers of the working classes it will appeal, certainly to those who already have no love for the Act; but it would surely appeal also to a very

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considerable number who have not hitherto considered the Act in this light. As to the rest, their opposition must be faced: they are not a majority of the electors.

The trouble here is that politicians are afraid of any considerable section of the electorate, even though a comparatively small minority, because the party balance is so nearly even, and that is why there was expressed the fear early in this article that only a bold administration would tackle the task of repealing the Trade Disputes Act. Yet the amount of courage required is not, after all, so very great. As has been shown, the section of the population whose opposition to repeal must be reckoned with, dwindles much as one examines it, and, with an educative campaign, may be made to dwindle more; while the residue comprises men whose opposition is a matter of course, apart from any proposal to repeal the Act. Furthermore, every Government faces inevitable opposition from considerable sections of the electorate; the Conservatives did not shrink from Licensing and Education Acts, though they knew they were thereby encountering the determined hostility of those important sections, the Teetotallers and the Nonconformists; the whole strength of the landed interest does not dismay Mr Lloyd George. A quite moderate equipment of courage, then, should suffice for the repeal of the Trade Disputes Act.

We have throughout used the word "repeal," rather than "amendment." Of course, technically, repeal will take the form of amendment. A Bill will be introduced "to amend the Trade Disputes Act, 1906," or "to amend the Trade Union Acts, 1871 to 1906," or "to amend and consolidate the Trade Union Acts, 1871 to 1906." This last would be the best method of all, were it not that to propose a root-and-branch measure like that would most likely give rise to a demand for a preliminary Royal Commission, involving a long delay. But though amendment be the form, repeal must be the substance. This nettle must be grasped boldly; and it may therefore be doubted whether legislative

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proposals for mitigating in one or another particular some extreme injustice in the Act, leaving its general framework in being, are the best way of approaching the problem. Such proposals as have been hitherto suggested have the additional disadvantage of being so obviously attempts to get concessions in the employers' interests. A deeper cut, a wider sweep, is surely the better way. Let us boldly attack the Act as a fundamentally ill-conceived measure, which in its essence strikes, in the earlier sections, at freedom—the freedom of a man to live his own life and earn his own living unmolested by superior force and fear of violence—and in the fourth section at the great principle of the equality of all men before the law—the principle that every man shall pay damages to recompense any wrong he may do to another

THE GRASSHOPPERS

“ **B**ECAUSE half a dozen grasshoppers under a fern
make the field ring with their importunate chink,
“ whilst thousands of great cattle reposed beneath the
“ shadow of the British oak, chew the cud, and are silent,
“ pray do not imagine that those who make the noise are
“ the only inhabitants of the field—that, of course, they are
“ many in number—or that, after all, they are other than
“ the little, shrivelled, meagre, hopping, though loud and
“ troublesome, insects of the hour.”

(Burke's *Reflections on the French Revolution*, Vol. III, p. 344.)

A LESSON FROM LEEDS

“ALL OR NOWT”—“NOWT”

HAD any man been asked a year ago to say what made up the fame of Leeds he would probably have referred to its great clothing industry, its famous choir, its vicinity to Kirkstall Abbey or, possibly, to its possession of one of the best restaurants in the kingdom: thus, according to his knowledge or his tastes. He assuredly would not have rested its fame on the fact that it has the most capable municipality in England. Yet, to-day, its handling of the strike of December and January, 1913-14, has emphatically added this claim to the city's record. In the words of Mr Will Thorne, M.P., one of the men's chief leaders in the matter, the end of that strike was “a very happy, happy termination under the circumstances,” and, he added, “I have never seen a termination so happy.”*

What this “happy termination” was and how it was brought about, it will be the object here to show.

In June, 1913, there was a small strike in Leeds on the part of the Paviers' labourers working for the city, of whom 150 came out, followed by 750 Scavengers, 150 Park employees and 150 Permanent way workmen. A committee of six aldermen and two councillors, set up to deal with the matter, made very considerable concessions in the way of improved pay and conditions. These concessions in large measure met the demands made and were approved by the

* *Yorkshire Post*, 14th January, 1914.

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Council on the 16th June. The figures issued* show that the advances of wages made to its various servants by the city during the year 1913, and before the dispute which arose in October, touched 1,021 out of 2,984 men affected, of whom 720 received an extra 2s. a week and over, and 298 of them 1s. and under 1s. 6d.

These demands having been granted, the city believed that its labour troubles were at an end. Not so, however, those who directed the operations of the Trade Unions. The success of the June strike gave the impression that the city of Leeds was malleable and the more advanced Trade Unionists decided to prepare a resounding blow. The hammer for this thwacking had to be expressly forged. It took the form of the "Leeds Federal Council of Municipal "Employees," to which were affiliated some eight several Unions having members employed by the city. It was created on the suggestion of the Tramway and Vehicle Workers' Union and was intended to enable a central organization to control practically every municipal workman. Thus were the exploits of le Roi Pataud of Paris to be emulated, but with success instead of with failure: thus was Syndicalism to prove itself a true boon to the worker.

The Tramway men themselves could not, in decency, strike work, for they were under agreement as to wages and conditions whereby they were prohibited from striking before the 4th August, 1914. How far they were controlled by this will be seen shortly.

Early in September a circular letter was sent, with the signature of a Mr Walt. Wood, to all the various committee Chairmen of the city demanding a general advance in wages of 2s. a week in addition to all previous advances and irrespective of the efficiency of the man, or the work done. At a later date Mr Wood stated that this demand by the men "was put forward as a basis for discussion; they never

* See the Report of the Special Committee on the Strike of the Municipal Workmen, printed at Leeds, 9th March, 1914, p. 7. This Report will hereafter be cited merely as "Committee Report."

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“ expected that the Corporation would surrender 2s. a week “ to all and sundry.”* It will be instructive to see how far this statement differs from the conduct of those who put forward the demand. It was based upon the statements that many men had not had advances for several years and that the cost of living had increased. The Council decided to defer all consideration of these demands until after the municipal elections in November.

On the 26th September the “ Leeds Federation of “ Municipal Employees ” struck its first blow, which took the form of a resolution calling upon the city to consider the all-round increase of 2s. at its next council meeting (the 8th October) and “ to provide for a meeting being “ arranged between all parties to such application, thereby “ preventing any possible dislocation of the city’s services.”

On Tuesday, 30th September, the result of a ballot of the members of the Gasworkers’ and General Labourers’ Union who were in the city’s service was declared. This Union contained approximately 3,000 men out of the 4,500 employed by the city, and of these 2,023 voted for a strike to enforce the 2s. demand while 138 voted against a strike.

At the meeting of the City Council on the 8th October a definite pledge was given to take the applications into consideration as soon as the new council should meet, and further that any advances agreed to should date back to 1st October. After this a meeting took place between the Lord Mayor and others representing the city on the one side, and Mr J. R. Clynes, M.P., Mr Will Thorne, M.P., and Mr Walt. Wood representing the men; and finally the Labour leaders agreed to defer their demands until the new council should meet. This decision was accepted by the Federal Council and approved by the men.

The new City Council appointed its Committees, and these bodies considered the applications and made a careful comparison of the wages paid by Leeds with those paid by

* Speech to Strikers, 11th January, 1914.—*Yorkshire Post*, 12th January, 1914.

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other cities and large employers of labour. As a result of this consideration, and a general instruction to grant a minimum wage of 6½d. an hour to all able-bodied labourers receiving less, a scheme of advances was prepared, and, on the 3rd December, 1913, approved by the City Council, which made a further promise to consider the case of any further workman who might have been overlooked or who had any other grievance.

This scheme of advances granted* a rise of 2s. or over to 466 men, of 1s. 6d. and under 2s. to 165 men and of 1s. and under 1s. 6d. to 1,501 men, while leaving the wages of 852 men unaffected.

The result of these advances, taken together with those earlier in the year, was that, of the 2,984 men affected by the dispute, 1,194 obtained an advance of 2s. or over, 94 men 1s. 6d. or over, and 1,456 men 1s. or over, while only 240 men neither had, nor were offered, any advance.†

The increased wages offered by the city were refused by the men's leaders and on the 7th December a mass meeting of the men repeated the demand for an extra 2s. a week all round and gave three days' notice of a general strike. It was to be "All or nowt this time."

In view of subsequent assertions that the city took up an unduly high-handed attitude in refusing to confer with the strikers, it is important to see what took place during the three days' interval before tools were laid down. On the 8th December Alderman Charles Henry Wilson, the leader of the Conservative party in the Council, which happened to be the predominant party, had an interview with Mr Will Thorne, M.P., and offered to refer the whole question in dispute to the arbitration of any fair-minded person outside Leeds, and more particularly, if the workmen so desired it, to Sir George Askwith as the sole arbitrator. In one hour, and without this offer ever being put before the men, the suggestion of arbitration was refused point blank

* Committee Report, p. 13.

† *Ib d.*, p. 15.

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by Mr Thorne and his colleagues. Arbitration would have required some suggestion of justification for the demands in every case. Their scheme was different—an all-round rise, justified or not, was to be obtained by the hammer's blow upon the iron believed to be soft. As Mr Arthur Gill, the Federation Chairman, observed at a meeting intended to put the men's case before the public, “ We can be the “ Arbitrators.”* Again, on the 10th December, the new Lord Mayor sent a letter to Mr Walt. Wood stating that he had been able to persuade the parties to agree to an early conference to deal with the grievances which the men considered that they had. He pointed out that the city should have reasonable time to come to a decision and that the three days would not afford such time. At a mass meeting of the Federal Council that evening this letter was read and the meeting resolved that it had come “ too late ” and adhered to the previous resolution to ask all men to cease work immediately. The blow of the new-forged hammer fell.

On the 11th December, 3,000 members of the Gasworkers' and General Labourers' Union struck work and 1,000 remained at their posts. On the next day the Enginemen and other workmen in the Electric Stations for Tramways and Lighting struck work. It has been stated that 1,100 of the tramway men could not in decency come out. Come out, however, they did on the 13th December and their consciences were reconciled to this action by a decision of their leaders that, although the men must adhere to their agreement not to strike on the question of wages and conditions, a ballot should be held as to whether they should strike “ if blackleg labour is brought into the power stations.”† The fact that such labour had been employed was then apparently assumed and, on the ballot deciding in the affirmative, the Tramwaymen, or at any rate a number of them, came out without further scruple. Another instance

* *Yorkshire Post*, 13th December, 1913.

† *Ibid.*, 12th December, 1913.

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of breach of contract was afforded by a number of the men at the Meadow Lane Gasworks who totally disregarded their obligations to give 28 days' notice because a foreman sprayed some water upon some coke—a duty usually performed by a labourer.* Others did not require even the solace of an excuse. In all, on the 13th of December, some 4,292 men were on strike, many merely in sympathy with those affected by the dispute. "Then the row began."

The City Council was composed of members belonging to three different parties, Conservative, Liberal and Labour; and if the two former could have been divided, the few Labour members might have hoped to hold the balance between them. The Labour members made an effort to display their tactical skill by summoning a special meeting of the Council for the 17th December "to pass such resolutions as the Council may determine." They had, however, as it appears, some difficulty in drafting a resolution, for by the time they arrived with a proposal that a committee be appointed "to confer and settle with the Corporation employees now on strike," Alderman Wilson had already handed in a somewhat similar proposal "delegating all matters arising out of, or in connexion with, the strike to a committee" consisting of himself and Alderman F. H. Lupton, R. A. Smithson, J. R. Ford and F. Kinder "with full powers to act." This resolution, having priority, was put and carried without amendment being suggested, or contrary vote: and the whole conduct of the strike was henceforth in the hands of the committee who represented the Conservative and Liberal parties in the council. The Labour members spoke much of their having been tricked, but, although possibly their tactical unreadiness may have prevented their voicing, until too late, their protests against exclusion from the Committee, it does not seem likely that any other result would have ensued once the Conservatives and Liberals were agreed to exclude them.

From the beginning to the end of this, as of every, strike,

* *Yorkshire Post*, 12th December, 1913.

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the story of its career divides itself into two parallel and interdepending columns: (1) that of the struggle of the city to perform its duty and to keep up its services, with the subsequent struggle of the strikers to prevent their fellows from returning to work, and (2) that of the negotiations.

It is to the second of these subjects that most attention will be given here as it is in the method of negotiation that this strike was most singular.

It must, however, never be forgotten that in Labour disputes the negotiations are as much dependent upon the course of the struggle outside as in real war they are swayed by the course of battles. In this case the outside events can be treated very briefly. The behaviour of the men throughout the strike was, on the whole, excellent: there was but one really brutal criminal assault, upon a young student who was helping to maintain the services, and two bloodless and more or less ineffectual bomb explosions. The crime record of the city as a whole was better than in normal times, which, as one of the men's leaders caustically remarked, proved that the city had all the scallywags at work. The greatest strain fell upon the gasworks. During the first few days the moon proved the most effective strike breaker, and after a few days the street lighting was adequately performed by the few remaining workmen assisted by volunteers. The gasworks themselves were highly troublesome. At New Wortley, where half the gas of the city is made, there was considerable difficulty, even with the help of volunteers, in keeping up a supply. On Christmas Day some four hundred men at these works were persuaded to sign on to resume work, but diligent picketing persuaded three hundred of them not to go back. Two hundred of these three hundred did, in fact, drift back to work within a few days, after which the voluntary workers were dispensed with. At the other works at Meadow Lane and York Road a considerable malicious waste of gas was detected by the Committee,* and attributed to some of the men who remained at work. The Cleansing Department was

* Committee Report, p. 53.

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left with less than 5 per cent of its staff—but the work was soon effectively carried out with the help of private citizens and members of the Citizens' League. The Tramways retained at work almost half of their staff, including every official. This latter fact is attributed by the Committee to the rule there observed that no official in charge of men should be a member of any union. Those of the Tramway men who came out had almost all returned to work by the 20th December.

The maintenance of peace was, as has been said, highly successful, and was effected by large drafts of police from all the great neighbouring cities. One most honourable and remarkable fact was the ready, efficient and willing help of all classes of the citizens, including a large number of University Students. This help was rendered without invitation from the University authorities, although, when a protest against it was made to the Vice-Chancellor of the University he expressed his approval of the action of the students. Only one unfortunate volunteer was killed, owing to his unskilful handling of explosive gases under his charge. In spite of brave words on both sides (for the strike was declared to be "collapsing" before it had lasted a week, and the men were told that they were "winning all round" within a week of their surrender) the strike ran a very regular course, those out of work declining fairly steadily from the figure of 4,434 at the start to some 2,400 at the "happy, happy termination."

And now to the negotiations. The moment the Committee of Five was appointed they resolved upon two courses of conduct, which differentiate this dispute from every other. They decided to take a shorthand note of all verbal conversations between themselves and the men, and, secondly, to put all decisions of either side into writing. At first sight the importance of these steps hardly appears, but when the difficulty of avoiding misrepresentation of what has been said is considered, especially where half-educated men who represent uneducated men are concerned, the

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great wisdom of this step becomes manifest. No better instance could be given than the history of the conferences of the 20th and 22nd December to be related hereafter. The common history of strikes has revealed conferences at which a lot of loose talk by both sides has resulted in a splitting of the difference; and the importance of the line taken by the Leeds Committee appears from the indignant protests of the men's leaders at the refusal to have what they called “ any proper conference.” That is, apparently, a conference without any written record; not a conference at which anything intelligent is said—for that could as well be put in writing—but one at which incautious admissions may be seized upon or distorted.

The first act of the Committee upon their appointment was to issue an invitation to all men to return to work within two days. This alone reduced the outstanding strikers from 4,434 to 2,965.

Subsequently arrangements were made for a conference on the 20th December: and it was attended by the special Committee and fourteen representatives of the workmen. A conference took place, the verbatim report of which fills seven pages in the special Committee's report to the city.* It is a most interesting document to anyone who desires to study the difficulties of the strike leaders. They had come to the expected “ conference ” to receive offers; they were met with a courteous request to state the grievances of their particular men. As their first spokesman announced, they had decided “ for each section to speak for themselves.” They were asked to do so. The Committee men made almost silent note of their remarks, which were mostly diffuse and general iterations of the fact that they wanted to receive offers. As Mr Wood remarked, “ My own contention of the “ manner to deal with it is that if you have anything to give “ to us now we should be pleased to receive, and we should “ be pleased to retire to discuss such proposals into another “ room while you discuss our proposals here, and then

* Committee Report, App. A, pp. 69-76.

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“remeet again on the subject.” Thus also the daughters of the horse leech. Mr Gill went so far as to say, “The delegates “are here to answer.” When each had said his allotted say the men withdrew and shortly afterwards received a written statement that the Committee would consider their statements carefully and send them a transcript of the shorthand note.

To this the men’s leaders returned a request that “all “hostilities . . . meaning the employment of any further “labour . . .” should be suspended till Monday. The answer of the Committee was brief, but in its few words sets forth their creed:

“So far as this Committee are concerned, there are no “hostilities. We are here to maintain the services of the “city, and this duty we shall perform.”

On Monday, the 22nd December, the Committee met the Federal Council and read them their answer, which pointed out that a careful study of the wages paid by others in Leeds and elsewhere showed that not only was there scarcely a single case where the city’s wage did not compare favourably, but further that out of 2,813 men, 2,386 were paid higher rates than existed in the average of the towns quoted by the men’s leaders. They then stated their terms: the men were to return on individual application, employment could not be found for all owing to dislocation, but all who could be effectively employed in the departments named would be put on at once, others as soon as they could be effectively employed: and lastly “If there are “grievances these will be considered after the men have “returned to work.”

The great hammer was rebounding from its blow, and the iron looked sorely as though it were not even dented.

To this the Federal Council replied indignantly repudiating the terms suggested and proclaiming their demand for “a full and further discussion ” and “a round table conference. ”

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The Committee replied by an emphatic repetition of their readiness to consider any case or any detail, no matter how small, which might be submitted to them in writing. Their adversaries of the Federal Council again protested against the refusal “ to discuss the men’s case in proper “conference.”

That night* a crowded mass meeting of the strikers was held in the Town Hall and some fairly wild statements were made. Mr Will Thorne, M.P., stated that they had been “ grossly insulted,” and after remarking that “ he had done “ his share of fighting in his day with his fist as well as with “ his tongue ”—he urged the men to “ Do your duty and “ fight as men should fight, as Yorkshiremen fought in days “ gone by. You will have to use both hands and your feet on “ this occasion.” Mr Jack Jones said that the Committee of Five “ was outraging every sense of public decency,” and Mr Walt. Wood was almost equally emphatic.

By the end of the year (1913) the departments were rapidly getting back into normal work, and what with the return of former workmen and the employment of Leeds residents (be it noted that no outsiders were employed), only about a thousand vacancies remained to be filled. Yet there were some 2,500 men still on strike. Up to then (indeed, with one exception which will be referred to later, throughout the strike) not one single grievance had been, or was, brought to the Committee’s notice. On the 31st December the Federal Council wrote that it was prepared to recommend a return to work if all who had not received 1s. advance should receive it, and all involved be reinstated. To this the Committee replied next day that they were glad that the demand for 2s. had been withdrawn, but that there were only 241 men who had had no increase of 1s. in 1913, and in all such cases the wages were the standard trade union rates; and further that they could not undertake to reinstate all the strikers.

On the 2nd January an angry letter was sent by the Gas-

* See *Yorkshire Post*, 23rd December, 1913.

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workers' and General Labourers' Union to the Committee, in which much was deplored and resented and many things characterized as insults, un-English, and menaces to liberty. This letter stated that the demand for 2s. a week was not withdrawn.

In their reasoned reply the Committee touched for the first time upon a point which may safely be said to be the most noteworthy in connexion with the whole affair.* While the men had been drawing their strike pay in idleness, and while the soft-handed undergraduates and portly citizens had stoked the retorts and flushed the drains, the keen minds of the Committee of Five had been at work. They had had more to do than to answer Mr Walt. Wood's letters. They had considered their city's services from the business point of view, and they were able to discover that enormous savings could be effected. They found that at least £36,000 a year (equal to a rate of 4d. in the £) was being wasted on at least 500 unnecessary men. A review of the details of these economies is unnecessary—suffice it to say that they included a saving of £6,000 a year at the cost of a capital expenditure of £19,000 on automatic gas lighting plant, £500 a year at a capital cost of £500 for electricity, a reduction from 947 to 708 of the gas makers and the sweeping away of 300 out of 841 of the street sweepers and cleansers. Many a city may long for the services of the Committee of Five, though not for the strike which brought it into being.

One last effort was made by the men's leaders to alter the fortunes of the fight. The Federation sent once more a demand for a Conference, while appeals were made to all Trade Unionists in the city's service to cease work. Urgent appeals were made to other Unions for funds and the suggestions of a rise in the strike pay from 12s. 6d. to 20s. were thrown out at meetings of the strikers.

Meanwhile, a grievance was actually discovered, reported and rectified. It affected three crane drivers, who had been

* Committee Report, p. 42.

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overlooked in the wages revision, and they each received an advance of 2s. This was the only grievance brought to the notice of the Committee from the beginning to the end of the strike.

On the 7th January, the Committee met Mr J. R. Clynes, M.P., in the first of a series of interviews which ended in his persuading the men to accept the settlement of the dispute. This departure from the policy of negotiation in writing (adopted after the violent speeches which followed the first conference) was due to the belief of the Committee in the moderation and good sense of Mr Clynes: a belief which was justified by the event.

A full shorthand note of the four interviews which took place from the 7th to the 12th January shows that the points pressed by Mr Clynes were those previously put forward by the men: (1) that the advances now to be granted should date back for all work done since the 1st October, (2) that at least 1s. a week rise should be granted to all, and (3) complete reinstatement. The first of these points had already been accorded to those who had gone back to work, and Mr Clynes argued that a different treatment of those who settled now would bring about a bitterness which would mar the solution.

Upon each one of these points the Committee remained absolutely unmoved and immovable. As to reinstatement, which proved the hardest problem to deal with, they pointed out that the economies which they proposed to make must largely reduce the total number of their men, and, while agreeing to discharge all temporary employees as soon as possible, they positively refused to shift any man who had obtained a permanent job. As to the result of this situation, they were chary of giving figures and above all desirous not to overstate what they could do for the men. The utmost prospect held out to Mr Clynes was that a thousand men could be taken back in two or three weeks, while for one thousand men there was “no hope,” and Alderman Wilson said

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that if half the 2,400 men got back, "it would be a good day's work."

On the 13th January Mr Clynes addressed a mass meeting of the strikers, who accepted the city's terms, which were then published in full. In effect they were as follows:

The advances offered before the strike were adhered to by the city, but payable to the strikers only as from the date of resuming work. In the case of those who had had no advance in 1913, the Committee would consider any grievance when the men had resumed work. As many workmen as could be effectively employed should be restarted—a considerable number within a day or two, a further considerable number before the expiration of seven days. Thereafter the Committee would not prejudice the chances of reinstatement by engaging fresh men, unless essential to the needs of a particular case. Incidentally, it may be mentioned that the figures as to reinstatement were more than justified by the event. On the 15th January 709 men, by the 22nd, 1,261 men and by the 3rd February no fewer than 1,386 men had been replaced in work.

This termination to an historic trade dispute was, as we have seen, pronounced by one of the parties to it—Mr Will Thorne—to be doubly happy, and in this conclusion it is to be hoped that all will concur. An attempt to extort acquiescence in an unreasoned and unjustified demand by plunging a great city into darkness, squalor, poverty and ill-health was defeated by the fact that its citizens came forward with energy—both of mind and of body—to protect themselves.

The permanent results of the attempt are that the city has saved 4d. in the £ in rates by removing superfluous workers, and that many persons have learned that the phrase "All or nowt" may sometimes really mean "Nowt."

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THE GLACIAL EPOCH EXPLAINED

WE have all heard of the Glacial Epoch, but it remains still a vague generality. What the plain man wants to know is the How? Why? and When? of it. Science, however, cannot supply this information. These are just the questions round which controversy has raged for so long that scientific men are forced to regard the Ice Age as a mystery, and even appear content to leave it undefined, as it provides a hazy background for many physical and meteorological theories, while leaving much to the individual imagination.

Research, however, in some branches of geology has been active, and there is now available a remarkable array of evidence which, when placed together as in a jig-saw puzzle, presents the matter of glacial periods in a new and intelligible light.

The full reasoning-out of all the evidence necessarily covers a great deal of ground since it is in conflict with numerous theories that have taken root, and thus established vested interests in the scientific world. These have arisen owing to the inability of astronomers to indicate a direct cosmical cause for the glacial periods, or to do more than suggest that an increased eccentricity of the earth's orbit might prove to be an important factor.

Just as geological truths during the last two centuries were stifled by a strict adherence to Biblical chronology, so have the facts regarding the glacial epoch been obscured

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by a too implicit faith in the tenets of astronomers, which has prevented phenomena being seen in their true focus. These have been represented as distant in time, when, in reality, they belong to the immediate past of pre-history.

That a movement of the earth, second only in importance to its yearly path and daily rotation, should have remained unknown through all the centuries since the great discoveries of the earlier astronomers is an astounding fact, and one that may well require pause before acceptance, but when it is considered how many beliefs are now in the melting pot, which were regarded during the last century as truths established for all time, it is conceivable that we have still some matters requiring revision even in the august science of Astronomy.

If the question of the origin of the glacial epoch were now to be placed for the first time before a body of scientific men untrammelled by preconceived and traditional opinions, investigation would naturally be directed to the factor that causes the seasons. Every schoolboy knows that the seasons owe their existence to the position of obliquity at which the earth is at present inclined to the plane of its orbit. Therefore, in seeking the cause of a change of seasons—a glacial epoch—one would first assume the probability of a change in the obliquity; nor would such a scientific investigation be relinquished as ineffectual until such a change was shown to be, from every point of view, impossible. That so obvious a basis of inquiry was not adopted in the past was due to the refusal of astronomers to admit that any pronounced change could take place. This again induced some investigators to improve the occasion by arguments to show that, even if a change to a greater obliquity were possible, it would still be ineffective in producing glacial conditions. Thus geologists have been led further astray. With the right-of-way to the only rational solution of the cause closed to them, geologists and physicists have worn themselves out in a controversial labyrinth, invoking every possible factor, from a dearth of comets, as fuel for the sun's heat, to a decrease in the

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amount of carbonic acid in the atmosphere, and in discussing every conceivably, or inconceivably, adequate cause.

Fortunately we are now in a position to disregard all these theories and to attack the whole question afresh, since the result of recent research enables us to remove the deadlock created by astronomers. It is also established that a definite change in the obliquity is taking place now, and has been in progress since the date of the earliest records; moreover, the limits set on the change of obliquity by Laplace, which confined it to insignificant proportions, are now declared to be non-existent, since mathematicians maintain that there are no real limits to such change.

At present the tendency amongst geologists is to hark back to the opinions held by Sir C. Lyell in 1860, that the Ice Age was due to a special geographical distribution of continents, but the majority profess to have abandoned theory and to content themselves with the recording of facts.

These facts prove to be in direct agreement with a theory hitherto discarded by astronomers, and that without due investigation, on the supposition that it was incompatible with the assumed cause of the movement of the precession of the equinoxes.

The theory referred to is that of the late Major General Drayson, R.A., at one time Professor of Astronomy at the Woolwich Academy, and consists in the indication of the true curve followed by the pole of the heavens (the prolongation of the earth's axis) which causes this precession. This curve, though nearly coinciding at the present time with the curve as traced by astronomers round the pole of the ecliptic, has a different centre (the point C of diagram), and consequently in one part of the curve, which the pole of the heavens traces out, is much further removed from the pole of the ecliptic than it is at present. As the obliquity is always a measure of the distance between this pole and the pole of the ecliptic, this would cause an increased obliquity.


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Referring to the diagram, the dotted line PTQ marks the circle (seen in perspective), which, according to astronomers, is traced by the pole of the heavens round E, the pole of the ecliptic, keeping always at an angle of about 23° from this point. The larger circle PRP^r is, according to Drayson, the true path; and the point P will, in the year 2296 A.D., be in the position of minimum obliquity of the ecliptic, to which the pole of the heavens is now closely approaching in the direction of the arrow. Since this circle PRP^r is centred on C, six degrees from E, when the pole was at P^r, some 15,000 years ago, the angle of obliquity P^rOE attained its maximum of $35^{\circ} 25' 47''$.

As there have been various attempts made, and notably by Dr Croll, whose calculations have been sanctioned by astronomers, to show that an increase of obliquity would melt the ice at the poles,* and would therefore not make for a glacial period, we must rely on the logic of the matter to assert itself in opposition to theory. If there were no obliquity there would be no seasons, but a reign of eternal spring in the polar regions, and no word for summer or winter. Introduce a small obliquity and immediately there occurs a perceptible difference between one part of the year and another, and words for the seasons will have to be coined. Increase the angle of the obliquity and the difference becomes more marked still, until with an obliquity of 35° we have winters of a rigour unknown to us, and in London the summer heat of Lisbon. If evaporation does not keep pace with precipitation or thawing with freezing, we at once have the conditions requisite for the construction of a glacial period. The interdependence of obliquity and season-contrast is so self-evident that it seems almost a truism to dwell upon it. The obliquity of $35^{\circ} 30'$ would, anyhow, bring the arctic circle down to Durham and would entirely deprive Scotland for several days in winter of direct sunlight, which, without any strain on the imagination, seems a distinctly chilly condition of affairs.

* From reports of Nansen and other explorers the height of summer fails to melt any snow in the interior plateaux of Greenland, and it is stated that *no snow whatever is permanently lost from the surface by melting.*

DIAGRAM OF THE SLOW CONICAL MOTION OF THE EARTH'S
AXIS WHICH CAUSES THE PRECESSION OF THE EQUINOXES.



The dotted circle (in perspective) shows the path of the pole of the heavens according to the usual astronomical theory. The revolution is supposed to take 25,868 years.

The outer circle (PRP¹) shows the path as worked out by Drayson and is completed in 31,682 years. Obliquity of ecliptic at the maximum $35^{\circ} 25' 47''$, minimum $23^{\circ} 25' 47''$, present obliquity $23^{\circ} 27' 1.70''$.



The Glacial Epoch Explained

On reverting to the diagram it will be seen that for many hundred years in the immediate past the two curves have been nearly coincident. This would allow any discrepancy between them to be less patent.

From the elements of the Drayson curve have been deduced the following facts: that the period of completing one revolution of the curve is 31,682 years (not the 25,868 of astronomers); that the point of maximum obliquity was reached at the date 13544 B.C.; and that glacial conditions lasted until 5624 B.C.; that from the rate of decrease of obliquity just previous to the final stages of disappearing glaciation the change of climate was much more rapid than has since been the case, though a further decrease has been constantly in progress, and will continue for nearly 400 years more.

From the coincident duplication of these conditions in the northern and southern hemispheres, it follows that glaciation at both poles would be at one and the same period. This fact is of the greatest importance.

Let us now pass in review some direct results of recent research in geology, and it will be seen how the new theory is corroborated in many particulars by fact.

Since the days of Agassiz, who may be regarded as the first authority on this question, we have much increased our knowledge of glacial phenomena, and the glacial period has been subdivided into many glaciations and "genial" "episodes" numbering, according to present belief, as many as eight glaciations in the British Isles. At the same time more extended research has brought to light the fact that glacial periods are not confined to the later part of the Tertiary, but have occurred throughout all geological time, as there are traces in the earlier strata of the earth's crust which can only be attributed to the agency of ice, so that, on *a priori* grounds, it would appear that some recurring cycle of cosmical conditions is always in operation.

While every country within the zone of ice-action presents individual features, localizing scientific opinion and creating

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separate schools of theorists, the leaders of geological thought speak with no uncertain voice regarding both the universality of the glaciations over the whole globe, and especially as to their correspondence in time in both northern and southern hemispheres. There is not a shadow of doubt that they were contemporaneous; that an ice age in the north was synchronous with an ice age in the south. This, as opposed to the statement below, enables us to pay less regard to professed astronomical opinion and to give our adherence to Drayson, who alone, as will be shown, appears to have interpreted the astronomy of the subject correctly. We have also present conditions to support the evidence of the past. Observation has shown that in the last hundred years, and notably in the last few decades, a progressively increasing diminution of the glaciers and ice-fields in the north polar regions has taken place; while recent expeditions to the Antarctic have observed similar changes, and a marked decrease in a year or two in the same locality; so that identical processes are in operation in the two hemispheres.

Confronting these facts with the following statement by the late Sir R. Ball in *The Cause of an Ice Age*, 1890, we obtain in these polemics an admission from the opponents of Drayson which is fatal to the supposed security of their position:

“They (geological evidences) assure us no doubt that “ice ages have occurred in both hemispheres, but they “leave us uninformed as to whether ice ages were consecutive or concurrent. Now this is not a mere matter of “ordinary significance, as it involves an absolutely vital “point in the astronomical theory of the ice ages. So much “so is this the case, that if it could be shown that the ice “ages in the two hemispheres were concurrent, the “astronomical doctrine would have to be *forthwith* “*abandoned*.” He goes on to say: “Of course there is no “chance of such a contingency arising, and I merely “annunciate it to show the significance of the doctrine that

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“the ice ages in the opposite hemispheres were not concurrent, but were consecutive: in fact we may feel convinced on astronomical grounds that this must have been the actual state of things.”

American geologists were the first to shake themselves free from theory, and to set about calculations with a view to arriving at some approximate date for the passing away of the last glacial conditions, and have long held that this occurred at a comparatively recent date.

These calculations were based primarily on the rate of retrogression of the Niagara Falls and those of the St Anthony river. In recent years the investigation has been extended to various other phenomena, such as the accumulation of drift, the wearing away of river banks, and the filling up of kettle-holes (peculiar depressions left in the track of glaciers), with results that enable them to agree with corresponding calculations made by geologists in Sweden, and to give time-estimates in close correspondence with the requirements of Drayson's precession curve. They thus establish a date round about 7,000 years ago for the great melting of the ice, and show how tremendous were the forces called into action during the final stages, while the duration of the whole glacial period is shown to be probably 25,000 years or, “at the outside, only twice that amount.” The results are thus summarized in *The Origin and Antiquity of Man*, by Professor G. F. Wright.

The combined effect of all this evidence from so many different sources is irresistible. Large areas in Europe and North America which are now principal centres of civilization were buried under glacial ice thousands of feet thick, while the civilization of Babylonia was in its heyday. The glib manner in which many writers as well as many observers of limited range speak of the Glacial Epoch as far distant in geological time, is due to ignorance of facts which would seem to be so clear that he who runs must read them.

Admiral Sir A. de Horsey in *Draysonia** presents us with a curve showing the variations in the obliquity during a whole

* Longmans, Green & Co.

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cycle of revolution. This curve shows a very rapid decrease in the amount of the obliquity between 6000 and 5000 B.C. The importance of this can be gauged by the way it confirms American research, but it pieces in remarkably with another question with which we are going to deal, that of the "submerged forests."

The "submerged forests" are so recent in geology, and, from their position on oozy between-tide-levels, so uninviting, that they have met with undeserved neglect; yet the unravelling of their history is of the greatest importance to both the sciences of archæology and of geology. On the question now before us they throw a flood of light, and must be briefly described.

"They can be traced," says Mr Jamieson,* "round the whole of Britain and Ireland from Orkney to Cornwall and even it would seem along a great part of the western seaboard of Europe, as if they bore witness to a widespread elevation when Ireland and Britain formed one mass of dry land, united to the continent and stretching out into the Atlantic."

Round the coasts of England they are so frequent as to be practically continuous, and disclose at numerous places at low tide the remains of trees and masses of peat with sometimes whole roots of trees with portions of their boles still attached to the underlying silt. The trees are oaks, willow, alder and birch; and all the indications of the fossil bones and shells also point to their being of modern date; while the relics of man himself and of his stone implements when found are of recent neolithic times. As we are going to give quite a new aspect to this subject, it had better first be explained by a quotation from *The Change in the Climate*,† by Major R. A. Marriott.

Diodorus Siculus, the historian, who wrote about the time of the Christian era, speaks of Ictis, which, from the description of its position regarding the tin trade and its character

* J. G. S., vol. xxi.

† E. Marlborough & Co.

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as alternately an island and a peninsula, corresponds to St Michael's Mount in Cornwall. This was 2,000 years ago and a change of level of a few feet would entirely alter its geographical character. This lapse of time therefore fails to show any change in the respective levels of sea and land in that part of the coast. Yet the submerged forests can be traced all round our coasts and they are geologically of quite recent date. This points not to "slight alterations of level" between sea and land at various times," but to some cause affecting all our coasts simultaneously and in the same degree, some cause which has certainly not on the coast of Cornwall been in operation for 2,000 years at least. The break-up of the glacial period about 7,000 years ago was not only a letting loose of all the pent-up energy of the accumulated ice, but a repayment to the sea of what had been overdrawn during 15,000 years. It has been calculated that the ice piled up on the northern hemisphere was a mass of at least six million cubic miles. The doubling of this for the two hemispheres is sufficient to lower the ocean more than 200 feet, extending largely our coast boundaries and permitting the formation of forests and peat, which now that the sea has got its own back again remain permanently submerged.

As the question of whether Michael's Mount is designated by Ictis is a controversial one, it is as well to state that there are other places, such as the marshes known as the Glastonbury Levels, which can be proved to be at the same level now as they were at the beginning of the Christian era. The condition of Holy Island and of the Roman embankment at the Wash point also to the general absence of any coastal movement for some 2,000 years.

When the nature of the composition of the different strata, which have been chiefly exposed in dock excavations, is examined, everything points to a succession of events not of long duration. Each stratum is either indicative of a submergence of land which had just previously constituted a foreshore, or of a fenland which had been temporarily protected by sandbanks, thus allowing a short time for the accumulation of vegetation above mean-tide level. The movement moreover is never reversed; it is a steady

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encroachment of the sea. This points very significantly to the continuous rise of the sea of which the glacial melting was the cause. Is any calculation possible of the duration of this upward movement of the sea level? This is what is said by Mr Clement Reid in *Submerged Forests*.*

It is useless to pretend to any exact calculations as to the time needed for the formation of these alternating strata of estuarine silt and marsh soil; but looking at the whole of the evidence, without bias either way, it seems that an allowance of 1,000, or at most 1,500, years would be ample time to allow. A period of 1,500 years may therefore be taken to cover the whole of the changes which took place during the period of gradual submergence. If this is approximately correct the date at which the submergence began was only 5,000 years ago, or about 3,000 B.C. The estimate may have to be modified as we obtain better evidence; but it is as well to realize clearly that we are not dealing with a long period of great geological antiquity; we are dealing with times when the Egyptian, Babylonian and Minoan civilizations flourished.

It is unlikely that this geologist was aware of Professor Wright's similarly expressed views, which were written at about the same time. It is certain, however, that it never crossed his mind that a recent deglaciation was the cause of the recent "subsidence of the land" as he appears to regard it. These two opinions approaching the same conclusions as Drayson, from such entirely different standpoints, constitute perhaps the most remarkable, though not the most important, evidence which we have before us.

We have had so many interpretations of the Deluge in the last century, that to say that we now have a real explanation may provoke a smile of incredulity, but all the astronomical and geological facts point to conditions under which catastrophic changes would take place in many iso-thermal zones of the globe, on the rapid melting of ice-sheets many hundreds of feet thick, and covering enormous areas.

From the obliquity curve before mentioned the date of

* Cambridge University Press.

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this would be between 6,000 and 5,000 B.C., and American geologists say that the rocks register the occurrence of extraordinary cataclysmic conditions on the final passing of the ice. The Lake Dwellings built on piles in mountainous districts of the temperate zone have been assigned to about this same date. The condition of the valleys in spring must have been perilous in the extreme, and might well account for the choice of such habitations. Lastly the submerged forests, curiously enough known locally as "Noah's Woods," testify by their character to a comparatively rapid submergence. With swollen rivers, devastating floods, and a rising sea, small wonder that an account of the destruction of nearly the whole human race should have been handed down as a tradition to Biblical times.

The depth of the submergence of these forest beds seems to be uniform all round our coasts. The Mersey, Thames, Humber and the Bristol Channel thus show a depth of deposit of some seventy feet in which there are signs of at least two forest-beds and occasionally of three or more. As many geologists consider that the inland strata bear witness to two glaciations since that of the boulder clay one may consider that this number is borne out, as a minimum, by the number of forest beds; but from the nature and position of this deposit it will require a much closer scrutiny before we can take the number of beds as a register of the number of glaciations to be recorded. It is evident, if the computations regarding the cubic contents of the continental ice are correct, that with a submergence of thirty feet (of the latest forest bed) we are dealing with a glaciation or glaciations of minor intensity. This has an interesting bearing on the differing character of various glaciations which have occurred during geological history and which will be further alluded to.

The more the evidence is considered the greater becomes the importance of these forests from the *data* they supply. If the evidence stood alone it would seem to require some such compelling cause, but capping all the accompanying

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testimony from other lands, it assumes a convincing character, supplying us with a geological unit of time and with measurable samples of the rate of deposition.

Flint implements have been found from time to time both in America and in England showing glacial striations, but as some, in the accepted chronology of this subject, are of recent culture, this evidence has been supposed to admit of an explanation other than the passage over them of ice carrying on its under-surface the etching material of harder rocks; though had such stones not been fashioned by man, the marks would certainly have been attributed to glacial action. It is an axiom of mineralogy that while it is possible for crystalline flint or quartz grains, the frequent constituent of rocks, to scratch flint, nothing else likely to be encountered will do so, unless it is higher in the scale of hardness, which a ploughshare is not. But apart from this there have been found quite recently flint implements of early neolithic culture under glacial deposits at West Holstein in Germany and elsewhere. Though such evidence is *per se* apparently incontestable, it seems perplexing to minds nurtured on ideas which place the glacial period far back in the remoter past, and consequently attempts have been made to explain it away.

We have thus important evidence that glacial conditions occurred within comparatively recent times and lasted but a short time as reckoned in geology. What is the astronomical view of the occurrence?

In so far as this question has been considered by astronomers they have hitherto, as has been stated, denied the possibility of any pronounced change in the obliquity, and, if pressed for an explanation of the cause of a glacial period, rely on Croll's theory to account for it. What Croll's theory is will be described later. By subscribing to this theory they lend the weight of their authority to the following propositions:

1. That the cause of a glacial period must be sought for in a greater eccentricity of the earth's orbit.

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2. That the most recent glacial period after lasting some 200,000 years, passed away about 80,000 years ago.
3. That a glacial period in the northern hemisphere coincided with a genial period in the southern hemisphere.

So entirely at variance in every particular is this with facts now ascertained, that we can proceed with less hesitation to criticize the astronomical position.

The curve traced out by the pole of the heavens, as shown in the diagram, is the projection, as it were, on to the heavens of the movement which causes the precession of the Equinoxes. In order to better understand the meaning of this term, suppose we have a sphere of some material, which will float just half immersed in water, and let the water surface represent the plane of the ecliptic. Then tilt the sphere 23° to represent the obliquity of the ecliptic, and the points where the earth's equator cuts the water surface are called the equinoctial points. The movement of the pole of the heavens from year to year along this curve causes these points on the earth's equator to move also, hence arises what is termed the "precession of the equinoxes," the equality of length of day and night being caused on the two occasions on which, during the earth's annual orbit, the sun is at the zenith of these points.

The effect of this movement is such that the Pole Star, which now roughly marks the pole of the heavens, has not always done so, but happens to be the most important star on the portion of the invisible curve now being traced out by the pole. A different star would thus mark the pole when the Great Pyramid was built, and again another star at the date of erection of Stonehenge. Consideration of the orientation of the pyramid passage and of the "Hele" stone have been utilized in the ascertaining of the dates of these monuments, on the astronomical assumption that "the pole of the heavens traces a curve round the pole of the ecliptic as a centre at a distance of $23^{\circ} 28'$ from it," and requires 25,868 years to complete an entire revolution. It should be noted that an acceptance of the curve

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ascertained by Drayson must entail a revision of these dates, though it will not greatly affect the calculations.

Tacked on to the above statement quoted from Sir J. Herschell's *Outlines of Astronomy* is another (Art. 640) in which it is said that the pole does not keep at the distance of $23^{\circ} 28'$ from its centre, the pole of the ecliptic, but decreases its distance to the amount of $48''$ per century.

This is the crux of the whole matter, since Drayson suspected that the paradox of a moving centre must mean that some other point was the real centre of the curve of precession. With infinite labour, extending over twenty-five years, he came to the conclusion that the real centre was 6° removed from the pole of the ecliptic. This point was arrived at by an arduous geometrical application of records of star positions and their "precession" movements, and when once ascertained amply verified itself by the calculations which it made possible. Taking his stand at this centre he was enabled to reduce all seeming difficulties to order, to ascertain with ease star positions at distant dates, the obliquity of the ecliptic for any date, and in general was in a position to ascertain by calculation what astronomers can only do by observation, and incidentally found himself able to state the precise date and duration of the last glacial period.* One may ask how it was that such strong proofs were not at once accepted. Perhaps official mediocrity stood in his way, but there was at that time, and is now, believed to be a very solid argument against the adoption of any other centre but the pole of the ecliptic in the fact that Newton having shown that precession was caused by the pull of the sun and moon on the equatorial protuberance, the consequent motion must be centred on the ecliptic pole.

We are now in possession of much evidence to show that this central position of the pole of the ecliptic is very

* Whether the curve is really a circle cannot be as yet proved, but this accuracy of calculation and the general accord established between research in North America and the remoter portions of the curve indicate that a circle can well be postulated.

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improbable, and it can be seen how an assumption which was well grounded in Newton's time becomes untenable in view of our increased knowledge of the conformation of the earth and of its want of symmetry, which has been borne out by exhaustive pendulum experiments. It can also be shown that the paradox of a shifting pole-of-ecliptic-centre has involved astronomers in a further muddle, disguised as a movement about the "invariable plane." Such a movement, if it exists, has been shown to be inoperative in accounting for changes in the obliquity, and, indeed, the latest opinion on this matter of the "invariable plane" is a tacit admission that former opinions were entirely wrong.

As Drayson's contention has been hitherto described as a "myth," it is instructive to record the various changes in the opinion of astronomers since he first promulgated his ideas fifty years ago. According to Sir J. Herschell, the pole of the heavens traced a curve round the pole of the ecliptic as a centre at a distance of $23^{\circ} 28'$, but with a secular variation of $48''$. This variation has since been found to constitute a progressive decrease, and the obliquity can no longer be said to be fixed, for it is now about $23^{\circ} 27'$.

In the last century astronomers were content to attribute this supposed variation to a movement of the ecliptic plane, a movement first limited by Laplace to an angle of $1^{\circ} 21'$ about a mean plane (the invariable plane) and then re-investigated by Leverrier a few years afterwards, when this limit was increased to $4^{\circ} 52'$, a somewhat large difference. It is now stated that Laplace and Leverrier are both wrong and that "when the problem is considered in a more "rigorous form, no real limits can be set to a change of "obliquity," but in order not to give away at once the whole weakness of the former position it is added that it can be shown that the obliquity cannot vary more than 2° or 3° within a million years of our epoch. It will not come as a surprise, if, after a further "rigorous" investigation, this last statement is found to be also erroneous. Step by step astronomers seem to have abandoned their former position

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and to have approached that of Drayson, and so far as the outside world is concerned the dispute appears to have become one of detail rather than of fact.

It must not be supposed that Drayson's contention is merely an hypothesis. It has even passed the theoretical stage and appears to be proved by the most searching mathematical tests, supplied by himself and verified by Admiral Sir A. de Horsey.

On the other hand the hitherto accepted motion of the earth, which causes the precession of the equinoxes, has apparently many elements of incompleteness. The period of its revolution is not accurately known; the constant of precession, which was utilized to ascertain this period, has lately been revised; and the frequent observations which are necessitated are in themselves an admission of ignorance of the true curve.

Astronomers are much in the same difficulty as they would be if the path of the earth round the sun were supposed to be a circle instead of an ellipse, and they were consequently obliged to make occasional adjustments. The precession is so slow from generation to generation that these adjustments appear as results of improved methods of observation and thus escape notice.

Drayson steps in, not with a new theory, but with a new interpretation of the curve by which all difficulties and uncertainties vanish and all the supposed intricate and involved celestial movements are clearly accounted for. The proof that he is right is that now the precession can be established on the same footing as the yearly revolution, and no longer requires observation, but can be calculated in the same manner as the sun's altitude at any given moment of the year. Nothing further is really required beyond an official inquiry followed by acceptance on the part of astronomers. That such an investigation will be made, except under pressure from geologists, is extremely unlikely; though as no question of principle is now involved, this matter could be examined without loss of dignity.

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Astronomers must be now aware that it is incumbent on them to solve the riddle of the ice-ages, and that, in so far as they have intervened in this question, they have proved themselves to be hopelessly in disagreement with ascertained facts.

When all the items of Drayson's astronomical discoveries, as given in *Draysonia* and in *The Change of the Climate*, are added to the foregoing geological reasoning, no stronger claim for an authoritative examination can well be imagined. Does it not seem probable that in this long discarded and despised theory lies the truth, which astronomers appear to be now slowly discovering? But, since its acceptance would affect the whole astronomical structure, knowledge in this direction must perforce advance with extreme caution and reluctance.

Reference has been made to the varying intensities of separate glaciations. There is no doubt that since the glaciation which spread the boulder clays over our islands and over such a large portion of the eastern counties, whatever have been the number of subsequent glaciations, this particular one was marked by conditions which have not since been repeated. Masses of mud, detritus, and rubble interspersed with boulders, and of great depth in places, were carried by ice and dropped in widespread fashion by forces which were sufficient to remove large masses of chalk and other rock by a thrusting-and-shearing process, and even to transport them for long distances. The time of the boulder clay was *par excellence* the glacial period, and in earlier days was supposed to be the culmination and final term of the cold conditions, but studies in the ethnology of the cave man and his times have revealed the fact that a cold period certainly marked the close of the Moustierian age, and that this was posterior to the deposition of the "drift" gravels which must be referred to ice agency, and which again represent in their positions of different horizon and

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accompanying stratification more than one period of cold. Then we have also in later pre-historic times both the striation of neolithic implements by the passage of ice over them as well as their infra-position to glacial deposits. As the most remote of these glaciations above mentioned was, however, subsequent to the boulder clay, we are presented now with a much greater number of phases of recurring cold conditions than has ever before been suspected.

From the conclusions of various geologists and notably those of Penck who postulates four glaciations, we are led to believe that the recurrent glacial conditions worked up to a maximum of intensity and then again decreased. Indeed there are indications that they have more than once done so, and the unique character of the boulder clay, puzzling though it has been, seems under the new light thrown upon it by the origin of the submerged forests to admit of explanation. By studying a map of the marine depths in the North Sea and English Channel it appears that, if minor glaciations such as the later ones are sufficient to lower the sea to a depth of some 70 feet—that of the lowest forest bed—a glaciation of maximum or greater intensity would lower it to such an extent that the North Sea from the Dogger Bank southwards would become dry. This bank has now nowhere a depth of more than 90 feet below the surface on which also are found remains of forests identical with those of our coasts.

A glaciation of maximum intensity would cause a simultaneous great extension of the Scandinavian ice-sheet, which might now for the first time traverse the bed of the North Sea and invade the eastern counties, ploughing up in its course the deltas formed by the Rhine and Elbe and other rivers, transporting large quantities of alluvium and stones on to our island, and, to show its proportions, shearing off enormous masses from the chalk, as can be seen at Cromer; while at Sewerby it buried, as if under a volcanic outflow, the old shore defences of cliff and beach. The character of that part of the boulder clay which extends from the

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Humber to the Thames and over the Midlands strongly supports this surmise as to its origin.

It is these gigantic results which have tended to blind geologists as to minor glaciations, and it is easy to understand how other glaciations in this part of the world, with only ice-sheets of insular origin, might come and go leaving comparatively slight traces. How the material was gathered for the construction of such monumental records of this invasion is certainly in part explained by a consideration of the history of the submerged forests.

The various cycles of glaciation have presumably the unit period of 30,000 years duration, so that in a retrospect reaching back to the boulder clay we deal with a time sufficient to introduce many changes of level between land and sea which may tend to obliterate some of the signs of their proper sequence. Added to this there is the difficulty that the greater glaciations seem themselves to have caused differential movements in the earth's crust owing to the enormous accumulations of ice over certain areas. To this we probably owe the existence of raised beaches and "drowned" valleys which are more numerous as we go north. These introduce considerations embarrassing to a clear understanding of the conditions, as the causes are more local. It must suffice for the present that we have a geological unit of time wherewith to measure, and an astronomical explanation of the recurring glaciations as well as of their varying intensity. How far Croll's theory is applicable to this question will now be shortly considered.

Croll was mainly concerned with the varying ellipticities of the earth's orbit round the sun as the basis of his glacial theory, and obtained his data from computations made by Leverrier, the co-discoverer with Adams of the planet Neptune. Piecing his theory in with Drayson's rectified curve of precession, we can now throw more light on the differences of degree in the amount of glaciation.

The path of the earth round the sun is an ellipse approaching the shape of a circle. Though it never actually attains

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the circular form, it vibrates, as it were, to a mean position of eccentricity sometimes gradually increasing its eccentricity and getting farther from the sun, and sometimes decreasing its eccentricity and coming nearer to the sun in its yearly course. This is not a regular rhythmic movement, and requires varying periods of hundreds of thousands of years for completion. What concerns us is that the earth is sometimes much nearer the sun than at other times, the difference being as great as fourteen, or even seventeen, million miles.

Now if it happened that the northern hemisphere, for instance, had its winter in aphelion at the time of maximum eccentricity as well as of maximum obliquity, or, in other words, if a combination occurred of a much more distant sun at a time when the northern hemisphere was tilted away from it in winter, and at its period of maximum tilt as well, we should have all the forces at work mutually assisting each other, and ice-effects would be produced of enormous proportions. Conversely there would be occasions when the glaciating conditions would be in the other extreme of comparative mildness.

There are other factors to be considered, such as the probable shift of the earth's centre of gravity and a consequent change in the curve of precession, but we cannot define them as yet, nor do more than suggest that by them, or by investigation of the gyro-dynamics of the question, we shall obtain the full answer to the enigma of past sub-tropical conditions in the polar regions.*

According to Croll's tables the two last periods of high ellipticity were 1,000,000 years ago, lasting for about 300,000 years, and again about 300,000 years ago which was of 200,000 years duration. Previous to this was a period of about 2,500,000 years ago when the eccentricity was near its maximum.

At present our phase of ellipticity is low and though

* It is mathematically not improbable that the curve may prove to be a spiral.

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successive glaciations for some time to come will be of a minor character, we shall have enormous difficulties to combat. With a glaciation similar to the last one, conditions very disastrous to mankind in general would be brought about. While London might escape, the position of many towns in the north would be imperilled, and Glasgow perhaps be smothered under permanent ice.

The weather and the climate have been of such an unusual character of late years all over the Continent that it formed a subject of special investigation at an Agricultural Congress held at Rome in 1911. No conclusion, however, was arrived at. The winters in Canada are certainly growing less severe, and the season during which agricultural operations can be undertaken more prolonged. Last year Flammarion pointed out in *L'Astronomie* that the weather in France is now uncertain and of a peculiar nature, July and April having exchanged their usual temperatures; the temperature in April was as much above the average as in July it was below it. At the same time in Petersburg and Harparanda in Russia they had in July unusually warm weather. With us in England the extreme forwardness of the seasons has been remarkable; a careful record of temperatures has shown that since 1840 the tendency towards low temperatures in winter has certainly diminished, while recent winters, besides being free from snowfall and from prolonged frost, have for months together maintained temperatures above the normal.

It is in the retreat of the Alaskan and Swiss glaciers that we have the most direct evidence of change; the disappearance of the former has taken place over wide areas, and to a considerable depth. Our winters also fail to respond to the prophecies of meteorologists, who from time to time intimate that the mild cycle is exhausted and that we must prepare for a winter of extreme severity. The alteration is, of course, due primarily to the decrease of obliquity, though the change of angle in the last thousand years is very slight; but, as we are now able to regard the climate as one emerging

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from a glacial period, we can ascribe the change to a gradual reduction of the amount of ice in the polar regions.

In the balancing of the forces of heat and cold there is always present the auxiliary of diminishing obliquity to tip the balance in favour of the former, and one can imagine that at certain stages in the process, secondary factors may operate with comparative suddenness, as when a leakage goes on unobserved in a dam for a long time and then produces effects out of all proportion to the primary cause.

It appears that this change in the climate, which was not suspected until just before the end of the nineteenth century, has been really in accelerated operation for the last fifty years. Referring to the analogy of our seasons this is what may be expected. In the spring we have the cold days of May ("the ice-saints") which have been established long enough to have become proverbial in Europe; then, in June, the month of months, we are still without absolute certainty of continuous warm weather, but towards the end of the month summer is ushered in with full promise of warmer weather to come, and in the 30,000 years cycle, according to Drayson, we have now reached the date corresponding to June 17 of the solar year. May we not assume that we are just now at the turning point of a climatic change and that a cold winter will be in the future an exception rather than the rule? It is only for posterity, however, to witness the full development of this change, to be named by future ages as a "genial episode" within recorded history.

That frosts were formerly more severe in early history is apparent from many sources. The Book of Job speaks of frosts in a part of the world where such are now unknown. The writings of Julius Cæsar frequently mention the freezing of rivers in Gaul and the passage of his armies over the ice; while Hume in his history speaks of the occasional freezing of the Tiber. This period of classical times would represent the fitful cold of the month of May; and to follow the same analogy, though the midsummer of the 30,000

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years cycle is only some 400 years ahead of us, to obtain the full effects of this genial episode we may have to wait between 3,000 and 4,000 years for the August temperatures. Whether this lapse of time will be sufficient to clear the poles of ice seems more than doubtful, but it would be sufficient largely to reduce the ice area and perhaps thus make the dream of a north-west passage easy of fulfilment.

In the annals of arctic exploration devoted to this object we come across a curious discovery which has a very important bearing on the subject of this article.

In the early 'fifties, when Captain McClure was navigating the Arctic Archipelago, he found in about latitude 75° N. on the ice-bound islands of Banks' Land, Melville Island, and still further north on Prince Patrick's Island in several places, trunks of pine trees, with the bark in very perfect condition standing erect in situ. The wood was slightly altered, but in no sense fossilized, and was still combustible. So profoundly inexplicable did this appear at the time that, after an extravagant theory had been put forward that they were somehow drifted there, the matter was dropped as an insoluble riddle and apparently forgotten.*

It is evident now that, as the submerged forests testify to the rapid melting of the ice, so these other forests bear witness to mild conditions in the polar regions previous to the oncoming of the last cold period; and can be dated back to about 21,000 B.C., which would agree with the present condition of their remains, preserved from decay by the dry cold temperatures.

This is of extreme interest to us, as we are entitled to assume that before our "genial episode," on which we are apparently entering, has given place to the next glacial episode, the belt of pines which in North America are now limited to latitude 63° , as a mean,† will eventually be able to extend for 12° further north, opening up vast unexplored regions for the activities of man.

* These facts are obtained from Croll's *Climate and Time*.

† See Map 2 "Atlas of World's Commerce" (G. Newnes, Ltd.).

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What a vista it opens up for the future of our race; teeming populations, multiplied by the elimination of disease and war, filling the now empty regions of the north; science applied more and more to extracting the utmost from the nutrients of the soil and atmosphere; the exhaustion of coal and oil and their replacement by the direct energy of the sun, and of rivers and ocean tides; the internationalization of all food supplies and fisheries; the utilitarian domestication of what is left of bird and animal life; in short, a much less interesting and beautiful world, in which every forest will be a plantation and every river engineered for water supply, but we may hope a happier and less selfish one, and therefore better equipped for the inevitable on-creep of the next glaciation, when millions of our race must either find some place in the sun, or by the adoption of Malthusian doctrines be content gradually to disappear.

The conditions of the previous genial episode warrant a further assumption, that the extent to which the arctic ice was replaced by a forest belt is a counterpart and a measure of the glaciation which followed.

If surface ice and snow was annually melted in North America for 12° north of the present limit of 63° for pines, it is not much to assume that, at the opposite extreme, when the arctic circle was in latitude 55° , the mountainous regions of Scotland, Wales and Ireland would fill their valleys with glaciers; and there are many signs that such was the case, in Scotland certainly, not so very long ago.

This is stated in order to correct the tendency amongst some geologists to disregard glaciations which have not the proportions of the boulder clay glaciation. They are not willing to designate as a glacial period what to them appears merely a small fall in temperature, or a slight change of climate.

Whatever their criterion of a glaciation may be, the above reasoning seems to point to a very wide belt of the temperate zone being affected. That the glaciation was of

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no mean order is evidenced also by the measurement of the amount of water extracted from the sea and put on the land as ice.

The last submergence which buried the coast forests can be reckoned as of 30 feet in depth. This, in terms of ice, represents what is sufficient to cover a belt of land twelve degrees wide in these latitudes to a depth of at least 250 feet of ice all over. The consequent change wrought in the climate and aspect of the countries of the northern temperate zone would be immense.

As light thus dawns on the true history of the glacial epoch one is able to see how accurately geologists have gauged the changes that have taken place, and how, under the misguidance of astronomers, they have been prevented from seeing the real cause of them. Dr James Croll, in *Climate and Time*, in which he develops his astronomical theory and embodies the outcome of the best opinion of his day, says of the intermixing of organic remains which belong to different conditions of climate:

It is perfectly true that if there had been only one cold and one warm period, each of geologically immense duration, the remains might of course be expected to have been found in separate beds; but when we consider that the Glacial Epoch consisted of a long succession of *alternate cold and warm periods* of not more than 10,000 or 12,000 years each, we can hardly expect that in the river deposits belonging to this cycle we should be able to distinguish the deposits of the cold periods from those of the warm.

In this accurate statement of the case, it is the words “of not more than 10,000 or 12,000 years each” which should have been italicized, as they are almost in exact accord with the seasonal divisions of the astronomical cycle as interpreted by Drayson.

Whether Drayson is eventually found to be justified or not, geologists need no longer be deterred from forming their own conclusions by any lack of official sanction from astronomy.

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They have, as we have seen, the following signal evidences of a recent glaciation. The results of research in North America and the conclusions of the Swedish geologists tell the same story as that which is revealed by the submerged forests which encircle our own coast. The lake pile-dwellings and the glacial striations upon neolithic flints confirm the lesson of the arctic pre-glacial forests. The milder winters of recent years and the reported retreat of the polar ice, in both arctic and antarctic waters, join with the neolithic flints found beneath glacial deposits in giving verisimilitude to the ancient and sacred tradition of the deluge.

All these things testify, independently and with cumulative force, to the probability of deductions which, when first drawn by Drayson, were rejected as fallacious and devoid of foundation.

OUR DAILY BREAD

THE ALL-ENGLISH LOAF

A LONG course of dinners in clubs, embassies, coffee-houses, inns and other places where they eat throughout Europe brings the conclusion that the one food which Europe cannot produce is bread. Russia, if it really be in Europe, ought perhaps to be excepted. Each new bread tasted affords a sense of pleasure which, when tested by repetition, proves to have its origin in mere satiety with the last bread and gives place to a liking for its equally unsatisfying successor. Most countries take their fashions and methods in cookery, as in millinery, from Paris and the long white woolly roll of Paris with its crisp gilded outside has been more or less successfully imitated throughout Europe. But to eat that white roll is to fill your belly with the east wind, with something that has neither taste nor substance and which leaves a sense of having eaten nothing out of which good cometh.

There can be no need to dilate upon the importance of the bread we eat. It always forms a large portion of our meals; upon its quality depends a large part of our appetite and upon its nutritive value a large portion of ourselves. Millers, bakers, men of science, and men of commerce are engaged in countless numbers in transporting and in preparing the wheat that is to end in bread. It is sad to have to come to the conclusion that all their efforts end not in making bread at all, but in spoiling it. On looking closer, however, the wonder perhaps should be that they do not

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spoil it more. For a wonderful Food Supplement to *The Times*, published on the 8th of June of this year, affords some information which explains much.

It appears that "among the requirements in flour by which it is commercially judged are its strength, flavour and colour." Then follows the revelation that "strength" does not mean strength in any accurate or even popular acceptance of the term, but something entirely different. For we are told that "strength is the measure of the capacity of a flour for producing a bold, large-volumed, well-risen loaf." In other words it would seem then that the strongest flour is flour which, for a given weight, makes the biggest loaf. To put it in another way, the strongest flour is the flour which in baking takes up the largest amount of gas and of water, and which therefore, in a loaf of a given size, contains the least flour and the least of that which alone can be truly called bread. Moreover, it also appears that the more gas and water the flour will take up, the more it will lose thereof in a given time. A loaf, we are told, will usually weigh "when first offered for sale to the public, say, 2lb. But if the purchase is delayed for 12 hours that same loaf will have become an ounce lighter by loss of water." Had the purchaser bought the loaf when it was first offered for sale he would have bought this ounce of water for an ounce of bread, and it is rather made a reproach to him that he should forego that advantage by his unreasonable delay. And now mark—"The purchaser is no loser" [that is, no loser in losing the ounce] "because he has the same weight of nutrient solids in the staler bread that he would have had in the full-weight new bread." It seems to follow, therefore, without question, that the capacity for taking up more water and more gas, which is described by the false term "strength," is only a capacity for taking up something of no value at all, unless it be, if at all, for the purpose of giving the loaf the appearance of being larger than it ought to be, a quality which it immediately begins to lose. Then we are told that "Some flours, among which that from English

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“wheat may be taken as a familiar example, produce small “flat, close-textured and ‘runny’ loaves.” What a “runny” loaf is we are not told, nor is it easy to guess. But these flours “are called weak flours,” whereas one would have thought they should rather be called strong flours, inasmuch as they stand in the loaf by themselves, without relying upon their power of bolstering up and cloaking themselves with gas and water. Then comes the quality of flavour, which it must be confessed is what would appeal to most of the unscientific, unbakerlike and unmillerlike world. As to this we are told that “English wheat, although weak” [meaning strong] “is supreme in flavour, and so, although it alone “makes a small loaf, it is nevertheless in considerable “demand for bread-making purposes.” Here we see what is supposed to be its fault, and here also its surpassing merit. It makes a small loaf, consisting mainly of itself, and not mainly of gas and water, and being supreme in flavour must be, and is, infinitely more palatable than other wheat which produces more of these accidental and irrelevant constituents. Finally, we are told that “A flour is said to have “plenty of colour, or to be ‘coloury’ when it is very nearly “white, or white with a delicate yellow bloom.” Here, then, we see that just as “strength” means absence of strength, so “colour” means absence of colour, and that the current millers’ and bakers’ idea of a perfect wheat is that which is either white, or nearly white, and which has scarce any taste at all. But English wheat is not either very white or nearly white; neither has it a yellow bloom. It is rather of a grey tone. However, we learn that “English wheats are not of “good colour, though with modern milling processes a white “flour may be obtained from most varieties.” It may be that modern milling processes, as some allege, involve bleaching processes derived rather from the chemist than from the miller.

This brings us to the question of “milling.” For many, perhaps for countless, centuries wheat has been ground by stone mills. For as many centuries the stout yeomen whose

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limbs were made in England got the major part of their nutriment from bread made of flour thus ground. But “at length engineering science broke in upon the seclusion and apathy of this forsaken or neglected industry, rollers rapidly supplanted stones, and milling attained a position of scientific and economic efficiency never before possible.” That means that first in Hungary—which long produced a special white, tasteless flour known as “Hungarian”—and next in England at some time about fifty years ago, the old system of grinding by stones was superseded by the new system of grinding by steel rollers. In itself there would not appear to be any greater objection to grinding by steel than to grinding by stone, unless it be that it is perhaps possible to overgrind wheat, and that the more complete and final grinding of the steel roller may take some of the taste, and even some of the nutriment, out of the flour. Certain it is that the finer, steel-ground flour of to-day does not appear to have either the substance or the taste of the stone-ground flour of fifty years ago. But this may perhaps be due to the modern system of “using a blend of wheats,” all equally fine-ground, and giving altogether that loaf which the miller and the baker most admire, and the customer most readily buys because of its appearance. However that may be, we must confess to an incurable prejudice against steel roller-ground flour. It appears, moreover, that as the rollers are used they gradually diminish in size, whence it seems to follow without any sort of doubt that a portion of their substance is, in the grinding process, continually being distributed among the flour they produce and, through the loaves made of that flour, into the insides of those who eat them. This apparently is inevitable, but this, as some believe, has produced very serious results upon the interior economy of those who, by eating bread made of the steel-ground flour, are continually infiltrating into themselves infinitely minute portions of the steel which is thus ground into the flour. And there are to-day in England not a few members of the medical and surgical professions who hold that it is the

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presence of many years' accumulation of these very particles of steel which contributes to make appendicitis so notable a modern disease. Whether this is really so it would not be becoming here to pronounce. Moreover, it is very true that stone rollers wear away just as steel rollers do; and if we are to believe the theory above quoted of the genesis of appendicitis, we must also believe that minute particles of steel are injurious, and minute particles of stone innocuous. Which, however, may well be true.

One effect of the general practice of blending, and of the drawing into the vortex of commercialism the relatively small portion of our bread-making wheat grown in this country, in order that it may be blended and averaged with the much larger quantity of wheat coming from other countries, is this: that it is almost impossible to buy flour made solely from English wheat. The pure English wheat is not "strong" (meaning weak) enough for the miller and the baker, and they have therefore practically removed it from the market in order to substitute for it the "stronger" (meaning weaker) wheat from which to produce the modern loaf as they desire it. Consequently, any person who would eat an all-English loaf has to face considerable difficulties in obtaining its constituent materials. He must go to a farmer who grows the wheat, and who, if possible, also grinds the wheat. Thus alone can the purchaser be assured that the flour he gets is of English wheat alone, and stone-ground. Having got the right flour, he must have the loaf baked at home; for there is, so far as many experiments have disclosed, no baker in London who bakes an All-English Loaf, composed of English flour alone, unmixed with any foreign flour, and ground by stone. To many householders all this trouble may seem excessive, to many of them it is all but impossible to take so much pains about their bread. But if the pains be taken, the appetizing nutty taste of the loaf, the constantly renewed pleasure derived from its flavour, and the unusual sense it gives of having something inside one, will more than repay them.

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There is indeed one form in which all-English flour is to be found. It is the Navy biscuit, which up to this time has been guarded with jealousy against any foreign admixture. This is certainly the best of all biscuits; it has the same tempting taste as an all-English loaf, and though, unless it be warmed up in an oven, it is hard, yet its very hardness is an advantage which those must prize who would preserve their teeth by giving them some use.

Is there then no baker who will give us an All-English Loaf? If there be one he must seek all-English flour and be sure that he gets it. He must make it into a loaf of the old, classical shape, like an exaggerated penny-bun. He must renounce the vanity of whiteness. He must forego the deceptions of gas and water. He must be content to sell an honest loaf. And he will assuredly not fail to sell it.

When once the *gourmet* has tasted the fresh, appetizing nutty-flavoured All-English Loaf and has so appreciated it as to banish all others from the table, fashion will do the rest. And when that is done, English wheat will be worth a shilling a quarter more than any foreign wheat; not because of any Customs duty wrung from either native or foreigner, but because of the tardy recognition of its superiority for making bread.

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“And Aaron said unto them, Break off
“the golden earrings, which are in the
“ears of your wives, of your sons, and of
“your daughters, and bring them unto me.”

“And he received them at their hand,
“and fashioned it with a graving tool,
“after he had made it a molten calf: and
“they said, These be thy gods, O Israel,
“which brought thee up out of the land
“of Egypt.”

“And Moses said unto Aaron, What
“did this people unto thee, that thou hast
“brought so great a sin upon them?”

“And Aaron said, Let not the anger of
“my lord wax hot: thou knowest the
“people, that they are set on mischief.”

“And I said unto them, Whosoever
“hath any gold, let them break it off. So
“they gave it me: then I cast it into the
“fire, and there came out this calf.”

Exodus xxxii, 2, 3, 4, 21, 22, 24.

THE BUDGET, 1914-15.

AS usual, and even more than usual, the Accounts of Income and Expenditure presented by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on 4th May in his Budget speech (as amended by the White Paper of 23rd June) were incomplete, and therefore, however accurate in particulars, false in general. In what respects and to what extent they were false the following statements will show.

The Budget figures are of course all estimated and subject to the final correction of the appropriation accounts. And how untrustworthy Budget estimates may be is shewn by the fact that, having on 4th May estimated for a receipt of Customs duties of £35,350,000 and of Excise of £39,650,000, Mr Lloyd George, only seven weeks later, re-estimated those receipts respectively at £35,500,000 and £39,850,000, thereby adding to his estimate under those two heads a sum of £350,000—just when, as it happened, he wanted it.

The Accounts as presented are as follows:—

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<i>Revenue 1914-15</i>		<i>Expenditure 1914-15</i>	
Customs	£35,500,000	National Debt ..	£23,500,000
Excise	39,850,000	Road Improvement	1,545,000
Estate Duties ..	28,770,000	To Local Taxation	9,885,000
Stamps	9,900,000	Other Consolidated	
Land Tax	700,000	Fund Services ..	1,706,000
House Duty ..	2,000,000	Army	28,885,000
Income Tax ..	53,921,000	Navy	51,550,000
Land Value Duties	725,000	Civil Services*	58,902,000
Post Office Services	31,750,000	Revenue Depart-	
Crown Lands ..	530,000	ments	4,821,000
Suez Canal Shares	1,370,000	Post Office ..	26,227,000
Miscellaneous ..	2,130,000		
<i>Alleged Total Revenue</i>	£207,146,000	<i>Alleged Total Expendi-</i>	
<i>These are the figures as</i>		<i>ture†</i>	£207,021,000
<i>officially alleged and</i>		<i>To which must be</i>	
<i>presented. But in order</i>		<i>added:</i>	
<i>to complete the account</i>			
<i>there must be added</i>			
<i>thereto the following</i>			
<i>omitted items:</i>			
Borrowings to meet		Works and so-called	
“Capital expendi-		“Capital expendi-	
“ture,” so-called	5,265,000	“ture”	5,265,000
Receipts “appropri-		“From Receipts	
“ated in aid” of		“appropriated in	
expenditure ..	9,100,000	“aid”	9,100,000
Lighthouse dues (say)	520,000	Lighthouses (say) ..	520,000
Insurance Fund le-		Benefits, administra-	
vies on the subject		tion and invest-	
(say)	18,000,000	ments of Insurance	
		Fund Levies ..	18,000,000
		<i>True Total Expendi-</i>	
		<i>ture</i>	239,906,000
		Balance	125,000
<i>True Total Revenue</i>	240,031,000		240,031,000
Difference between		Difference between	
alleged and true		alleged and true	
total Revenue ..	£32,885,000	total Expenditure	£32,889,000

* (a) Education, £19,564,000; (b) old age pensions, £12,710,000; (c) labour exchanges, insurance, etc., £9,312,000; (d) tuberculosis and nursing, £250,000; (e) other civil services, £17,066,000, total £58,902,000.

† The estimates for army, navy, civil services and revenue departments are here “net” or false estimates, omitting the appropriations in aid. For the gross or true estimates see CANDID QUARTERLY REVIEW for May, p. 556.

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The mischief of omitting items such as those which have been above added to complete the account is twofold. In the first place it falsifies both the real Expenditure and the real Revenue—and always in the direction of making both appear less than in fact they are. In this instance each is made to appear less by some £33,000,000. In the second place the omissions destroy all power of comparison between the amount of Expenditure or Revenue, in any one year with that of any other year, and therewith destroy one of the principal purposes for which all accounts are kept and rendered. For the omitted sums are not always the same, nor are they the same in proportion to the total from which they are omitted. In 1894-5, for instance the Receipts appropriated in aid of expenditure were only £5,500,000; this year they are nearly double what they were in 1894-5, being over £9,000,000, so that their omission in the one year is of very different effect on the total from that of their omission in the other.

“Why omit anything?” it may be asked. The only answer is that it is an effect of the Treasury Mind, which always seeks to show that any Government in being costs less than is the fact. Formerly, and up to 1866, the Revenue Departments were allowed to deduct the “expenses of collection” from their total receipt, so that their net receipt only appeared. Then that was very properly altered, so that they now set down their total receipt (though even now with some sly omissions) on the one side, and on the other their total expenditure—as is manifestly right. Then—up to so late as 1908—the large sum annually paid (nearly ten millions in the present year as at present settled) to Local Taxation authorities, was omitted on both sides of the account and treated as though it was neither received on the one side—as it was—nor paid out—as also it was—on the other. Then that too was very properly altered. It was Mr Asquith who, in 1908, restored this vast sum to both sides of the account, and thereby to that extent made the account less false—to the great confusion of all previous

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statistics and figure mongers. A further step in the same direction is now urgently needed.

It will be observed that we have added four items to the account. Their addition is justified by precisely the same reasons as applied in 1908 to the payments to Local Taxation authorities. It is in one word that they both come into and form part of the Income of the country, and both go out from it and form part of the Expenditure. Let us take them in succession.

First come the borrowings to meet what is called "Capital Expenditure"—a mere deceptive phrase invented to suggest that it differs somehow from other expenditure and ought therefore not to be held to be expenditure at all. The £5,265,000 is to be spent on Telephone acquisition, on Telegraph, Post Office, Land Registry and Military works, and on Public buildings. The only peculiarity of it is that it is all Money borrowed under special Works Acts, and having special sinking funds of its own. This differentiates it in no respect from other expenditure of money borrowed by additions to the National Debt in general, which has two or even (including the Terminable annuities) three sinking funds of its own, and the produce whereof has been largely spent on similar purposes and included in accounts of expenditure. The device of a misleading phrase whereby it is sought to treat the Debt for the borrowed money as differing from the National debt in being no debt, the Income from the borrowing as no income, the Expenditure thereof as no expenditure—is merely pitiful. Yet nothing else is even suggested to justify the exclusion of this large sum from the accounts.

The Receipts appropriated in aid of expenditure, represent the large sums of money received by the spending Departments from sales of the departmental property, such as obsolete warships and old stores, from rents, fees, and other sources. According to the principle and purpose of the Exchequer and Audit Act 1866, they should all be paid into the Exchequer, instead of being retained by each Department and added to the sums voted in Supply as its

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spending money. This abuse and evasion of the Act of 1866 is justified as being "convenient"; and it is so, as well to the Departments as to the Government of the day, which is thus relieved from having to get voted, and what is worse, debated, some £9,000,000 of the money it means to spend. For in fact this money is not voted at all by Parliament, which has no control over it, but is allocated as spending-money to the Departments by the Treasury alone, by virtue of a special and very mischievous and unprincipled Act (the Public Accounts and Charges Act 1891) which is most destructive of Parliamentary control and ought to be repealed. In any case these Receipts are all Income and ought to figure as such; they are also all Expenditure, and as such they should likewise figure.

The Lighthouse dues arise from national taxation, very improperly and unjustly imposed on a special class for the performance of the undeniably national duty, not to them alone but to all the world, of keeping our coasts duly lit, beacons and buoyed. The shipowners who use the ports pay them, to the exclusion of the far larger number who use the lights only but not the ports—and who go free. They are levied by the Custom-House. They are taxes in every sense of the term. In every sense of the term they are Revenue, and in every sense they are also Expenditure. Yet they too are excluded from both sides of the Account.

The Insurance Fund for the full year ending 11th January, 1914, showed a receipt of £24,644,000, whereof some four-eighths were invested for future issue, one-eighth was spent on administration, and three-eighths were "issued for "benefits."* Except the contribution of the State, of an amount at present uncertain but which probably would not exceed in a full year £6,000,000, it is all derived from a tax felt by all to be of an especially severe and odious character. Yet the £18,000,000 or more, levied on employers and employed, although as truly Revenue as any part of that

* Replies to Lord Henry Bentinck, House of Commons, 18th February and 28th April, 1914.

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derived from any tax whatever, and as truly Expenditure as any whatever, is silently excluded from both sides of the Account, without so much as a reason given or pretended for excluding either.

With these items restored to their place, the Revenue (as estimated) for 1914-15 is seen to be not the £204,146,000 named as the total by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, but in fact £240,031,000. And similarly the Expenditure is not the £207,021,000 named by him as the total, but in fact £239,906,000.

This point of the falsity of our national accounts is here dwelt upon, partly because it is recognized and understood by very few, since most men accept without question the figures officially put before them rather than affront that labour of close examination which alone reveals their deceptive character; but mainly because no true idea of the very gravely increasing financial perils that menace us even in Peace, and much more in War, can be gained by even the most acute and industrious until truth is restored to the accounts presented to us.

For the purpose of comparison the officially alleged accounts and the true accounts, arrived at in the same way by restoring to them the omitted items, are here given for 1894-5, as taken over from their predecessors by Lord Salisbury's and Mr Balfour's Government; for 1905-6 as taken over by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's and Mr Asquith's Government; for 1908-9 under Mr Asquith; and for the present year 1914-15.

	<i>Total alleged expenditure.*</i>	<i>Total real expenditure.</i>	<i>Chancellor of the Exchequer.</i>	<i>Price of Consuls on 31st March.</i>
1894-5	£93,918,420	£108,922,634	Sir W. V. Harcourt	104½
1905-6	£140,511,955	£167,907,208	Mr A. Chamberlain	90⅞
1908-9	£152,292,395	£169,976,887	Mr Asquith	84⅜
1914-15	£207,021,000	£239,906,000	Mr Lloyd George	75¾

Those who will examine and compare these figures will find them eloquent.

* Statistical Abstract of the United Kingdom, Nos. 54 and 56.

National Debt

NATIONAL DEBT

THE National Debt at present stands thus*

	On 31st March, 1913. £	On 31st March, 1914. £
Funded Debt	593,453,857	586,717,872
Terminable Annuities	31,519,908	29,552,219
Unfunded Debt ..	36,500,000	35,000,000
Other Capital Liabilities	54,814,656	56,384,019
Total	<u>£716,288,421</u>	<u>£707,654,110</u>
Net decrease as compared with previous year ..	£8,518,007	£8,634,311

When the present Government first became responsible for the Debt—i.e. on 31st March, 1906—the corresponding total was £788,990,187, with Consols at 90 $\frac{3}{4}$. So that this Government has, with Consols on 31st March, 1914, at 75 $\frac{3}{4}$, in those eight years reduced the Debt by £84,336,077 and the price of Consols by 14 $\frac{5}{8}$. Mr Lloyd George says the reduction in Debt is £104,000,000, a statement with which even the officially alleged facts do not agree. This year he has again unfixed the “Fixed Charge” for the Debt by £1,000,000 and has reduced it from £24,500,000 to £23,500,000—a most wanton and improper raid on the New Sinking Fund.

Thus while he increases the expenditure for everything else, he decreases the expenditure which is most necessary—that for the reduction of the Debt. We are not to care what we spend; we are to care least of all for what we owe.

* Reply in House of Commons to Lord Castlereagh, 11th May, 1914.

THE NEW TAXATION

ALL Governments are paupers. They have no accumulated treasure. They have nothing but what they can extract from the subject year by year. In principle they must go to Parliament each year for all the money they want for that year; and if, at the end of the year, they have any sum left over, because accidentally or deliberately they have taken more from the subject than the year has needed, that sum goes automatically to the reduction of the National Debt. In principle all our taxes, like all our accounts, are annual and should expire each year and be re-granted, if needed, for the next year. But in modern practice and in fact things are different. All our taxes instead of being annual are now permanent, being imposed by permanent Acts of Parliament, with the sole exceptions of the Tea Duty and the Income-Tax, which still expire annually. Wherefore a Government finds itself in possession of an assured income representing the whole Revenue of the State, less Income-Tax and Tea Duty. This income is, however—let this be marked and remembered—subject still to the power of Parliament to reduce any part of it—even any permanent part—in any year; for in any year the whole of the Fiscal system is brought under Parliamentary review by virtue of the Resolution “that it is expedient to amend “the law relating to” Customs, Excise and the other sources of revenue. This power of fiscal revision seems to be now usually overlooked or forgotten; for scarcely ever is any amendment of the law or reduction now proposed in the House of Commons in respect of such burdens as those imposed by the Estate Duties or other permanent burdens on the subject. Yet the power is there to do it; and may yet be exercised whenever the House of Commons recognizes its duty to simplify and alleviate rather than to complicate and increase taxation.

The New Taxation

The worst of the present unexampled system of Taxation is that it proceeds from no settled principles of Finance conscientiously held, and founded upon knowledge or even conscientious examination, of fiscal methods. Nobody would attribute either to Mr Lloyd George—least of all would he himself, who quite honestly believes himself to have a Mission from Heaven, as high above all fiscal principles as the Byzantine Emperor was above Grammar; and who also as honestly believes it to be part of that mission to get votes in its support and his own. Therefore, he calls upon all who are embittered by fault, failure or fate to look henceforth for help, not to themselves but to him. “Here is the Rich Man,” says he, “living in purple and fine linen and faring sumptuously every day. You have hitherto not envied him, or hated him as you should, nor displayed any active malice and ill-will towards him. I have come from Wales to alter all that. Envy, Hatred, Malice and Ill-will are in some secret-recess of your hearts, smouldering unseen and unknown even to yourselves—nay overlaid perhaps even by kindly feeling towards your landlord or your master, because, forsooth, you have received some kindness from him. Out upon such weakness! I will blow up the embers of that smouldering hatred into a flame that shall devour. This is the Rich Man your enemy. Come let us slay him and his inheritance shall be ours. And meantime your votes shall be mine, as they should be.”

Such an appeal may meet with partial and occasional success, for although in this country it is new and startling yet to a few it is alluring. But that will not last. Such appeals may, for the moment, tempt some of the worst, they will have no permanent effect upon the mass of a sound and honest people. When Mr Lloyd George went to the Ipswich election to preach his doctrine, and told the voters there that they were half-starved slaves, horribly oppressed, worked to death for the enriching of “lan’l’ds” and only to be redeemed by his methods, the jolly East Anglians

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merely grinned at statements they knew to be absurdly untrue—and voted against the hapless candidate who had the misfortune to be thus supported. In sober truth it is as absurd as it is false to represent the poorer classes of this country as starved or oppressed, but most absurd and untrue of all to pretend that their richer neighbours are their oppressors and enemies. They all know by personal experience that the contrary is the truth, and that it is most especially so with those landlords who, in Mr Lloyd George's opinion, are at once the richest, the vilest and the most tyrannical of all men. Nothing can less resemble the truth. In general, and with very few exceptions, the landlords are on the friendliest terms with their poorer neighbours, who feel bound to them by the remembrance of many kindly services done during many generations to them and to their forbears. For the landlords have lived among them and have never been deaf to the cry of the poor and the needy among their own people. That is no less true of the other kind of rich who are not landlords. They indeed are without the personal ties that come with the land; but they too have never failed to acknowledge and to perform their duty to their poorer brethren. Their subscriptions to hospitals, and the infinite variety of other works of benevolence or charity are yearly counted by tens of millions—gifts as free and voluntary as they are generous and indicative of that kindly human feeling which Mr Lloyd George would have us believe is non-existent. There is not, and there never has been, nor (please God!) ever will be in England such landlords as those of France before the Revolution, who wrung from peasants they never saw their very last farthing, and left them naked and starving on the richest soil in Europe, while themselves wore their rents upon their backs to swell the bloated splendour of Versailles; nor was there ever or will be here any rich Foulon who met the cry of a starving people for bread with the taunt that they might eat grass. The catastrophe that repaid the French rich for their heartless-

The New Taxation

ness will not come here, however much Mr Lloyd George may invite it, for there have been no such cruel wrongs as the French poor then suffered.

The new Gospel of "Hate one Another" is deplorable in every aspect. It is as uncharitable as it is wanton. The Rich do not at all mind paying their share, or even more than their share, of the cost of any real reforms truly calculated to benefit their fellow-citizens. Unless perhaps among the very new rich whose dominant tone is often that of indignation at being "robbed"—as robbed indeed they are by some of the new taxation—unless among these, wherever rich men are found there is found a general acknowledgment that their greater wealth brings with it a greater obligation. Nay, in these days there is often—very often—even a foolish feeling among those who have inherited rather than acquired wealth that they have no good right to it and ought not to have it. It is a very cruel and baseless slander of the English Rich to accuse them of selfishness or even of indifference to the troubles of the Poor. They too have troubles of their own and can feel for those of others. They are, as they have always been, and now more than they have ever been, ready to play their part, whether in person or in purse, in bettering the condition, social or material, of their fellow-countrymen. And if this can be done by submitting to the taxation of their possessions, whether of Property or of Income, they will most cheerfully and gladly make the necessary sacrifice for the public good.

But they do ask, and ask most reasonably, that the purposes for which such sacrifices are demanded shall offer a reasonable prospect of attaining their intended purpose: that plans of reform, whether social or material, shall be first fully thought out before they are adopted, and shall not be a mere bundle of loose, impracticable yearnings, flung at the country and embodied without consideration in coercive taxing Acts. They ask, moreover, that any such plans shall be carried out, not with a lavish and careless hand, but with that regard to economy which will

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ensure that the sacrifices made by them and others shall not be more than the purpose really needs. They claim, as one of the means to this end, that the Treasury should continue to do its traditional and principal duty in acting as a check upon extravagance and the foremost guardian of economy in outlay; and that it shall not be suffered to remain, as is now the case, itself one of the most lavish of the spending departments, and less a check upon than an encourager, an accomplice and leader in extravagance and waste. With these conditions fulfilled, the Rich will not be backward in their contributions to the public service. They will cheerfully and gladly pay, under these conditions, each man his share. But they will even then expect, as they have the right to expect, that the demands made on their purse shall be made with some fairness, some consideration and some courtesy, that they shall not at once be mercilessly taxed and outrageously vilified, and that some other more appropriate method shall be adopted of lightening their pockets than the bluster and the bludgeon of the Footpad.

THE BILL OUT OF ORDER

As originally proposed on 4th May the Budget would have added £8,800,000 to the taxation of the country; whereof £800,000 was to be raised partly by an increased rate of Estate Duty, and partly by the "abolition of Settlement Estate Duty"; and £8,000,000 by increases and alterations in the rates of Income-Tax, as well as by extending the tax to Incomes from Foreign investments, although never received in the United Kingdom.

Within seven weeks, however (on 22nd June), it was suddenly announced, casually and at the end of a sitting, that instead of being increased from 1s. 2d. to 1s. 4d. in the £, the Income-Tax would only be increased to 1s. 3d.; that the proposed extra taxation would thus be reduced in

The Bill Out of Order

amount from the £8,800,000 originally proposed to £6,500,000; and that the Income-tax payer would thus be saved in the year a burden, stated to be £2,500,000 but more likely to be in fact £3,000,000. This surprising statement was made in a speech by Mr Herbert Samuel proposing the second reading of the Finance Bill with the increase to 1s. 4d. already in it. He also announced that it was now intended to abandon the provision made for contingent grants to Local Authorities, amounting, as proposed, to £2,182,000. The world at once asked what could be the reason of this.

The reason was that the Worm had at last turned; that a deputation, headed by Mr Holt, and representing 40 or 50 middle-class Liberals, cruelly stigmatized as "millionaires," had six days earlier waited on Mr Asquith to protest against the levy of taxation for an expenditure on the grants to local authorities representing no part of the service of the year but belonging, if to any year, to a future year, or possibly to no year at all. It had also been pointed out in *The Times* five days earlier, that it is Mr Speaker's duty to require the limitation of the total grants of taxation to the total needs of the year. And for one or other, or for both of these reasons, Mr Lloyd George had to give way at the last moment and thus suddenly to take off the penny. It was a great event. It was a very encouraging one. The millionaire Worms had, by their revolt, enforced probably by Mr Speaker's warning, saved themselves and their fellows from three millions of the new wanton, unnecessary, unconstitutional and outrageous taxation. After that some good may be expected even of the House of Commons. There are apparently members of it who now see a point beyond which they will neither be led nor driven in the devious and fantastic ways of the New Extortioner.

But that was not all. Earlier in the day on which the surrender of the Penny was announced, Mr Cassel had pointed out that the Finance Bill itself exceeds the order of the House whereon alone it is founded; as to which Mr Speaker

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Lowther admitted that he was right, saying, "no doubt "that is so." The only proper course to be taken in that case, and the course invariably adopted thitherto, was to order the Bill to be withdrawn and to give leave to introduce a new Bill. Unfortunately for the traditions and the future practice and proceedings of the House that course was not enforced. Suggestions were made for "curing" this fatal defect, and one of them was adopted which was no less contrary to the traditions and practice of the House than the condonation of the defect itself. When on 1st July the order for the Committee on the Bill was read there was proposed an "Instruction" to the Committee which, according to all the previous rulings of Mr Peel and other Speakers, was flagrantly out of order, not alone in itself but also and all the more because it gave the Committee a power to amend the law relating to the National Debt, which it has always hitherto been held could only be derived from a Resolution in Committee—which Resolution did not in this case exist, since the Bill had been blunderingly and improperly read a first time before any such Resolution had been agreed to. But the Instruction was hastily ruled to be in order and the motion for it was very unfortunately allowed to be put and passed. Unless, however, other departures than these from tradition and practice were to follow, it was yet the duty of the Committee* to alter the title of the Bill by omitting from it the "Grants "for Local Taxation" which were to "automatically disappear" from the Bill itself. In that case the withdrawal of the Bill, which Erskine May says "is always necessary "if there be any change of title" appeared imperative and unavoidable. Yet here, too, the rules and traditions were set aside, and the "cure" of inexcusable blunders and misdeeds, not merely formal but substantial, was completed by yet another deplorable departure from established rules and rulings and settled procedure. All of which will assuredly bear evil fruit. The rules and traditions of the

* Standing Order 34 of the House of Commons.

“ This Calf ”

House have grown up out of its felt and acknowledged needs; they have for centuries been jealously guarded and enforced because found by experience to be the only efficient safeguards of the control and authority of the House. To trifle with them, to wrest from them their plain meaning, or to evade them for the mere sake of avoiding a momentary difficulty, is to enter upon a most dangerous course, calculated to destroy as well the dignity as the authority of Parliament. No present convenience of any Government, nor even any inconvenience, however great, in the collection of taxes can be put in the scale to weigh against the duty of the House and its Speaker to enforce strict observance of necessary Parliamentary rules. Beside this neither the life of a Government nor the levy of a tax is of any weight whatever. As Mrs Harris declared in her Petition recorded by Swift:

“ ’Tis not that I value the money three skips of a louse
But the thing I stand upon is the credit of the House.”

“ THIS CALF ”

YET even with rules disregarded and traditions set aside the ill-starred Finance Bill 1914 was not at the end of its troubles. It was found necessary on the 7th July to introduce—for the first time in the history of Budgets—a drastic closure by Time-Table Resolution, allowing but four days’ discussion in Committee (besides those already given on 1st and 2nd July), two days on Report and one day on the third reading. The only excuse given was that the Government had driven things so fine that no more time could be spared, inasmuch as the Bill must receive the Royal Assent not later than the 4th August, or else the Income-Tax and Tea-Duty Resolutions must lapse, when not only could no more tax or duty be collected but all money hitherto

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collected by virtue of the lapsed Resolutions must be "repaid or made good."

Then the Millionaire Worms turned again. They went home to dinner. They abstained. Some even voted against the scandalous motion; and it was found in the end that the normal Government majority of 94 had fallen to the despairing figure of 23! A Portent if ever there was one.

Meantime, the tinkerings to which the Finance Bill had been subjected had produced a series of muddles which may truly be called monumental. The joint effect now began to be realized of the Parliament Act of 1911 and of the Provisional Collection of Taxes or Bowles Evasion Act 1913. That Act is a shameful statute, avowedly devised for the sole purpose of evading the Law. As declared by the King's Courts, the Law is that no tax may be levied except by authority of an Act of Parliament. But this statute, in derogation of the Bill of Rights and of all the other fundamental laws of the Kingdom, gave "statutory effect" and a tax-levying power to a mere Resolution of the House of Commons alone, when as yet there was no Act of Parliament. Yet, despite the countenance given to this Act, when as yet but a Bill, by the Front Opposition Bench—then as so often in secret league and agreement with the Front Bench opposite—certain able and energetic private members procured the insertion in the Act of some very strict limitations on the levy by Resolution. Among others was this: that the Resolution "shall cease to have statutory effect" within four months "after the date on which the Resolution is expressed to take effect"—which in this case was for Income Tax on the 6th April and (for Tea) on 1st July. Unless therefore an Act were passed to replace and enact the Resolutions at the very latest by the 5th August, then the statutory effect and taxing power of the Income-Tax Resolutions vanishes, and when that happens "any" "money paid in pursuance of the Resolution" shall be "repaid or made good." The words, it will be noticed, include *any* money, and are as absolutely universal as they are

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absolutely mandatory—*any* money paid *shall* be repaid, and must be. On the other hand, the Finance Bill (assuming it to be a “ Money Bill ”) if sent to the Lords “ at least one month “ before the end of the session ” and if not passed by the Lords “ within one month,” might by the Parliament Act be presented to the King and become a one-house Act of Parliament, enacted by the King “ with the advice and “ consent of the Commons ” alone. But except with those two conditions both fulfilled it could not be so presented, much less enacted. To make it safe, therefore, and certain to have the unconstitutional advantage of the Parliament Act, it would have had to be sent up to the Lords at latest by the 4th July—which was soon seen to be impossible. Yet without that it could not be passed over the head of the Lords by the fatal 5th August. And if not then passed, the Income-Tax Resolutions cease to have effect, and all money levied under them must be repaid or made good.

In fact the Bill can only reach the Lords on this 24th July. The Lords, therefore, wholly escape, in this instance, all risk of being set aside by the Parliament Act. Their independence has become restored to them. They might reject the Finance Bill. They might amend it, and return it so amended to the Commons. It could not be passed over their heads without submitting to the delay between 5th August and 25th August—three weeks during which no Income-Tax could be levied, and during which all such tax or duty levied since 5th April and 30th June “ shall be re- “ paid.” It could not, in short, at such a price be passed over their heads at all. Despite all, then, the Parliament Act knot by which they were believed to be finally tied up, at least as regards a Money Bill, has proved at last to be but a slippery hitch which will not hold them. The Parliament Act has in short not at present abolished the Lords or even suspended them; nor has the Bowles Evasion Act evaded Bowles or invested Resolutions with any but a very defeasible authority. In the case even of this molten and graven Calf the Finance Bill, the last word still remains,

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despite its supposed setting aside out of the Constitution, with the House of Lords. Thus then "there came out this "Calf."

Such is the result of the crude and incapable attempts of revolutionaries to put the Constitution into a Statute, to set aside an element of the Sovereignty, and thus to ensure the predominance over all of their own Party and their own Caucus. The attempt is a failure. The weapon of the revolutionaries, forged by themselves, has broken in their hands.

Friday, 24th July, 1914.

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HOME RULE—SO FAR

IN the last three months the Irish Question has on the one side of the stream been whirled along in tumultuous eddies and on the other remained as it were stagnant and covered with scum. The sluggard backwater has been that of governmental prescience and statesmanship, the eager torrent that of events beyond the control of the politician.

When the May number of the *CANDID QUARTERLY REVIEW* went to Press the Government lay prostrate upon its back, vainly endeavouring to pretend that it had meant to assume that undignified posture. The "plot" to suppress or intimidate Ulster had failed ignominiously and completely and the Army had been found unwilling to mix itself in sordid politics. The rival "plot" to arm the Ulster volunteers by a great smuggling enterprise under the very nose of the Navy had succeeded as signally. The "Fanny," long awaited and long announced, steamed away unscathed after landing all the arms required, leaving behind her in the North of Ireland a sense of satisfaction at her success; in England a sense of admiration at the efficiency of those who directed her escapade with a reminder that Nelson's telescopic blindness might be recurrent in the Navy; and, in the South of Ireland, a sense of profound envy of those who had so utterly confounded the politics and frustrated the knavish tricks of the detested Saxon.

In describing the feelings of England we refer to the great majority of her people. Some few Liberal politicians,

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however, took another view, and smarting sorely at their own untimely reverse, felt that the second successful "plot" could be used as an *ex post facto* justification for the first and unsuccessful one. The group (prominent among whom was one whose name is rarely associated with a demand for bloodshed—Sir William Byles) cried out for revenge—the vindication of the Majesty of the Law and the instant and exemplary punishment of the guilty. The fact that such action would have led to civil war was either forgotten or neglected by these advocates of stern measures; and all the scorn poured out by them upon the Government for its "cowardice" must be read in the light of this fact. Yet so fierce was the outcry that the Prime Minister enunciated one of his most sonorous and coruscating platitudes. He stated in the Commons House that:

"In view of this grave and unprecedented outrage, the House may be assured that His Majesty's Government will take without delay appropriate steps to vindicate the authority of the law and to protect officers and servants of the King and His Majesty's subjects in the exercise of their duties and in the enjoyment of their legal rights."*

So far, however, nothing has been done. The "appropriate steps" have remained undisclosed and the unsatisfied longings of the smarting back benches of the Government's supporters have resulted merely in a number of safety-valve meetings in the country, intended to stiffen the backbone of the Government. Even these meetings have been sadly abandoned since the growth of the National Volunteers, and little is left to their supporters beyond melancholy inquiries in the House of Commons as to whether the Government is ever going to show any signs of its existence in Ireland.

Throughout the months that followed nothing occurred to give any cause for hope that a solution was at hand, and much happened to make it seem more remote. The third Home Rule Bill went on upon its mechanical and relent-

* Official Report, House of Commons, 27th April, 1914.

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less course. Its committee stage was again omitted. The suggestion stage was also dispensed with. The Third Reading in the Commons was passed by a majority of 77 votes—seven less than those of the Irish Nationalist parties in that house.

In considering the meaning of this fact it will be well to remember some of the utterances of Liberal leaders.

In 1885 Mr Gladstone, in tones of the utmost solemnity, said to his constituents at Midlothian:

“It will be a vital danger to the country and to the Empire, if at any time when a demand from Ireland for larger powers of self-government is to be dealt with, there is not in Parliament a party totally independent of the Irish vote.”*

In 1894 his successor, Lord Rosebery, announced the famous axiom that

“before Irish Home Rule is conceded by the Imperial Parliament, England, as the predominant member of the partnership of the three kingdoms, will have to be convinced of its justice and equity.”†

In 1901 the present Prime Minister reiterated Mr Gladstone’s warning in the following words:

“I have for some time held the opinion . . . that the Liberal Party ought not to assume the duties and the responsibilities of government unless it can rely upon an independent Liberal majority in the House of Commons.”‡

Thus far the Liberal Premiers.

In the same year Sir Edward Grey harped upon the same note; he said:

“If the Liberal Party was to be an effective party, either with British affairs or with Irish affairs, it must keep its

* Morley’s *Life of Gladstone*, Vol. III, pp. 237, 238.

† Official Report, House of Lords, 12th March, 1894, col. 32.

‡ Speech at Ladybank, *Dundee Advertiser*, 30th September, 1901.

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“independence. He would not willingly see any government
“in power which depended for its lease of power upon any
“section which had expressed ill-will to British interests.”*

In 1910 the present Chief Secretary for Ireland, in answer to a deputation in Bristol, said:

“Home Rule was one of those questions which, like
“others, must be left, and ought to be left, to the judgment
“of the people. If they thought they could smuggle a Home
“Rule Bill through the House of Commons for three mortal
“sessions one after the other, all he could say was that their
“ignorance was beyond all conception.”†

Meanwhile Ireland—the unfortunate victim of this fatuous experiment—again began to display activity. A movement, at first almost unobserved, to create a rival southern army as a counterpoise to the Ulster Volunteers spread rapidly and successfully, and all the politicians were, by the end of the brief Whitsuntide Holiday, confronted with the fact that some eighty thousand men of this new force were already said to be enrolled, while 15,000 a week were still enlisting. How far these men could be regarded as troops remains as yet unknown, but the official statistics of the drilled forces in Ireland have been given in answers to questions in the House of Commons as follows:

24,400 Regular Forces.

10,460 Royal Irish Constabulary.

132,000 National Volunteers.

85,000 Ulster Volunteers.‡

Together with this new force, which accepted (though somewhat unwillingly) the nominal domination of Mr Redmond and his political party, there grew up a new hardening process in the Liberal party. All attempts at settlement by consent as the result of conferences were now discarded and

* Speech at Bristol, *Bristol Mercury*, 12th December, 1901.

† *Western Daily Press*, 2nd December, 1910.

‡ The first two of these figures appear in the Official Report of the House of Commons Debates for the 16th June (col. 760, 761), those of the Volunteers in that for the 9th July, 1914 (col. 1203).

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the “communications” with Sir Edward Carson, subsequently pointed to in the House of Lords by Lord Crewe as evidence of a spirit of compromise, resolved themselves into the fact that, during the previous fortnight, the Prime Minister had asked Sir Edward to lend him a map of Ulster showing the distribution of Protestants and Catholics within the province.

The Government, placed as they were between the deep sea of civil war and the devil of Nationalist repudiation, now devised another new move in the Party game. They recognized and admitted that some form of exclusion for Ulster must be adopted. The recognition of their previous error was made by Lord Crewe, speaking with the full authority of the Government, to the House of Lords in the following weighty words:

“But, my Lords, this special and peculiar temper which exists in the North of Ireland, added, no doubt, to a temper of a different kind founded on the contempt which some business men in the North of Ireland entertain for the capacity and character of their fellow Irishmen in the south, seems to make it *imperative to propose some form of exclusion for part of Ireland*, for those most affected by those fears, from the operation of the Government of Ireland Bill.”*

Yet to introduce any amendment by way of suggestion into the Home Rule Bill would involve having themselves to devise an acceptable policy. The same danger appeared to be involved in the introduction of an amending bill in the House of Commons. The Government therefore introduced an amending Bill in the House of Lords in a form which they knew to be utterly unacceptable to that House. The scheme, then, was either to have this bill rejected at sight, which might throw some odium upon the House of Lords; or, at least, by making that House, in which the Unionists predominate, speak first, to draw from them an offer which the Government could subsequently consider. Thus, at

* Official Report, House of Lords, 23rd June, 1914, col. 381.

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any rate, time would be gained and "something might turn up."

The Amending Bill, when its text was made known, proved to be a most extraordinary document. It provided that where a tenth of the population of any Ulster county, or County Borough, should demand it a poll should be held and, if so decided by the electors, that county or town should be "excluded" and the Government of Ireland Act (*sic*) 1914 (which expression "means any Act passed in the "present session to amend the provision for the government of Ireland") should not apply thereto. All the judicial provisions of that "act"* were however still to apply, but to be slightly varied as applied to any excluded area. The most extraordinary part of this proposal was the complete absence of any detailed legislative provision for the results of the exclusion. It is clear that if the exclusion of the white squares in the upper third of the chess-board was ever really intended, the gravest difficulties must arise. The original of the Home Rule Bill contains such provisions as those creating an Irish right to alter the Customs duties. Either these provisions must be abolished if some counties are excluded, or elaborate inter-county frontier Customs offices must be created. This is only one of a myriad such difficulties; and, except as will be seen, the Amending Bill does nothing to meet them, nor without a careful consideration of the Home Rule Bill, line by line and clause by clause, could the difficulties to be encountered in the Amendment of it be found—much less corrected.

Perhaps the most astounding clause of this curious bill was the eighth. It concealed under the innocent looking side note, "Extension of power to make Irish Transfer Orders," the following provisions:

"The power of His Majesty to make Irish Transfer Orders
"shall be extended so as to include power to make such
"adaptations of enactments and such provision with

* Clause 5.

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“respect to the transfer and apportionment of property,
“rights and liabilities, and such other provisions as may
“appear to him necessary for the purpose of dealing with the
“government of the excluded area during the period of ex-
“clusion, and with the relations between the excluded
“area, the rest of Ireland and Great Britain during that
“period, and shall also include a power to make such pro-
“visions as may be necessary in order to bring the Govern-
“ment of Ireland Act, 1914, into operation in the excluded
“area on the termination of the period of exclusion.”

The reference in this section to Irish Transfer Orders is to section 46 of the Home Rule Bill which empowers the King by Orders in Council to make regulations restricted to those needed “for setting in motion the Irish Parliament and Government” and for bringing the Act into full operation and giving effect to its provisions. These restrictions are swept aside by the Amending Bill and the effect of this section thereof is apparently to give to the King (meaning the Minister) a power to make such “provisions as may appear to him necessary for the purpose of dealing with the government of the excluded area.” If such powers were indeed granted to the Crown there would be no precedent for so plain an invitation to tyranny since the famous statute which enabled Henry VIII to issue proclamations which should have the force of Law. The “Excluded Area” would be at the absolute mercy, legislative, administrative and judicial, of a ministry which might be dependent for its own existence upon the votes of Mr Redmond and his followers.

The area would thus be in the same position as if it had not been excluded. Clearly, for example, the easiest way of dealing with the difficulty produced by a raising by 10 per cent of the duty on sugar by the Irish Parliament, would be a “provision” equally raising the duty in the excluded area. Ulster would indeed be worse off than if not excluded. Instead of being merely in a permanent minority in an Irish legislature, she would have the comfortable knowledge that the “property, rights and liabilities” of her citizens might

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be arbitrarily dealt with by an autocratic English minister, possibly dependent upon the good will of the Irish Party and assuredly hampered by the knowledge that any failure to follow exactly in the footsteps of the Irish Parliament would necessitate the creation of intricate and expensive machinery of frontier organization. The excluded area would probably, therefore, in effect, be governed by an Irish Parliament in which it had not even a minority vote.

These and similar facts did not look as though the Amending Act were ever intended to come into force, and it would surely have been more candid if the Government had either introduced in the Commons House their own proposals for a settlement, or else had resigned, in constitutional manner, to the Opposition the task of putting forward proposals. What they did amounted to this: "We have," they said, "got Ireland into a mess. We have almost enacted a statute which, if passed, will lead to war in the North of Ireland; if not passed may lead to war in the South. We have no solution to offer. We dare not either enforce our proposed law, consult the country or resign. Therefore we ask the Opposition, from the Opposition benches, in the despised House of Lords, to invent and propound a solution."

The weight of the admission that exclusion of some kind had become "imperative" is incalculable. It meant that, unless some amending bill was enacted, the Home Rule Bill must remain unenacted. It could never be, either by virtue of the British Constitution, or by virtue of any rule of morality or common sense, the duty of any House of Parliament, or any minister of the Crown, to propose for the Sovereign's assent a measure which, admittedly, involves a civil war. Nor could it be the duty of the monarch to signify such assent if any minister were found so criminal as to advise it. Unless the two bills, original and amending, could be presented simultaneously they must both fall to the ground unenacted.

Many courses were open to the House of Lords. The

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course adopted by it redounds to its great honour. Casting aside all temptations to follow the paths of party spirit, it entered earnestly and seriously into a discussion of the Amending Bill with a view to one object and one object only—to avert the horrors of internecine strife. The King should be saved from the cruel dilemma of a choice between entering upon the course of an admitted and open rupture with one of the great parties in the State, and the even more destructive attempt to control with an army which would not fight in civil strife, two other and greater armies raised and maintained for the very purpose of so fighting. The Amending bill should in turn be amended in a way to provide such real and effective exclusion as should save England from the degradation of having wantonly added a final straw to the long history of Irish bloodshed.

Already, when the second reading of the Amending Bill was in progress things had come to a dangerous pass. The situation in the border lands between north and south in Ireland was not unlike that which ensued during the recent joint occupation of Salonica by the rival armed forces of the Greeks and Bulgars. The Commander in Chief of the Ulster forces, provoked by assaults upon persons suspected of belonging to his force, issued an order permitting his men to carry their arms and to resist any attempt to disarm or interfere with them. The biting of thumbs had begun. The problem was—now, after ten months of wicked and deadly delay—no longer how to better the government of Ireland, but how to avert instant and bloody war.

The second reading debate in the House of Lords was, as is so often the case, marked by the speeches of men of independence of thought—so sadly absent from the Lower House. The Government speakers reiterated the opinion that the original measure “could not be better” and—yet asked the House to better it by passing the Amending Bill. Some few members expressed their intention to divide against that Bill, and did so—to the number of ten. The great bulk of the House followed the course suggested by Lord

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Lansdowne, who advised that, while no countenance of any kind should be given to the Home Rule Bill, the Amending Bill should be read a second time and then amended by the House in such a way as to make it an effectual bill for the exclusion of Ulster from the Home Rule Bill. That the House would ever accept the original Bill he declared to be impossible, and he clearly expressed the view that the amending measure was not “a solution of the Irish difficulty, “but a makeshift emergency measure designed for the sole purpose of gaining breathing time and averting conflict,”* or as Lord Curzon expressed it, “a Peace Preservation “Bill.”†

The future of Ireland must be left for the future to decide. The wasted days of the last ten months and the tramp of armed feet have made it impossible to see a solution clearly until the muddied waters settle down. One step has, however, been taken towards that ultimate settlement. That is the expression by Lord Lansdowne of his agreement with Mr Balfour:

“that there is a great Irish problem to be solved, that it requires investigation and that it requires to be handled “with courage and with sympathy, and that we cannot fall “back upon a mere policy of negation.”

In its new form the Amending Bill left the House of Lords for the Commons on the 14th July, 1914.

Meanwhile, again, the delay of the Government in showing signs of any true spirit of effectual conciliation or compromise had produced unexpected events in Ireland.

On Friday, 10th July, under an armed guard, was held the first meeting of the Ulster Provisional Government. An official declaration was issued which reiterated the determination of that Government to resist “the authority of “any Home Rule Parliament on Ulster” and instructed their Executive to “act in the spirit of this declaration.”

* *The Times*, 2nd July, 1914.

† *Ibid*, 7th July, 1914.

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The effect of this declaration was said to be that the Ulster Executive was thereby empowered to act without further reference to the representatives. Meanwhile further successful and unsuccessful attempts at gun-running were reported both in the north and in the south of Ireland.

In the May number of the *CANDID QUARTERLY REVIEW*, in an article dated 1st May, 1914, will be found this passage:

“We may yet see the Minister sovereign in England and
“a priesthood sovereign in Ireland. We may yet see the
“resistance to such a sovereignty culminating in a civil war,
“extending not to Ireland only but to England. Neither is
“yet certain. Both are at present conceivable.

“Nevertheless, it is possible that a new, great, and so far
“unexpected event may change the whole situation. The
“resources of the Constitution are not yet finally exhausted.
“The House of Lords still exists. So does the King.”

Within the last few days the fact that the House of Lords still exists, and that, despite all, the last word both on Finance and on the Home Rule Bill does to-day still remain with that House, has had to be recognized. And the fact that the King does also still exist to play a Kingly part for the welfare of his people has been, by the act of the Minister, made unexpectedly apparent to all men.

The Amending Bill, in the form excluding Ulster entirely from the operation of Home Rule, was to have been discussed in the Commons House on the 20th July. On that morning a grave announcement was made by the Prime Minister in the following words:

“I am authorized by the King to announce to the House
“that in view of the grave situation which has arisen, he
“has thought it right to summon representatives of parties
“both British and Irish to a Conference at Buckingham
“Palace with the object of discussing outstanding issues in
“relation to the problem of Irish government.”*

The persons invited were Mr Asquith and Mr Lloyd George on behalf of the Government, Lord Lansdowne

* Official Report, House of Commons, 20th July, 1914.

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and Mr Bonar Law on behalf of the Opposition, Mr Redmond and Mr Dillon on behalf of the Irish Nationalists and Sir Edward Carson and Captain Craig on behalf of Ulster. The Speaker was to preside, the first meeting was to take place on the following day and consideration of the Amending Bill was adjourned for a week.

Contradictory rumours arose as to whether this action was the result of the initiative of the Sovereign or of the Prime Minister. This question is utterly irrelevant, improper and immaterial. The Prime Minister had assented to the Conference. Had he not done so, he must have accompanied his announcement by the further announcement of his own resignation. What is notable here is the want of candour with which the announcement was made. It was not accompanied, as it should certainly have been, by a statement that the action taken by the King was taken after consultation with, and with the concurrence of, himself and his colleagues. The House was therefore left to suppose that the King had thus acted without either such consultation or such concurrence. It cannot possibly be true that the King's intervention was as sudden and unexpected as the bald announcement made left it to appear. The King's intervention then announced was certainly no new thing. Undoubtedly His Majesty has been filled with grief and anxiety at the prospect which has been growing in all men's eyes during the last ten months, of Civil War in his Kingdom, and of the certainty of its being accompanied by the ruin of his own military forces. And when History comes to be fully written we have no doubt it will be found that not now for the first time, but many months ago, the King warned Mr Asquith of the necessity for coming promptly to a settlement by consent, as well as of the dangers that would be incurred should no such settlement be reached, and of the grave responsibility which might in that event lie upon the Monarch. There was then, we may safely conclude, no sudden intervention, but an intervention of which the Minister had long been warned; nor was there any interven-

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tion behind the back of the Minister, but only one of which he well knew, in which he concurred, and which—as he subsequently avowed—he had in fact advised.

In attributing the decision, in the words above quoted, to the King alone Mr Asquith acted in a manner not only unconstitutional but deficient alike in candour and courage; for, having agreed to it, he was and is principally, and before Parliament solely, responsible. The instant result of this incomplete and insufficient declaration was an insolent Resolution of the Labour Party directly attacking the King in the following terms:

“The members of the Labour party, having heard the
“Prime Minister’s statement that the King has considered
“it right to summon a conference of representatives of
“British and Irish parties to discuss outstanding points on
“the problem of Irish Government, and having been unable
“to express their opinions in the House of Commons itself,
“owing to the way in which the statement was made,
“though strongly wishing for a permanent settlement, *pro-*
“*test against such command having been issued regarding any*
“*matter of political controversy as being an undue interference*
“*on the part of the Crown*, and calculated to defeat the pur-
“poses of the Parliament Act.

“They further put on record their *surprise that two of the*
“*representatives are practically rebels under arms* against con-
“stituted authority, and *regret this indication that in future*
“*an organization of force is to be officially considered to be most*
“*effective in industrial as well as in political disputes.*”

If Mr Asquith did not intend this result to ensue he was guilty of the gravest lack of intelligent foresight; if he did so intend, it does not seem easy to characterize such action by a Minister of the Crown. The only charitable explanation of his conduct is that he intended to leave to the King the whole credit for the bold and statesmanlike attempt at a settlement by consent which the Ministry should have begun over ten months ago, immediately after the publication of Lord Loreburn’s letter had established by his unsuspected and impartial authority the imminent danger of Civil War in Ireland.

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That, however, is not the worst of it. The next day Mr Lloyd George excused his absence from the House of Commons by complaining in the following terms* of having to go to the Palace for the first meeting of the Conference of eight invited thereto by the King:

“ I much regret that owing to certain circumstances over
“ which I have no control, because a duty has been thrust
“ upon me that was certainly not of my own seeking, but
“ which I had no option but to accept, which entails giving
“ a good deal of time in attending to a matter that is not
“ strictly relevant to the duties of my office—I very much
“ regret that in the first hour it was impossible, consistent
“ with the proper discharge of that duty, for me to be
“ present here.”

In these terms Mr Lloyd George describes, and in effect openly complains of, an invitation by the Monarch to take part in a Conference summoned for the avoidance of Civil War. No higher honour than this could be conferred upon, no more solemn or urgent duty could be required of, nor any greater opportunity afforded to a statesman of public spirit. Yet he describes it as a duty “ thrust ” upon him, a duty “ not of his own seeking,” and proceeds to complain that it entails his giving time and attention to a matter not belonging to his office. Such an outbreak was more indecent than any hitherto indulged in, even by himself. It was disloyal in the highest sense of the word. It could only be read as a sly and insulting insinuation of blame to the King for a Royal intervention inspired by the deepest anxiety and regard for his people.

The King’s speech delivered to the Conference of eight was as follows:*

“ Gentlemen,
“ It is with feelings of satisfaction and hopefulness
“ that I receive you here to-day, and I thank you for the
“ manner in which you have responded to my summons.

* *The Times*, Wednesday, 22nd July, 1914.

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“It is also a matter of congratulation that the Speaker has consented to preside over your meetings.

“My intervention at this moment may be regarded as a new departure. But the exceptional circumstances under which you are brought together justify my action.

“For months we have watched with deep misgivings the course of events in Ireland. The trend has been surely and steadily towards an appeal to force, and to-day the cry of Civil War is on the lips of the most responsible and sober-minded of my people.

“We have in the past endeavoured to act as a civilizing example to the world, and to me it is unthinkable, as it must be to you, that we should be brought to the brink of fratricidal strife upon issues apparently so capable of adjustment as those you are now asked to consider, if handled in a spirit of generous compromise.

“My apprehension in contemplating such a dire calamity is intensified by my feelings of attachment to Ireland and of sympathy with her people, who have always welcomed me with warm-hearted affection.

“Gentlemen, you represent in one form or another the vast majority of my subjects at home. You also have a deep interest in my Dominions oversea, who are scarcely less concerned in a prompt and friendly settlement of this question.

“I regard you then in this matter as trustees for the honour and peace of all.

“Your responsibilities are indeed great. The time is short. You will, I know, employ it to the fullest advantage and be patient, earnest and conciliatory, in view of the magnitude of the interests at stake. I pray that God in His infinite wisdom may guide your deliberations so that they may result in the joy of peace and honourable settlement.”

This grave and weighty utterance was sent to Mr Asquith the day before it was delivered and concurred in by him. His Majesty “left it to the discretion of the Conference to determine whether or not the speech should be published, and the Conference unanimously decided in favour of publication.” It was not however until the following day that these facts were announced in the House of Commons by the Prime Minister who added, in answer to a further question, that

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“His Majesty the King throughout this matter has followed the strictest constitutional precedent. He has not taken any step from the beginning up to now except in consultation with, and on the advice of, his Ministers.”

Before this tardy announcement all the London Liberal newspapers had combined, upon the false and ignorant assumption of their Fleet Street jurists and Westminster gossipmongers, to make a baseless and impudent charge of political partisanship against the King.

That the King's speech should have had to be made is a most terrible reproach to the Ministry. For it is in effect but a restatement in Kingly language of the effects and perils established by Lord Loreburn's letter of over ten months ago, and it is only because the Ministry have during those ten months been content to stand by, to see passions rising and armed men springing out of the earth, without making any serious attempt to come to an agreement, that the speech itself was rendered necessary.

It was only when and after the Ministry had failed that the King made this his own attempt at peace. It was a noble attempt. It was a Kingly act. And whatever may be the attempts of the unscrupulous, it will redound to the everlasting glory of King George.

At the moment of writing these words the Conference of eight has finally broken up, and separated without arriving at any agreement. The whole situation, therefore, remains as dark and as dangerous as ever.

Two things are clear. Firstly, that the dangers of the situation have been greatly augmented by the policy of doing nothing adopted by the Government during the ten months which have elapsed since Lord Loreburn's famous letter to *The Times*; and secondly, that, even if the fatal outbreak of strife can be averted by exclusion, the only advantage of the new situation, created by the Home Rule Bill with exclusion, will be that thereunder the government of

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Ireland will be so much more unsatisfactory than it is to-day that there will be recognized a real need for a measure for the better government of Ireland.

Certain considerations arising from the fact that the Amending Bill has been introduced in the House of Lords have not received sufficient attention. If, as the indirect result of the Conference, or otherwise, this Bill should pass both Houses its future course and that of the Home Rule Bill is clear. Both Bills will become law; one in the ordinary way and the other either by virtue of the Parliament Act or by agreement of the Lords. If, however, no agreement is reached, then the Amending Bill, having come from the Lords, cannot be withdrawn in the Commons but must necessarily submit to a vote upon its second reading. The Government may then advise the House to vote against the Bill or they may vote for it and introduce amendments in Committee. If such amendments are carried and not agreed to by the Lords the House of Commons may either insist on them or not. The Commons debate upon this question of insistence or non-insistence on their amendments would be the final chance of passing the Amending Bill at all and so of obtaining for Ulster any form of exclusion. If the Government were either to accept the Bill from the Lords without amendment or, having amended it, to ask the House of Commons to refrain from insistence upon their amendments they must clearly provoke such a breach with the Nationalist party as must result in their defeat in the House of Commons. If on the other hand they elect either to reject the Bill on second reading or to insist on amendments unacceptable to the House of Lords, the Bill is lost and the Home Rule Bill remains naked, and heartily ashamed, to face first its rejection by the Lords and next its fate under the Parliament Act.

What that fate may be will, if there be any sense of humour left, fill the world with scorn and laughter.

By the second section of that supposed masterpiece the

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Parliament Act, if any Bill fulfils certain conditions (all of which the Home Rule Bill will then have fulfilled)

“ that Bill SHALL on its rejection for the third time by the
“ House of Lords, *unless the House of Commons direct to the*
“ *contrary*, be presented to His Majesty and become an Act
“ of Parliament on the Royal assent being signified thereto.”

Thus the only thing that can then prevent the presentation of the Bill to the King is that the House of Commons should “ direct to the contrary.”

In this situation the question will arise what advice Mr Asquith is to give. In the face of his introduction of the Amending Bill as an “imperative” amendment, in face above all of his responsibility for the King’s declaration that “ the trend has been surely and steadily towards an appeal to force,” that “ to-day the cry of Civil War is on the lips of the most responsible and sober-minded of my people,”* that we are “ on the brink of fratricidal strife,” and that this is “ unthinkable ”—in the face of this it seems impossible that Mr Asquith should advise an assent ensuring that “ dire calamity.”

It is inconceivable and impossible that he should give such advice. But the Bill, says the Parliament Act, “ *shall* “ be presented to His Majesty ” and must then either be assented to or rejected. Either then Mr Asquith must advise Civil War; or else the rejection of the Bill; or else the only remaining loophole must be taken—the House of Commons must be got to “ direct to the contrary.”

Suppose then a motion in that House for that “ direction.” It would be an amazing appeal to the House to destroy the very Ark of the Covenant which it has taken them three long years to build. Would the Nationalists or the Labour Party vote for it? What portion of the Liberals in general would vote for it? Would the Opposition vote for it? Whatever reply may be given to these questions the situation would be

* “ Among whom,” says Mr Asquith, “ I may perhaps include myself.”
Official Report, House of Commons, 23rd July, 1914.

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strange indeed—that, after three years' struggle for its own Bill, a Government should be driven to invite the finally deciding House to destroy it; and then perhaps by that House be themselves destroyed instead.

Suppose the House refuses to “direct to the contrary.” Then Mr Asquith must, by virtue of the “shall” in the Parliament Act, see the Bill presented to the King. His only course then would be to advise the King to refuse his assent to the Bill. What a situation!

Or suppose that in the *mêlée* over such a situation the Government got beaten and had to resign. That still leaves the word “shall” with all its mandatory force. Mr Bonar Law, if he then formed a Government, would be as much bound as Mr Asquith by that word. And he, then, must see the Bill automatically and fatally go to the King. He would, it may be said, of course advise the King to refuse assent. But how if he had led the opposition to, and had voted against, the motion that the House should “direct to the contrary?” In that case he would at once be for the presentation of the Bill and for its rejection. On the other hand, if he had voted for the “direction to the contrary,” and been outvoted and beaten, he would be at once against the presentation of the Bill and yet the instrument of its presentation.

All must see that the end is now at hand. In a few weeks it will be made evident that there is in England, besides the House of Commons, a House of Lords: that there is also a King—and that there is even a People.

Saturday, 25th July, 1914.

THE PEOPLE'S CHARGE TO THE KING

¶ Then the King sitting down
in King Edward's Chair, the
Archbishop . . . shall rever-
ently put it [the Crown]
upon the King's head . . .

¶ Then shall the choir sing:

BE strong and play the Man.

(The Form and Order of the Corona-
tion Service, 1911.)

BOB

MUCH of the joy, and some of the sorrow, of this world is woven into the web of life by our humbler fellow-pensioners on the bounty of the Almighty. In our pride we call them the inferior animals—perhaps because we do not understand them. To most of them we are complete strangers. The ways of the swallow in the air, the fish in the sea, the beetle on the earth, and the worm within it, are all unknown to us. Some of us are dimly aware that their short lives and incessant labours are given to keeping the balance of nature true, and this warm earth in perpetual youth, health and beauty. Their work, always well and faithfully done, is the upkeep of this planet, wherein they play a far greater part than any that we take to be our own. Yet we feel no gratitude to them, give them no thanks, are scarcely aware of them. Only a very little do we understand even of those of them that have offered themselves to our companionship and service; yet that little is enough to make us love them. Their complete self-abnegation, their generous devotion of themselves to our work, in which they daily rejoice and for which they are ready any day to die, their affection for us, their complete dependence upon us, cannot but touch the human heart. And the heart that is touched has its reward. The gallant horse, the faithful dog, bring much joy to those who are so happy as to win their friendship. Shall we not prize that friendship? May we not sorrow when we lose it? Alas! We must.

There was a shaggy, tawny, brown-eyed, bounding Irish terrier, whose exuberant vitality and boisterous spirits

Bob

filled the house. A few days since he was run over by a motor-car and instantly killed. Those who knew him cannot but grieve for him. He who knew him best cannot but grieve very sorely.

Here, indeed, was the friend that sticketh closer than a brother. His truly was the love passing the love of women. He had but one thought—it was for his master; but one desire—to be with him; but one end in life—to watch, guard and serve him. He knew every inflexion of his master's voice, felt and shared every mood of his mind. His sympathy never failed. In his master's joys and sorrows he had an equal share. One mood he answered with wild antics, the other with corresponding silence and dejection, and an occasional lick of the hand, just to show that he, too, felt, yet would not disturb, the sorrow. When lovers and friends stood aloof he remained loving and friendly as ever to the one being whose willing slave and companion he was. They two were together day and night. If, by chance, the master went abroad and they were separated, Bob sat at the door for days and weeks together, pining, listless, and refusing to be comforted till the happy day that re-united them; when alone either food or life seemed again worth having. On the steps of a club, or among the footmen in the street, he would wait for hours with his eyes fixed on the door through which the master had strangely disappeared; or sometimes, when his impatience got the better of him, would silently and craftily sneak in and upstairs into a forbidden drawing-room, or even into a forbidden House of Parliament; and, having there verified the presence of the only one, would crawl under a chair or bench till that one showed signs of going. In a taxi-cab he stood on his hind legs looking out of the off-side window, so that as the cab proceeded, meeting the stream of carriages going in the contrary direction, those in them who suddenly came upon his wild shaggy head and red tongue smiled at the strange object. And his master owed to him the cheering prospect of an unbroken stream of smiling faces, as though for once all the world were happy. In the

Bob

London streets he was well-known and well-liked. The police stopped the traffic for him; the local dustmen were his friends; the postmen knew him; the telegraph boys loved him; the cabmen called him by his name. If ever there was a popular favourite it was he. For although he loved but one, he was tolerant and civil, nay, even caressing, to the rest of the world.

The only thing he would not leave for his master was a fight. That was beyond him. He was a bonnie fighter. With the opposite sex—being a gentleman as well as a dog—he never had differences, nor with the small dogs of the ladies, which he held for no dogs at all, but only contemptible toys unworthy of his tooth. But any proper, real dog of his own size—or over—always found him ready. He never left a town till he had fought all the dogs in it that wanted to fight. One standing feud (of course, with another Irishman next door) was constantly renewed till the street ran with gore. Any strange dog he would stalk, crawling along flattened to the ground, and then walk defiantly round him in challenge to combat. No wounds or lameness could tame his pugnacity. It was only his master's rebukes and pullings away by the tail that prevented his life from being one glorious orgy of battle.

His unselfish love, his complete devotion, his perpetual youth and vitality brightened for many years a solitary life, and filled a lonely house with a gaiety which, without him, it would never have known. And now he is gone. His spirit is hushed, his brown eye quenched, his loving heart still. With his has gone no small part of his master's life. If there be a dog's heaven he is surely there. Yet even that he would leave, that and all else, at his master's voice.

Something of his loving spirit still seems to linger behind, somewhat of his faithful companionship still adheres to the scene of his life. He, too, is not wholly gone; for his memory remains.

Peace be upon him!

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